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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing body of increasingly restrictive environmental legislation 
surrounding the operation of business within Australia. In conjunction with this, 
there is heightened awareness and concern from stakeholders who want greater 
environmental accountability from Australian business. Banks work as a financial 
intermediary in the economy which is considered as an environmentally friendly 
sector. However, by extending loans to borrowing firms whose activities impact on 
the environment, banks’ lending businesses are indirectly related to the environment. 
Accordingly, banks are likely to be exposed to environmental risks in corporate 
lending due to borrowing firms’ environmental activities. As such, banks have an 
incentive to integrate environmental risks into their credit processes. The literature 
and banks’ practices regarding the integration of environmental risks into banks’ 
credit processes emphasise the evaluation of environmental risks; however, the 
subsequent control and monitoring of environmental risks is underdeveloped, 
especially in the context of Australia.  
This study examines environmental risk management in the corporate credit 
processes of major Australian banks. It particularly investigates the associations 
between environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank 
loans in the Australian context. The research problem is as follows: 
How are environmental risks associated with bank loan covenants and the 
cost of bank loans in Australian banks’ corporate lending? 
Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were undertaken with senior executive 
bankers in three of the four major Australian banks. These executives are responsible 
either for corporate lending decision-making or environmental risk management in 
corporate lending. Two interview checklists were designed for the interviews in a 
two-stage data collection process. The interviewees were allowed to elaborate on 
their answers wherever they thought it necessary and the interviews were recorded 
and transcribed. Given the small sample size, the researcher used critical judgement 
underpinned by accepted qualitative methods in the literature to manually analyse 
and extract themes and patterns to address the research problem. 
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The results of this study indicate that major Australian banks integrate environmental 
risk management into each stage of the corporate credit process. However, given that 
they are in the early stages of taking environmental risks into account and because 
only limited quantifiable environmental data are available, the integration is not 
sophisticated.  
To effectively control and monitor environmental risks, customised environmental 
covenants are included in bank loan agreements. These environmental covenants are 
non-financial and are established based on a comprehensive evaluation of 
environmental issues at industry, borrower and transaction level. Typical 
environmental covenants are based on environmental obligation compliance and 
periodic environmental reporting. The findings also suggest that the cost of bank 
loans will not reflect environmental risks unless these risks impact on the credit 
ratings of borrowing firms. Although environmental risks are not a specific input of 
major Australian banks’ credit rating models, they are a non-financial factor of 
expert judgement on the credit ratings of borrowing firms.  
As the first study investigating the associations between environmental risks and 1) 
bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans in the Australian context, this 
study validates the relevance of agency theory in dealing with environmental risks in 
the relationship between banks and their corporate customers. The findings also fill a 
gap in existing literature by indicating dimensions, determinants and attributes of 
environmental risks in major Australian banks’ corporate lending. In addition, the 
findings extend prior literature by identifying the form, contents, tightness, functions 
and establishment process of environmental covenants used in major Australian 
banks’ corporate lending. Further, this study adds to previous literature by 
documenting the conditions under which environmental risks impact on the cost of 
corporate bank loans. Last but not least, this study fills a gap in prior literature by 
articulating major Australian banks’ environmental sustainability transformation in 
terms of their environmental practices in corporate lending.  
This study provides a detailed evaluation of the stage that major Australian banks are 
up to in their journey towards environmental sustainability in corporate lending. It 
does this by confirming that environmental risk management is incorporated in each 
stage of the corporate credit process in major Australian banks and identifying the 
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corresponding activities in each stage. By indicating that environmental risks should 
be considered in banks’ corporate credit processes, this study has implications for 
their staff training activities. In addition, by investigating the impact of 
environmental risks on the cost of corporate bank loans, this study contributes to the 
enhancement of internal credit rating criteria in major Australian banks by including 
environmental factors. Furthermore, this study provides insights for the development 
of borrowing firms’ environmental management practices by indicating the 
importance major Australian banks place on borrowing firms’ environmental 
management in corporate lending. This study also provides a platform for Non-
Government Organisations to understand corporate lending decision-making by 
major Australian banks related to environmental issues.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The question is no longer whether commercial banks should address the sustainable 
development aspects of the activities they support, but how they should do it - what 
substantive standards should they apply? How should they implement them? And 
how should they assure compliance? 
                                                                  World Wildlife Fund & BankTrack (2006, p.2) 
 
 
This study systematically and comprehensively investigates major Australian banks’ 
practices in integrating environmental risks into the corporate credit process
1
. Of 
particular relevance, the associations between environmental risks and 1) bank loan 
covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans in major Australian banks
2
 are examined.  
1.1 Background and Motivations 
This section provides an overview of environmental issues in business and explains 
the necessity to gain insights into the integration of environmental risks into the 
corporate credit processes of banks in the Australian context.  
                                                 
1
 The corporate credit process is the process corporate customers go through to have their loan 
applications approved by banks. 
2
 This study aims to investigate the integration of environmental risks into the corporate credit process 
and particularly the associations between environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the 
cost of bank loans in corporate lending by Australian banks. The investigations are based only on 
major Australian banks as the majority of corporate bank loans in Australia are extended by these 
banks (Australian Trade Commission 2011a). When referring to banks of interest in this study, ‘major 
Australian banks’ and ‘banks’ are used interchangeably.  
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1.1.1 Environmental issues in business 
Environmental issues are a fundamental part of corporate sustainability 
considerations and have been the subject of wide ranging research (Connors & Sliva-
Gao 2008; Environmental Capital Markets Committee 2000; Feldman, Soyka & 
Ameer 1997; World Business Council for Sustainable Development 1999). It is 
widely accepted that environmental issues are likely to affect businesses’ cash flows, 
profitability, market competitiveness, strategic decision-making and viability 
(Hoffman 2000; Sarkis 2006; Thompson 1998b, 1998a). 
Businesses have been subject to ever-increasing pressures from both their 
stakeholders and legislative bodies regarding environmental issues (see Figure 1.1) 
(Coulson & Dixon 1995; Elijido-Ten 2007; Thompson 1998a; Watson et al. 2004). 
Stakeholders of businesses are increasingly environmentally aware and, as such, 
environmental issues have attracted unprecedented concern in the sustainability 
debate (Bansal & Howard 1997; Ernst & Young 2003; Magalhaes 2001). 
Stakeholders with heightened environmental awareness are more likely to show their 
unfavourable perceptions about businesses engaging in environmentally sensitive 
activities
3
 (Case 1999; World Business Council for Sustainable Development 1999). 
As a result, businesses are faced with ever-increasing reputational and financial risk 
deriving from their environmental related activities. Environmental pressures from 
stakeholders also contribute to tighter environmental legislation (Thompson 1998b).  
                                                 
3
 For the purpose of this study, environmentally sensitive industries/sectors or activities are those that: 
(1) have capacity to contaminate land, water, air or other natural resources; (2) require a licence or 
permit to use natural resources, without which they cannot operate; (3) require a licence for emissions 
and discharges, without which they cannot operate; (4) may incur penalties for environmental reasons; 
(5) may need to remediate contaminated land or install equipment to treat waste (National Australia 
Bank 2011). 
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Source: Adopted from Hoffman (2000, p.17) 
Figure 1.1  Sources of Pressure for Corporate Environmental Action 
 
There has been an increase in both the depth and breadth of environmental legislation 
prompted by legislative bodies in an attempt to mitigate negative environmental 
impacts and improve the environmental sustainability of businesses (Case 1999; 
Jenkins et al. 2002; Thompson 1998b). Environmental legislation impacts on 
businesses through both operating costs and environmental liabilities (Case 1999). 
The ever-tighter environmental legislation has resulted in increasing compliance 
costs for operations (e.g., businesses might need to purchase new equipment for their 
production lines to meet their environmental obligations) (Case 1999). In addition, 
under tighter environmental legislation businesses are more likely to incur 
environmental liabilities such as those for remediation of contamination
4
, legal 
penalties and/or compensation for third parties than they otherwise would (Case 1999; 
Godfrey 2005). The growing incidence of environmental disasters (e.g., unusual and 
                                                 
4
 For the purpose of this study, contamination refers to environmental contamination.  
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destructive weather patterns) in recent years further evokes public scrutiny into 
environmental issues, since businesses’ unsustainable activities have been blamed for 
these disasters. Therefore, environmental issues are of high-priority for sustainability 
and long-term viability of businesses (Charter & Polonsky 1999; World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development 1999).  
1.1.2 Environmental issues and banks—environmental risks 
Banks, as one of the financial intermediaries in the economy, generally believe that 
they have negligible environmental impacts compared to businesses in 
environmentally sensitive industries (Jeucken & Bouma 2001; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001; Sarokin & Schulkin 1991). However, by extending 
loans to borrowing firms that are involved in environmental activities, banks are 
likely to be exposed to environmental risks (Case 1999; Thompson 1998b, 1998a; 
Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). For the purpose of this study, environmental risks 
are interpreted consistently with Case (1999). Case takes a broader point of view, 
which includes a three-dimensional construct of environmental risks. The three 
dimensions are direct risk (also referred to as lender liability), indirect risk (also 
referred to as credit risk) and reputational risk. 
There is a view indicated in existing literature that banks have fallen behind in 
integrating environmental risks into their lending businesses in the last two decades
5
 
(Jeucken 2001; Jeucken & Bouma 2001; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001; Thompson 
1998a). Banks tended to ignore environmental risks in their lending businesses until 
the advent of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
                                                 
5
 For the purpose of this study, banks’ lending businesses only include corporate lending and lending 
to small and medium enterprises. Personal lending and project financing are not included.  
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Liability Act 1980 (CERCLA, also known as Superfund liability) in the United States 
(Ganzi et al. 1998; Jeucken & Bouma 2001; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). Under 
CERCLA, there have been cases
6
 where lenders suffered enormous environmental 
liabilities from environmental damage caused by their insolvent borrowers
7
. 
Environmental risks in lending businesses, which manifest as environmental 
liabilities for lenders (lender liability), started to attract the attention of banks in the 
global market in the 1990s (Case 1999; Coulson & Dixon 1995; Ganzi & Huppman 
2006; Ganzi et al. 1998; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001; Ward 1996).  
Furthermore, there is heightened environmental concern from stakeholders and a 
growing body of increasingly restrictive environmental legislation. Accordingly, 
banks have acknowledged that borrowing firms’ environmental impacts can have 
both financial and reputational consequences for banks (Jeucken & Bouma 2001; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001; Sarokin & Schulkin 1991; Thompson 1998a). 
Therefore, banks are likely to face environmental risks in their lending businesses 
which can manifest themselves in direct risk (lender liability), indirect risk (credit 
risk) and reputational risk (Case 1999; Thompson 1998b, 1998a; Weber, Fenchel & 
Scholz 2008). To succeed, banks need to ensure that their lending decisions finely 
accord with their overall risk exposure, including environmental risks (Coulson & 
Monks 1999; Glantz 2003). Consequently, banks are incentivised to incorporate 
environmental risks into their lending businesses (Coulson & Monks 1999; 
Thompson 1998b; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008).  
                                                 
6
 For example, the cases of Maryland Bank & Trust Company and Fleet Factors Corporation in the 
USA. 
7
 Environmental liability refers to the costs related to real property that are environmentally 
contaminated, such as clean-up costs and remediation costs. Environmental liability is directly 
imposed on borrowing firms. When the borrowing firms are insolvent, there is a possibility that 
environmental liability will be borne by banks, which is known as lender liability, resulting from 
environmental aspects of borrowing firms (Case 1999).  
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Despite the widely-accepted awareness of the integration of environmental risks in 
banks’ lending businesses, there remains vagueness of banks’ environmental 
responsibilities, and limited research has been conducted into how banks integrate 
environmental risks into their credit processes. The limited work that has been done 
is mainly based in the USA, UK, and Europe due to the more advanced debate on the 
significance of environmental risks to banks and more available environmental 
information (Ernst & Young 2003; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). The globalisation 
of trade and financial markets develops rapidly and thus lending businesses are not 
confined by national borders (Jeucken 2001; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). As 
such, there is a growing global consensus that promoting environmental 
sustainability in banks’ lending businesses is an international trend, which requires 
banks’ collaboration at an international level (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). This 
international collaboration requires an understanding of the integration of 
environmental risks into banks’ lending businesses across different countries. 
Consequently, it is imperative that research be undertaken in countries other than the 
USA, UK and Europe. 
1.1.3 Environmental risks and Australian banks  
The Australia’s economy is one of the strongest and most resilient in the world, 
which is manifested by approximately two consecutive decades of solid growth 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2011). The performance of the Australian 
economy throughout the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) further solidifies the position 
of the Australian economy as one of the most resilient economies in the global 
market (Australian Trade Commission 2011b). In Australia’s economy, the finance 
service sector is one of the fastest growing sectors and serves as a major and growing 
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driver for the strength of Australia’s economy8  (Australian Bankers' Association 
2004; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2011). In the Australian finance 
service sector, banks are the main provider of finance services
9
. Their assets account 
for around 50% of the total assets of the Australian finance service sector (see Table 
1.1). Therefore, the healthy and safe operation of banks’ lending businesses has a 
critical role to play in Australia’s resilient economy and contributes to the health and 
resilience of global markets (Australian Trade Commission 2011b).  
Table 1.1 Assets of Banks and Their Weights in Total Assets of all Financial 
Institutions in Australia 
 
 
Banks’ assets (other 
than Reserve Bank) 
(AU$billion) 
Total assets of all 
financial institutions 
(AU$billion) 
Share of banks’ total 
assets of all financial 
institutions (%) 
December 2005 1451.1 3054.8 47.5 
December 2006 1720.4 3636.9 47.3 
December 2007 2161.3 4344.0 49.8 
December 2008 2672.6 4705.3 56.8 
December 2009 2582.0 4568.0 56.5 
December 2010 2663.4 4675.0 57.0 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin B1: Assets of Financial Institutions 2005-2010 
 
Environmental risks facing banks are likely to threaten the health and safety of banks’ 
lending businesses and the critical role Australian banks can play in global markets 
(Australian Trade Commission 2011b; Ernst & Young 2003; Thompson 1998b). To 
this end, it is imperative to conduct a study investigating the integration of 
environmental risks into banks’ lending businesses in the Australian context. In 
                                                 
8
 The finance service sector includes commercial banks, investment banks, venture capitalists, asset 
managers, multilateral development banks and rating agencies. It is used interchangeably with 
financial institutions in this study.  
9
 ‘Banks’ refers to Australian domestic banks and does not include the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
building societies and credit unions.  
8 
 
addition, Ernst & Young (2003) indicate that despite the soundness of Australian 
environmental legislation, there is some doubt about the extent to which 
environmental legislation is enforced in Australia; and environmental disclosure 
regulations are less developed when compared to those in the USA, UK and Europe. 
These issues further contribute to the importance of investigating environmental 
practices that Australian banks are undertaking to integrate environmental risks into 
their lending businesses.  
1.1.4 Australian banks’ commitments and practices to integrate 
environmental risks into their lending businesses 
Contemporaneously with banks’ awareness of environmental risks in their lending 
businesses, it is widely accepted among environmental agencies, non-government 
organisations (NGOs), market participants and academics that lending decisions by 
banks have significant implications for promoting the environmental sustainability of 
businesses (Case 1999; Environment and Finance Research Enterprise 1995; Jeucken 
2001; McKenzie & Wolfe 2004). The explanation for this is that through banks’ 
decision-making regarding whether to lend to a borrowing firm, as well as the terms 
and cost structures under which a loan is extended to the firm, banks are able to 
shape public perception about what technologies and development activities they are 
supporting and advancing (Case 1999; Environment and Finance Research Enterprise 
1995; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001).  
The growing worldwide awareness among environmental agencies, NGOs, market 
participants and academics is exemplified by the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) Statement by financial institutions and the Equator Principles 
(Ganzi & Huppman 2006; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). The UNEP Statement by 
9 
 
financial institutions demonstrates that identifying and quantifying environmental 
risks should be considered as ‘business as usual’ for risk management in all 
operations (United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 1997). In 
Australia, the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ), the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), the National Australia Bank Limited 
(NAB) and Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) are signatories to the UNEP 
Statement for financial institutions. The Equator Principles provide financial 
institutions with a benchmark for identifying, assessing and managing environmental 
risks (The Equator Principles Association 2011). The Equator Principles, designed 
for project financing, are also expected to be further integrated into the signatory 
banks’ corporate lending practices. Indeed, this has been suggested by BankTrack 
(2005a). There are currently three major Australian banks adopting the Equator 
Principles: ANZ, NAB and Westpac. However, both the UNEP Statement for 
financial institutions and the Equator Principles are voluntary-commitment based and 
have no mechanism to ensure their implementation (BankTrack 2003; van Gelder, 
Herder & Kouwenhoven 2010).  
Furthermore, there is a recognised trend worldwide that banks, to some extent, 
perform environmental risk management (ERM) in their credit processes as part of 
credit risk management (Greene 2006; Magalhaes 2001; Murray, Kelly & Ganzi 
1997; Strandberg 2005). ERM in banks’ lending businesses aims to minimize 
foreseeable environmental risks and mitigate unforeseeable environmental risks to 
acceptable limits (Magalhaes 2001; Murray, Kelly & Ganzi 1997; Strandberg 2005). 
Weber, Fenchel and Scholz (2008) indicate that there is a lack of environmental risk 
control and monitoring for most of the banks and the problem lies in the absence of 
standardised environmental information and mechanisms to control and monitor 
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environmental risks. However, apart from the research of Weber, Fenchel and Scholz 
(2008) based on European banks, there is no other literature providing evidence 
regarding banks’ ERM practices to date.  
As a result, despite banks’ commitments and current practices for integrating 
environmental risks into their lending businesses, how and to what extent Australian 
banks translate their environmental commitments into environmental practices 
remains a mystery (Ernst & Young 2003; O' Sullivan & O' Dwyer 2009; Thompson 
& Cowton 2004).  Inspired by this scarcity of knowledge, there is a view that further 
research is needed to expand the depth of knowledge on the approaches banks use to 
integrate environmental risks into their credit processes (Ernst & Young 2003; 
Thompson 1998b; Thompson & Cowton 2004).  
1.1.5 Associations between environmental risks and bank loan covenants, 
and the cost of bank loans 
Incorporating environmental covenants into bank loan agreements can be one of the 
mechanisms used to factor environmental risks into banks’ corporate credit processes 
(Case 1999). Environmental covenants are one of the components of bank loan 
agreements and contain promises by borrowing firms to take or avoid certain 
environmental-related activities (Asian Development Bank 1993; Bekhechi 1999; 
Case 1999). There is evidence that environmental covenants are the most frequently 
used mechanism for controlling and monitoring environmental risks that banks are 
exposed to in their lending businesses (Environment and Finance Research 
Enterprise 1995; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000). However, the work of Case (1999) 
is the most recent academic research in relation to environmental covenants in bank 
loan agreements. No research has been done to gauge the impacts of changes to the 
11 
 
regulatory, economic and institutional circumstances on environmental covenants 
during the last decade. Furthermore, with the exception of the research conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), there is no available literature regarding how 
environmental risks incurred by banks in their lending businesses are associated with 
bank loan covenants in the Australian context. Most importantly, to the knowledge of 
this researcher, no research has investigated the form, contents, level (tightness), 
functions or establishment process of environmental covenants.  
Apart from environmental covenants in bank loan agreements, the cost of bank loans 
can also be used for managing environmental risks by incorporating an 
environmental risk premium and thus differentiating businesses that expose banks to 
different environmental risks (Barannik 2001). In contrast to this point of view, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) indicate that no Australian bank seems to customise 
the cost of bank loans in terms of environmental risks in their lending businesses. 
However, there is concern about the soundness of the results presented by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in that the report is primarily desktop review-based with 
only limited consultation with representatives from Australian banks 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). As a result, whether and how environmental risks 
facing banks are associated with the cost of bank loans in their lending businesses 
remains unknown.  
Therefore, to fill the knowledge gaps identified in section 1.1, this study investigates 
major Australian banks’ integration of environmental risks into their corporate credit 
processes. Of particular relevance, this study examines how environmental risks 
facing banks in their corporate lending are associated with bank loan covenants and 
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the cost of bank loans in the Australian context. The source of data for this study is 
face-to-face interviews with senior executive bankers.  
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem and Research Purpose 
As discussed above, despite significant interest in banks’ environmental practices for 
integrating environmental risks into their lending businesses, there is still a lack of 
research investigating banks’ practices for factoring environmental risks into their 
credit processes. Even less research has been conducted in this area in relation to 
Australian banks. To the knowledge of this researcher, no research has been 
published examining the associations between environmental risks in banks’ 
corporate lending and 1) bank loan covenants, or 2) the cost of bank loans in the 
Australian context. With the view to filling the gaps in previous literature, the 
purpose of this study is to address the research problem:  
How are environmental risks associated with bank loan covenants and the 
cost of bank loans in Australian banks’ corporate lending? 
Two research questions (RQ) are developed in order to address this research problem. 
 RQ1: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated with 
bank loan covenants? 
RQ2: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated with the 
cost of bank loans? 
Before embarking on the exploration on the research questions, several issues need to 
be clarified, since they form the background information required to address the 
research questions. These issues include practical knowledge of banks’ corporate 
lending and bankers’ interpretations about their corporate lending experiences. 
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Therefore, they are investigated in the context of providing background information 
rather than being covered in the research questions.  The issues are: 
 Definition, dimensions and attributes of environmental risks from banks’ 
perspective, and the determinants of banks’ environmental risk exposure;  
 Banks’ corporate credit processes and ERM in banks’ corporate lending (see 
Figure 1.2); and 
 Definition, form, contents, functions and establishment process of loan 
covenants. 
Associations between environmental 
risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) 
the cost of bank loans
The corporate credit process of banks
Banks’ ERM
 
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 1.2  Linkages between the Corporate Credit Processes of Banks, Banks’ 
ERM and the Research Questions
10
  
 
The literature related to the research questions and the above issues is reviewed 
extensively in Chapter 2. To consolidate the literature related to the research 
                                                 
10
 The establishments of loan covenants and the cost of bank loans are included in corporate credit 
processes of banks. In addition, as environmental risks impact on banks through lender liability, credit 
risk and reputational risk, ERM is expected to be undertaken during the corporate credit process. 
Therefore, this study assumes that the associations between environmental risks and 1) bank loan 
covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans are inherent in banks’ ERM and corporate credit processes. 
Aiming to elicit the most informative information and allow bankers to lead interviews, the 
exploration of the research problem started with an investigation of banks’ corporate credit processes. 
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questions, the theoretical linkages between environmental risks and 1) bank loan 
covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans are outlined in the following section (section 
1.3). In addition, section 1.3 introduces the research methodology used to answer the 
research questions and address the research problem.  
1.3 Theoretical Perspective and Research Methodology 
In this study, agency theory is used to explain the associations between 
environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans. There 
is a conflict of interest in the relationship between banks (one of the creditors) and 
borrowing firms, leading to the agency cost of debt (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith 
& Warner 1979). To this end, agency theory suggests the presence of covenants in 
debt agreements to reduce the agency cost of debt and implies an impact of the 
residual agency cost of debt on the cost of bank loans.  
There is likely to be a conflict of interest related to environmental aspects between 
banks and borrowing firms when their interests in a given environmental issue are 
not aligned (Sloep & Blowers 1996). The conflict of interest exposes banks to 
environmental risks and contributes to the agency cost of debt. Therefore, it is 
expected that environmental covenants are included in bank loan agreements to align 
the conflict of interest related to environmental aspects and thus manage 
environmental risks. Due to the costs of including environmental covenants, the 
conflict of interest in terms of environmental aspects is not possible to be eliminated 
and thus there is residual agency cost of debt related to environmental aspects. The 
residual agency cost of debt is expected to be reflected in the cost of bank loans.  
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However, there is limited literature regarding how environmental risks facing banks 
in their corporate lending are associated with covenants and the cost of bank loans. In 
addition, to the knowledge of the researcher, no relevant research in the Australian 
context has been published. Therefore, to examine these theoretical linkages, an in-
depth understanding of bankers’ experiences and perceptions about the impact of 
environmental risks on covenants and the cost of bank loans in Australian banks’ 
corporate lending is required.  
The phenomenological paradigm is the most appropriate for this study, since it 
focuses on capturing the holistic process of how bankers’ experiences and 
perceptions on the integration of environmental risks into the corporate credit process 
are perceived and given meaning (Denzin & Lincoln 2011; Patton 2002). Consistent 
with Patton (2002), this study advocates paradigm-directed methodological 
appropriateness rather than a paradigm-dictated methodology. Although a 
quantitative methodology or a mixed methodology could have been employed, a 
qualitative methodology is considered the most appropriate approach given the 
research purpose, the research problem and the available sources of data.  
This study aims to gain a comprehensive understanding of the associations between 
environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans 
through investigating bankers’ relevant perceptions and experiences. First, bankers’ 
relevant perceptions and experiences are subjective, complex and context-based, and 
thus they are not able to be predicted and numerically measured as required by a 
quantitative approach. Second, environmental information regarding the associations 
in Australia is scarce and subjective. In the first instance, this constrains the 
statistical analysis of numerical data required by a quantitative approach. In addition, 
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in-depth investigations and informed interpretations of Australian banks’ integration 
of environmental risks into their corporate credit processes is required to address the 
research problem. However, this is not able to be achieved by a quantitative approach 
that rules out emerging insights and interactions between the researcher and the 
bankers. Third, neither databases nor interviews with bankers can provide the 
quantifiable environmental information required to address the research problem.  
Therefore, a quantitative approach is not included in the methodology adopted by 
this study.  
A qualitative methodology emphasises investigating the complexity of the 
phenomena in their natural settings, capturing relevant emerging insights and thus 
offering an effective way to generate information that is in-depth, detailed, context 
based and nuance-considered (Patton 2002). Consequently, a qualitative 
methodology is the most appropriate approach to facilitating a comprehensive and in-
depth understanding of environmental risks in corporate lending and their 
associations with bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans.  
There are two phases of data collection in this study, which are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4. The data for both phases are collected through semi-structured interviews 
with senior executive bankers from major Australian banks. These bankers are 
responsible for either corporate lending decision-making or the management of 
environmental risks in corporate lending. Snowball sampling, one of the strategies of 
purposive sampling, is adopted due to the difficulty in determining the exact 
positions and personnel having responsibility for environmental risks in corporate 
lending. Eight bankers from three of four major Australian banks are interviewed. To 
facilitate the interviews, two interview checklists are designed for the two phases of 
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interviewing. The second checklist is based on the first one and revised according to 
the results of the Phase one interviews and a banker’s review.   
There is no clear demarcation between data collection and data analysis in qualitative 
research, and interview data analysis and collection are intertwined in this study 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002; Patton 2002). In addition, given the small 
population and sample size, the qualitative data analysis is manually conducted by 
the researcher which is underpinned by accepted qualitative methods in the literature 
(see section 4.4, Chapter 4). Five phases of data analysis (see Figure 4.3) are 
conducted to produce specific and thick descriptions
11
 in a comprehensive and 
systematic way. 
1.4 Definitions for Key Terms 
The key terms involved in this study and their definitions are outlined in Table 1.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 ‘Thick’ refers to rich, in-depth and context-based.  
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Table 1.2 Definitions for Key Terms 
 
Terminology Definition Sources 
 
From 
banks’ 
perspective 
Environmental 
risks 
Environmental risks arise from the 
probabilities of environmental risk 
events occurring caused by borrowing 
firms’ environmental-related 
activities. Environmental risks have 
three dimensions: direct risk (lender 
liability), indirect risk (credit risk) and 
reputational risk.  
(Case 1999; 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development 2011; 
McKenzie & Wolfe 
2004; Thompson 
1998a) 
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
risk management 
 
 
 
ERM is the process of systematically 
identifying environmental risks, 
analysing the significance of the 
consequences if environmental risk 
events occur, the likelihood of their 
occurring, and borrowers’ financial 
resources to deal with the potential 
environmental consequences, 
managing the resulting level of 
environmental risks to acceptable 
limits, as well as monitoring 
environmental risks on an on-going 
basis. 
(Barannik 2001; 
Magalhaes 2001; 
Stoklosa 2001) 
Environmental 
sustainability 
 
Environmental sustainability in 
banks’ lending businesses is largely 
manifested by banks’ ambition to be 
environmentally sustainable in every 
facet. It is a dynamic concept, which 
continues to evolve with the 
development of the economy and 
technologies.  
(Gerster 2011; 
Jeucken 2001) 
From both 
banks’ and 
borrowing 
firms’ 
perspectives 
Environmental 
covenants 
An environmental covenant in a bank 
loan agreement is the expression of a 
borrowing firm’s promise to take or to 
avoid certain environmental-related 
actions and it is established, to a 
certain degree, against the borrowing 
firm’s specific environmental issues. 
(Asian 
Development Bank 
1993; Bekhechi 
1999; Case 1999) 
From 
borrowing 
firms’ 
perspective 
Environmental 
management 
Environmental management 
encompasses all efforts of a 
borrowing firm to minimize the 
negative environmental impacts 
resulting from its operations and 
products. 
(Klassen & 
McLaughlin 1996) 
Environmental 
performance 
Environmental performance is the 
result of a borrowing firm’s 
environmental management. 
(Case 1999; 
Praxiom Research 
Group 2005) 
Source: Developed for this study 
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1.5 Contributions 
As mentioned in section 1.1.2, the limited research in relation to the integration of 
environmental risks into banks’ credit processes is mainly based in the USA, UK, 
and Europe. This can be explained by the more advanced debate on the significance 
of environmental risks to banks and the availability of a wide range of environmental 
information in the USA, UK and Europe (Ernst & Young 2003; Schneider 2008; 
Sharfman & Fernando 2008). However, there are different macroeconomic, 
institutional and regulatory contexts that Australian banks operate in compared to 
those in the USA, UK and Europe. In the first instance, the Australian financial 
market is smaller than that in the USA, UK and Europe (Battellino 1999; 
Commonwealth of Australia 2002; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001; Valentine, Ford & 
Copp 2003). In addition, compared to businesses in the USA, UK and Europe, 
Australian firms use bank loans as the main source of debt financing rather than 
public debt (Cotter 1998b; Securities Markets Section 2005; Valentine, Ford & Copp 
2003). Furthermore, there is some doubt about the level of enforcement of 
environmental laws in Australia and the environmental disclosure regulations are less 
developed when compared to the USA, UK and Europe (Ernst & Young 2003; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001).  
In light of these, as the first study investigating the integration of environmental risks 
into banks’ corporate credit processes in the Australian context, this study 
contributes to theory in several ways. First, environmental risks from a bank’s 
perspective have been examined in previous literature, leading to a three dimensional 
construct for environmental risks (Case 1999; Thompson 1998b, 1998a; Weber, 
Fenchel & Scholz 2008). The three dimensions are direct risk (lender liability), 
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indirect risk (credit risk) and reputational risk (Case 1999; Thompson 1998b, 1998a; 
Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). However, limited research has been undertaken into 
the determinants of environmental risks facing banks and the attributes that 
differentiate these risks from traditional risks in banks’ lending businesses. Most 
importantly, there is no existing literature on the determinants and attributes of 
environmental risks in the Australian context. This study attempts to identify the 
definition, dimensions, determinants and attributes of environmental risks facing 
Australian banks in their corporate lending.  
Second, some researchers argue that environmental risks facing banks are an 
essential consideration of their credit processes and environmental risks impact on 
each stage of the credit process (Thompson 1998a; Thompson & Cowton 2004; 
Ward 1996; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). However, little attention has been paid 
to whether and how environmental risks facing banks are considered in each stage of 
the corporate credit process. To the knowledge of this researcher, this study is the 
first investigation into whether and how environmental risks are integrated into each 
stage of Australian banks’ corporate credit processes.  
Third, the presence of environmental covenants in bank loan agreements for 
corporate lending has been justified by a number of authors (Case 1999; 
Environment and Finance Research Enterprise 1995; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000). 
The research from Case (1999) provides a specimen of environmental covenants that 
are mostly used in corporate loan agreements. However, the work by Case is 
conducted in the last decade and thus the circumstances that it based on are likely to 
change. In addition, the characteristics of environmental covenants including their 
form, contents, functions and level (tightness) in bank loan agreements for corporate 
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lending are rarely investigated due to the confidentiality of bank loan agreements. In 
Australia, this study is the first to explore the characteristics of environmental 
covenants by conducting extensive interviews with senior executive bankers in major 
Australian banks. 
Fourth, previous literature suggests that environmental risks facing banks should be 
factored into the cost of bank loans for the sake of banks’ effective risk management 
(Coulson & Monks 1999; Glantz 2003). However, Case (1999) indicates that the 
absence of standardised environmental information and concerns about market 
competitiveness lead to the rare practical case adjusting the cost of bank loans in 
terms of environmental risks. Particularly, knowledge regarding whether and how 
environmental risks facing Australian banks in their lending businesses are 
associated with the cost of bank loans is limited. This study bridges this gap by 
investigating the association between environmental risks and the cost of bank loans 
in major Australian banks’ corporate lending.  
Finally, agency theory provides a rationale for the inclusion of covenants in debt 
agreements and implications for the adjustment of the cost of debt based on residual 
risks (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith & Warner 1979). This study demonstrates 
how agency theory has the potential to be applied to the investigation of 
environmental covenants in bank loan agreements and the association between 
environmental risks and the cost of bank loans. The results validate the relevance of 
at least some aspects of agency theory in this context. The following section sets out 
the research scope, which underlines the focus of this study.  
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1.6 Delimitations of the Research Scope 
There are three predominant delimitations of the research scope. First, banks’ lending 
businesses involve a broad range of activities (lending to small and medium 
enterprises, and corporate lending) and this study focuses solely on corporate lending. 
One of the most notable ways that banks affect and are affected by the natural 
environment is through their corporate lending (Thompson 1998a). Compared with 
corporate lending which involves considerable amounts of capital, lending to small 
and medium enterprises has a relatively small impact on the environment and is less 
affected by it.  
In addition, although project financing is likely to have a significant impact on the 
environment, the Equator Principles provide a systematic global benchmark for 
banks to manage environmental risks in their project financing. Therefore, this study 
is conducted only within Australian banks’ corporate lending. Syndicated loans are 
also beyond the scope of this study
12
. There are agency problems between the 
arrangers and other syndicated participating lenders in that lenders involved in one 
syndicated loan are usually not informed symmetrically (Mora 2010; Sufi 2007). As 
such, the agency relationships existing in syndicated loans are multi-level and much 
more complex than corporate loans provided by an individual bank. The agency 
problem in the bank-borrower relationship is expected be confounded by that in the 
arranger-participant relationship.   
Second, this study focuses on banks’ environmental practices rather than their 
environmental policies or commitments to environmental initiatives. The reason for 
                                                 
12
 Syndicated loans are provided by at least two lenders and are structured, negotiated and monitored 
by one or more dominant lenders known as arrangers. 
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this is that banks’ environmental practices are not necessarily reflective of their 
environmental policies and commitments (Case 1999; Corporate Responsibility 
Coalition 2005; Rhee & Lee 2003; van Gelder, Herder & Kouwenhoven 2010). 
Analysing environmental disclosures by borrowing firms and banks is also beyond 
the scope of this study. While there has been an increase in environmental 
disclosures by Australian businesses in recent years, the positive information being 
disclosed far outweighs the negative information suggesting that it is self-laudatory 
in nature rather than objective (Clarkson, Overell & Chapple 2011; Deegan & 
Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Frost  & English 2002). As a consequence, 
environmental disclosures are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the underlying 
environmental practices of businesses (Clarkson, Overell & Chapple 2011).  
Third, this study investigates the integration of environmental risks into the corporate 
credit process from Australian banks’ perspective rather than from borrowing firms’ 
perspective. Therefore, examining the environmental performance and environmental 
management of borrowing firms is beyond the scope of this study. In addition, it is 
beyond the research scope to explain in detail how a robust ERM system should be 
constructed and sustained in Australian banks’ corporate lending. Fourth, the 
emphasis of this study is a qualitative investigation of the associations between 
environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans.  
Therefore, banks’ risk modelling and quantification of environmental risks will not 
be addressed.  
1.7 Outline of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised into five chapters. Chapter 2 examines 
the relevant literature regarding the integration of environmental risks into banks’ 
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lending businesses. Of particular relevance, it provides a detailed review of the 
literature regarding environmental risks, environmental covenants and the association 
between environmental risks and the cost of bank loans.  
Chapter 3 discusses agency theory underpinning part of the reviewed literature in 
Chapter 2, which demonstrates the development of research propositions and thus 
identifies the theoretical framework. By demonstrating the relevance of agency 
theory in the relationship between banks and borrowing businesses in terms of 
environmental risks, Chapter 3 consolidates the literature pertaining to environmental 
covenants and the association between environmental risks and the cost of bank 
loans in banks’ lending businesses.  
Chapter 4 describes and justifies the employed research methodology. It involves the 
research paradigm underlying the research, thus informing the way in which the 
research problem and research questions are approached. Chapter 4 also includes a 
discussion about the research methods for data collection and analysis.  
Chapter 5 presents the results and shows the themes and patterns of the collected 
information. It leads to a conceptual framework for this study. To this end, Chapter 5 
presents a comparison between this conceptual framework and the one developed 
from previous literature and outlined in Chapter 2. The results presented in Chapter 5 
also provide the basis for the discussion, conclusions and implications outlined in 
Chapter 6. Chapter 6 interprets the results in view of previous literature, articulates 
the implications for theory and practice, and specifies the limitations. Figure 1.3 sets 
out the structural framework for this dissertation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Overview of this study
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Detailed review of relevant 
literature
Chapter 3: Theoretical 
Framework and Propositions
Underlying theory of this study
Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology
How to conduct this study in order to better 
address the research problem
Chapter 5: Data Analysis
Results of this study
Chapter 6: Discussion, Conclusions and 
Implications
Interpretation of the results
 
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 1.3  Structural Framework of the Dissertation 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 provides an overview for this study by presenting the background and 
motivations, the contributions and the research scope. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on environmental risks in corporate lending of banks. Environmental risks 
have three dimensions, namely, direct risk (lender liability), indirect risk (credit risk) 
and reputational risk. They are likely to expose banks to significant financial and 
reputational losses in both the short- and long-term. To protect banks from potential 
losses, environmental initiatives arise which seek to establish principles for banks to 
follow when dealing with environmental risks in their lending businesses. The 
environmental initiatives involving banks and banks’ ERM are also discussed in 
Chapter 2. Of particular relevance to the research problem, this chapter provides a 
review of the associations between environmental risks facing banks and 1) bank 
loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans.  
This remainder of this chapter is organised as follows (see Figure 2.1). Section 2.2 
presents interpretations of environmental risks based on prior literature and places 
them in the context of this study; it also reviews the determinants of environmental 
risks facing banks in their lending businesses
13
. Section 2.3 reviews previous 
research on the United Nations Environmental Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP 
FI) and the Equator Principles, which banks can voluntarily become signatories of to 
demonstrate their environmental commitments. Prior literature related to banks’ 
ERM is discussed in section 2.4, while section 2.5 provides information about bank 
                                                 
13
 ‘Environmental risks facing banks’ and ‘banks’ environmental risk exposure’ are used 
interchangeably throughout the study. They include the content and the significance of environmental 
risks in banks’ corporate lending. 
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loan covenants, which serves as background knowledge for the discussion of 
environmental covenants in section 2.6. Section 2.7 presents the association between 
environmental risks facing banks and the cost of bank loans. The conceptual 
framework based on the literature reviewed in previous sections is discussed in 
section 2.8, which is followed by a summary of the main themes of this chapter. 
Figure 2.1 provides a diagrammatic view of the structure of Chapter 2.  
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2.2 Environmental Risks from 
Banks’ Perspective
2.2.1 Interpretations of 
environmental risks
2.2.2 Determinants of 
environmental risks facing 
banks in lending 
2.3 Environmental Initiatives of 
Banks
2.3.1 United Nations 
Environment Programme 
Finance Initiative (UNEP FI)
2.3.2 Equator Principles
2.4 Environmental Risk 
Management (ERM) of Banks
2.4.1 Concepts and 
procedures of banks’ ERM
2.4.2 Integration of ERM into 
banks’ credit processes
2.5 Covenants in Bank Loan 
Agreements
2.5.1 Classifications of 
bank loan covenants
2.5.2 Functions of bank 
loan covenants
2.6 Environmental 
Covenants
2.6.1 Environmental 
covenants for loans from 
multilateral development 
banks
2.6.2 Environmental 
covenants for loans from 
commercial banks
2.7 Environmental Risks and the 
Cost of Bank Loans
2.7.1 Determinants of the 
cost of bank loans 
2.7.2 Association between 
environmental risks and the 
cost of bank loans
2.9 Chapter Summary
2.8 Conceptual Framework 
based on Previous Literature
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 2.1  Structure of Chapter 2 
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2.2 Environmental Risks from Banks’ Perspective 
Generally, environmental risks arise from the probabilities of environmental risk 
events occurring (Brady 2005). Depending on various perspectives and foci, 
environmental risks can have different specific interpretations within a given 
framework (Barannik 2001; Thompson 1998b).  Environmental risks in this study are 
discussed from banks’ perspective.  
2.2.1 Interpretations of environmental risks 
This section reviews two interpretations of environmental risks in the literature: one 
is from UNEP and the other is from Case (1999). In addition, how these two 
interpretations align with each other is articulated. As such, an understanding of the 
dimensions of environmental risks is obtained and provides background information 
for the research problem.  
Driven by the development of environmental legislation, UNEP groups 
environmental risks into the following classifications for commercial lenders 
(Vaughan 1994): 
Commercial lending and credit extension (debt) risks 
a. Reduced value of collateralized property 
 Cost of cleanup is capitalized into property value 
 Property transactions may be prohibited until cleanup occurs 
b. Potential lender liability 
 Cleanup of contamination on collateralized property in which the 
bank takes an interest 
 Personal injures 
 Property damages 
30 
 
c. Risk of loan default by debtors 
 Cash flow problems due to cleanup costs or other environmental 
liabilities 
 Reduced priority of repayment under bankruptcy 
Case (1999) also interprets environmental risks from a commercial bank’s 
perspective. His classification is similar to that of UNEP, but is more comprehensive 
since it takes stakeholders’ increasing environmental awareness into consideration. 
Case (1999) identifies that environmental risks in banks’ corporate lending have 
three dimensions:  
Direct risk 
When a bank incurs legal environmental liability caused by insolvent borrowers, 
direct risk arises (Case 1999). Under environmental legislation, environmental 
liability is likely to be borne by the polluters, the owners, the occupier or the 
operators of a site where environmental risk events arise (Bates & Lipman 1998; 
Case 1999; Labatt & White 2002). That is, environmental liability is likely to be put 
on the parties that have an element of control over an environmental risk event (Case 
1999). When a bank forecloses on land or real property held as collateral
14
 
15
 and the 
property is environmentally contaminated, the bank is likely to be liable for the 
contamination (Case 1999; Coulson & Dixon 1995; Coulson & Monks 1999). It is 
possible that the bank will be required to pay cleaning-up and/or remediation costs 
for the environmental damage (Case 1999; Ward 1996). These costs can be 
extremely significant with no relation to the loan principal or the original value of the 
collateral (Case 1999; Ward 1996).  
                                                 
14
 ‘Forecloses on land or real property held as collateral’ refers to the proceedings initiated by a bank 
to repossess the collateral when borrowing firms default on loans.  
15
 Collateral is a common feature of a bank loan, which provides security for a bank. It is in the form 
of specific assets from borrowing firms.  
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Indirect risk 
Indirect risk arises when environmental issues impair a borrowing firm’s ability to 
repay its bank loan (Case 1999). With environmental legislation becoming more 
restrictive and stakeholders’ environmental awareness growing, borrowing firms face 
increased exposure to environmental costs (Case 1999; Magalhaes 2001). The 
environmental costs imposed on borrowing firms can be in the form of costs of legal 
compliance, costs of pollution clean-up, fines for non-compliance with 
environmental legislation and any loss resulting from reputational damage (Case 
1999; Thompson 1998b). These environmental costs have adverse impacts on a 
firm’s profitability and its cash flows which, in turn, reduce the firm’s ability to 
repay its bank loans (Case 1999; Thompson 1998b).  
Indirect risk also occurs when there is contamination of land or real property held as 
collateral or environmental legislation restricting the usage of the assets held as 
collateral (Case 1999; Thompson 1998b). The contamination or restriction impairs 
the value and saleability of the collateral. Given that collateral is a borrowing firm’s 
pledge to secure its repayment to a bank, there is a higher exposure to credit risk for 
the bank when the value and saleability of collateral are impaired (Case 1999; 
Thompson 1998b). It is worth noting that the probability of a bank’s exposure to 
indirect risk is much higher than that of its exposure to direct risk (Case 1999).   
Reputational risk  
Reputational risk is likely to emerge when banks extend loans to or have associations 
with firms that are environmentally irresponsible
16
 (Case 1999). Associating with 
                                                 
16
 ‘Associations’ can refer to any transactions between banks and their borrowing firms in addition to 
credit extension. 
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these firms results in more exposure to consumer boycott, media exposures and other 
stakeholders’ scrutiny of banks (Case 1999; Thompson 1998b). As such, it can lead 
to reputational damage for banks and impair their long-term viability (Case 1999; 
Ethical Investment Research Service 2006; Thompson 1998b). Therefore, 
reputational risk also plays a significant role in banks’ lending decision-making 
processes (Case 1999).  
Both interpretations of environmental risks from UNEP and Case cover 
environmental risks resulting from borrowing firms’ legal compliance and they are 
compatible with each other. The UNEP risk classifications ‘Reduced value of 
collateralized property’ and ‘Risk of loan default by debtors’ fall into the indirect 
risk category, which are related to the repayment ability of borrowers and the value 
of collateral. The risk classification ‘Potential lender liability’ can be categorized as 
direct risk which is defined as the possibility for banks to incur environmental 
liabilities resulting from borrowing firms’ environmental impacts. In addition to 
environmental risks associated with borrowing firms’ compliance with 
environmental legislation, the interpretation by Case (1999) also embraces 
reputational risk related to borrowing firms’ environmental reputation.  
Although reputational risk is considered the most difficult to financially identify and 
quantify, it has emerged as a major concern for banks in their corporate lending 
(Case 1999; Thompson 1998b). The reason for this concern is that reputational risk is 
likely to pose a significant threat to banks’ long-term viability (Case 1999; Coulson 
2001; Labatt & White 2002; Thompson 1998b). HSBC, one of the world’s leading 
commercial banks, claims that reputational risk is one manifestation of 
environmental risks in its lending businesses (HSBC 2012). Reputational risk is 
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considered and assessed as an integral part of HSBC’s risk management system and 
corporate sustainability practices (HSBC 2012). Consequently, the interpretation of 
environmental risks from Case (1999) which embraces reputational risk is more 
comprehensive and thorough than the UNEP classifications.  
However, there is scant knowledge regarding Australian banks’ interpretation of 
environmental risks in their corporate lending. Following the review of the 
dimensions of environmental risks in banks’ corporate lending, the next section 
considers factors determining banks’ exposure to environmental risks.  
2.2.2 Determinants of environmental risks facing banks in lending 
To understand whether and how environmental risks facing banks are associated with 
bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans, banks’ environmental risk exposure 
needs to be evaluated. This section provides an understanding of the considerations 
when evaluating banks’ environmental risk exposure in their lending businesses.  
According to Bowden, Lane and Martin (2001), risk is the function of the probability 
of a risk event emerging and the potential consequences of the emerging risk event. 
Therefore, environmental risks facing organisations are the combination of 1) the 
probability of environmental risk events occurring, and 2) the magnitude of the 
potential consequences resulting from the environmental risk events
17
 (Barannik 
2001; Brady 2005) (see Figure 2.2). From banks’ perspective, their exposure to 
environmental risks in lending businesses is mainly determined by the following 
                                                 
17
 Environmental risk events are those caused by borrowers’ environmental activities. 
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factors
18
 (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2011; McKenzie & 
Wolfe 2004): 
 the consequences of environmental risk events if they occur;  
 borrowing firms’ environmental management quality which determines the 
probability of environmental risk events occurring
19
; and 
 financial capability of borrowing firms to deal with their potential 
environmental consequences.  
Consequences
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Source: Adapted from Brady (2005, p.213) and Barannik (2001, p.250) 
Figure 2.2  Components of Environmental Risks 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 The terms and value of loans also influence banks’ exposure to environmental risks in their lending 
businesses. However, in order to obtain generally accepted determinants of banks’ exposure to 
environmental risks, the choice is made not to include an explicit differentiation by characteristics of 
loans. Therefore, they are beyond the scope of this study and are not discussed in this study. 
19
 The definition of borrowing firms’ environmental management is as described in Chapter 1. 
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The potential consequences of environmental risk events  
As discussed above, banks are likely to be exposed to environmental liability, loss of 
loan principal and interest, as well as reputational damage in their corporate lending 
when an environmental risk event occurs (Case 1999; Labatt & White 2002). 
Depending on the environmental activities borrowing firms are involved in, the 
significance of the potential consequences of an environmental risk event is different 
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2011). Borrowing firms in 
environmentally sensitive industries present a higher potential for significant 
environmental consequences than those in environmentally friendly industries 
(Coulson & Monks 1999; Thompson 1998a). If the potential consequences of an 
environmental risk event is significant, but the probability of the environmental risk 
event emerging is low and/or there is sound financial capacity to deal with the 
potential environmental consequences, banks’ exposure to environmental risks will 
be reduced (Barannik 2001; Brady 2005).  
The quality of borrowing firms’ environmental management and borrowing firms’ 
financial capacity  
Borrowing firms in environmentally sensitive industries do not necessarily expose 
banks to significant environmental risks that are beyond the acceptable range of 
banks, provided they have sound environmental management practices in place 
(Coulson & Monks 1999; Thompson 1998a). There is also an argument that 
borrowing firms operating in environmentally friendly industries can impose 
considerable environmental risks on banks if they have inferior environmental 
management quality (Thompson 1998a).  
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Case (1999) argues that borrowers’ environmental management quality plays a 
critical role in determining banks’ exposure to environmental risks in their corporate 
lending. This view is supported by Thompson (1998a) in his interview with a senior 
bank representative. The senior bank representative states that ‘…sound 
environmental management is seen as indicative of quality management, an essential 
ingredient for a viable and successful business, and this endears the bank towards 
the borrower’ (Thompson 1998a, p.248).  
The quality of borrowing firms’ environmental management is influential on the 
likelihood of environmental risk events occurring (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 2011; Sharfman & Fernando 2008). It is therefore 
a key consideration in banks’ environmental review for lending decision-making 
(International Finance Corporation 2012; McKenzie & Wolfe 2004). Coulson and 
Monks (1999) indicate that the likelihood of environmental risk events actually 
occurring is low if environmental issues are well-managed by borrowing firms. As 
such, all other things being equal, banks’ exposure to environmental risks will be 
lower than it otherwise would be if a borrowing firm has sound environmental 
management (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2011).  
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
20
 (2011) also indicates 
that sound financial capability of borrowing firms can offset the potential 
consequences of environmental risk events in certain circumstances. This is 
supported by the results provided by McKenzie and Wolfe (2004) who indicate that 
the capitalisation of borrowing firms in UK banks’ corporate lending can compensate 
for the consequences of the emerging environmental risk events. There is an 
                                                 
20
 EBRD is owned by 63 countries and 2 intergovernmental organisations, namely, the European 
Union (EU) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 2012). 
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assumption that a well-capitalised firm is more capable of dealing with the financial 
consequences of its environmental impacts (McKenzie & Wolfe 2004). Therefore, 
McKenzie and Wolfe consider borrowing firms’ capitalisation as a reflection of their 
financial capability.  
However, it is not always the case that sound financial capability of borrowing firms 
can mitigate banks’ exposure to environmental risks. Reputation built-up over 
decades can be damaged overnight if a severe environmental risk event occurs 
(Broomhill 2007). Therefore, borrowing firms who have the potential for significant 
environmental impacts (e.g., groundwater contamination) are usually under greater 
scrutiny from stakeholders and thus are more likely to have vulnerable reputation. By 
extending loans to these firms, banks are more likely to incur reputational damage 
(Case 1999; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2011). In such 
circumstances, even if borrowing firms have sufficient financial resources to cover 
the significant potential environmental consequences and the probability of 
environmental risk events occurring is acceptable by banks, there are still high 
environmental risks facing banks (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 2011).  
In the Australian context, there is no research investigating the determinants of banks’ 
exposure to environmental risks in their corporate lending. However, despite the 
absence of relevant research, there has been an increasing awareness of 
environmental risks in Australian banks resulting from growing restrictive 
environmental legislation and stakeholders’ increasing environmental awareness 
(Ernst & Young 2003). This recognition has been exemplified by major Australian 
banks’ involvement in the UNEP FI and the Equator Principles. The UNEP FI and 
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the Equator Principles are major international initiatives within banks endeavouring 
to promote environmental sustainability (International Finance Corporation 2007). 
Both these international initiatives deal with environmental risks facing banks. 
UNEP FI and the Equator Principles are discussed in section 2.3.  
2.3 Environmental Initiatives of Banks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
By reviewing banks’ environmental initiatives, this section demonstrates banks’ 
commitments to managing environmental risks in banking. It aims to identify 
whether bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans are suggested by guidelines 
and/or principles of these environmental initiatives as mechanisms to manage 
environmental risks.  
It has been acknowledged that banks are of significant importance in advancing 
environmental sustainability through direct and indirect influences on the firms they 
finance
21
 (Environment and Finance Research Enterprise 1995; O' Sullivan & O' 
Dwyer 2009). Notable initiatives of banks’ responding to environmental 
sustainability include the UNEP FI and the Equator Principles (Ganzi & Huppman 
2006; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). The signatories of the UNEP FI commit to 
incorporating environmental risks into all facets of their lending businesses. The 
Equator Principles provide banks with a benchmark for managing environmental 
risks in their project financing. However, project financing is only a ‘niche market’ 
in banks’ overall financing activities (van Gelder, Herder & Kouwenhoven 2010). It 
is widely accepted among the signatory banks that environmental risks are associated 
                                                 
21
 Direct influence involves scrutinising a borrowing firm to ensure it complies with applied 
environmental legislation and/or standards as well as providing the firm with information and 
consultation to assist with its ERM and environmental practices. Indirect influence refers to a bank’s 
decision regarding whether to lend to a borrowing firm, as well as the terms and cost structures under 
which a loan is extended to the firm. 
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with all their lending businesses and thus environmental responsibility should be 
thoroughly applied in banks’ lending businesses (BankTrack 2005b; van Gelder, 
Herder & Kouwenhoven 2010). Consequently, BankTrack (2005a) suggests that the 
Equator Principles should be further integrated into the signatory banks’ corporate 
credit processes. Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 examine the UNEP FI and the Equator 
Principles respectively. 
2.3.1 United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP 
FI) 
Inspired by the role banks play in promoting environmental sustainability, UNEP22 
has been working closely with banks globally since the 1990s.  In 1991, UNEP, 
together with Deutsche Bank, HSBC Holdings, Natwest, Royal Bank of Canada and 
Westpac, launched the concept of the UNEP FI in their endeavour to promote banks’ 
environmental awareness. After several years of development, the UNEP FI was 
eventually formed by merging the UNEP Financial Institutions Initiative (FII) and 
the UNEP Insurance Industry Initiative (III) in 2003. There are over 200 signatory 
financial institutions from approximately 40 countries under the UNEP FI (United 
Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 2011b). The UNEP FI 
encourages environmental considerations at all levels of lending businesses of 
financial institutions. Its mission is ‘…to identify, promote, and realise the adoption 
of best environmental and sustainability practice at all levels of financial institution 
operations’ (United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 2011b, 
2011a).  
                                                 
22
 UNEP, established in 1972, is the designated authority of the United Nations system in 
environmental issues at the global and regional level. Its mandate is to coordinate the development of 
environmental policy consensus by keeping the global environment under review and bringing 
emerging issues to the attention of governments and the international community for action (United 
Nations Environment Programme 2011).  
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In Australia, ANZ, CBA, NAB and Westpac are the bank signatories to the UNEP 
Statement by Financial Institutions on the Environment & Sustainable Development 
(referred to as the UNEP Statement in the following sections). The section 
‘Environmental Management and Financial Institutions’ in the UNEP Statement 
demonstrates that identifying and quantifying environmental risks should be 
considered as ‘business as usual’. Therefore, awareness of integrating environmental 
risks into banks’ lending businesses is exemplified by banks’ commitment to the 
UNEP Statement (Thompson & Cowton 2004). 
However, compliance with the UNEP Statement is voluntary and there is no 
mechanism to monitor whether and how signatory banks translate their 
environmental commitment into practices (van Gelder, Herder & Kouwenhoven 
2010). Simply committing to the UNEP Statement is therefore not necessarily 
representative of environmentally responsible strategies and practices of the 
signatory banks (Corporate Responsibility Coalition 2005; Rhee & Lee 2003; van 
Gelder, Herder & Kouwenhoven 2010). In addition, to date very limited research has 
been undertaken that examines the accountability of the signatory banks’ 
environmental commitment to the UNEP Statement, let alone how these banks 
translate the commitment into their environmental strategies and practices (Corporate 
Responsibility Coalition 2005; O' Sullivan & O' Dwyer 2009). Consequently, to what 
extent signatory banks’ environmental practices reflect their commitment to the 
UNEP Statement is still unclear (Thompson & Cowton 2004). The continuous 
development of environmental initiatives has been sharply accelerated by the advent 
of the Equator Principles which reflect the recent trend towards environmental 
sustainability (Ganzi & Huppman 2006). 
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2.3.2 Equator Principals 
On 4 June 2003, ten leading financial institutions from seven countries launched the 
Equator Principles which are voluntary-commitment based
23
. The Equator Principles 
are built on the Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability 
of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and on the World Bank Group 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines)
24
. These principles 
and guidelines that deal with environmental risks facing financial institutions are the 
most well-known and widely-tested in global markets. The Equator Principles are 
applied to banks’ project financing with total costs of US$10 million or more (The 
Equator Principles Association 2011).  
The introduction of the Equator Principles was the first time that there has been clear 
principles providing a consistent approach to managing environmental risks for 
banks’ project financing (BankTrack 2005a). The adopters of the Equator Principles 
aim to (Equator Principles Financial Institutions 2006, p.1):  
…ensure that the projects we finance are developed in a manner that is 
socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices. 
By doing so, negative impacts on project-affected ecosystems and 
communities should be avoided where possible, and if these impacts are 
unavoidable, they should be reduced, mitigated and/or compensated for 
appropriately. 
                                                 
23
The ten leading financial institutions are ABN AMRO Bank, N.V., Barclays plc, Citi, Crédit 
Lyonnais, Credit Suisse First Boston, HVB Group, Rabobank Group, The Royal Bank of Scotland, 
WestLB AG, and Westpac Banking Corporation. 
24
 IFC is a member of the World Bank Group, which is responsible for private sector investment. The 
detail of Performance Standards can be sourced from 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards and 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/EHSGuidelines provides EHS Guidelines. 
42 
 
It is estimated that more than 70% of the project financing by volume in emerging 
markets is under the guidance of the Equator Principles and 73 financial institutions 
operating in more than 100 countries have adopted the Equator Principles (The 
Equator Principles Association 2011). In light of this, most of the leading financial 
institutions worldwide are involved with the Equator Principles
25
. The Equator 
Principles provide banks with a global benchmark for identifying, assessing and 
managing environmental risks in their project financing
26
 . The Equator Principles 
have three signatory banks in Australia: ANZ, NAB and Westpac. 
When implementing the Equator Principles, the signatory banks are allowed to make 
some changes where appropriate (Cornwell et al. 2005; Equator Principles Financial 
Institutions Network 2009; Thomas 2004). In addition, the Equator Principles are 
voluntary-commitment based, and there is no mechanism to ensure their 
implementation (BankTrack 2003). As such, it is difficult to identify whether and to 
what extent signatory banks implement the principles in their project financing 
(Thomas 2004). This is evidenced in the research conducted by Scholtens and Dam 
(2007). They indicate that although there is increased awareness of environmental 
risks among signatory banks of the Equator Principles, limited evidence has been 
provided on whether these banks’ practices are aligned with their environmental 
policies and commitments.  
                                                 
25
 By saying ‘involved with’, the underlying assumption is that when signatory financial institutions 
provide project financing, they will require other participating financial institutions that are not 
signatories to also comply with the Equator Principles.    
26
Project financing is ‘…a method of funding in which the lender looks primarily to the revenues 
generated by a single project, both as the source of repayment and as security for the exposure. This 
type of financing is usually for large, complex and expensive installations that might include, for 
example, power plants, chemical processing plants, mines, transportation infrastructure, environment, 
and telecommunications infrastructure’ (The Equator Principles Association 2010). 
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To track the implementation of the Equator Principles, BankTrack (2005a) assesses 
26 signatory banks’ implementation of the Equator Principles in their project 
financing. The assessment is in the areas of external reporting and transparency, 
adoption and application, procedures and standards, implementation challenges and 
impact. BankTrack finds that the majority of banks do not perform well in their 
implementation of the Equator Principles. Specifically, the reporting of the 
implementation of the Equator Principles is limited, leading to poor transparency 
(BankTrack 2005a).  Furthermore, according to a recent assessment report from Mori 
(2007), the transparency and accountability of the Equator Principles implementation 
remains problematic. O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer (2009) also indicate that there is a lack 
of implementation and accountability mechanisms to ensure signatory banks’ 
adherence to the Equator Principles.  
In sum, despite the environmental initiatives that suggest the implementation of 
ERM in banks’ lending businesses, a systematic mechanism to effectively implement 
these guidelines and principles is underdeveloped (Corporate Responsibility 
Coalition 2005). Similarly, Ernst & Young (2003) conclude that there is a 
disconnection between Australian banks’ recognition of environmental risks and 
their practices related to ERM in their lending businesses. Literature on banks’ ERM 
is reviewed in the section below.  
2.4 Environmental Risk Management (ERM) of Banks 
This section provides a review of the concepts and procedures of ERM, and the 
integration of ERM into banks’ corporate credit processes. The review yields an 
understanding of banks’ environmental risk identification, assessment, control and 
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monitoring. The associations between environmental risks and 1) bank loan 
covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans are implied in this review. 
As discussed in section 2.2, banks are likely to be exposed to environmental risks in 
their corporate lending. There are significant financial and reputational consequences 
of environmental risks for both the short- and long-term. As such, an increasing 
number of banks globally have adopted ERM in their lending businesses in order to 
manage their environmental risk exposure and maintain their long-term development 
and viability (Greene 2006; Magalhaes 2001; Murray, Kelly & Ganzi 1997; 
Strandberg 2005). ERM has become a growing international trend among 
commercial banks, and aims to minimize banks’ foreseeable environmental risks and 
mitigate their unforeseeable environmental risks to an acceptable range (Darrell 2008; 
Magalhaes 2001). 
2.4.1 Concepts and procedures of banks’ ERM  
In 1995, UNEP sponsored a global survey on environmental policies and practices of 
financial institutions, which was conducted by Environment and Finance Research 
Enterprise (1995). The results of this survey indicate that more than 80% of the 
respondents incorporate certain levels of ERM in their lending businesses. However, 
most of the ERM activities focus on the evaluation of banks’ environmental risk 
exposure before lending decisions are made, and the least importance is placed on 
environmental risk monitoring (Environment and Finance Research Enterprise 1995). 
Murray, Kelly and Ganzi (1997) argue that an ideal ERM should also include post-
transaction monitoring which is defined as banks’ monitoring practices of 
environmental risks in the on-going process during the life of loans. Stakeholders’ 
environmental awareness is growing over time, environmental legislation is changing 
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and banks’ understanding of environmental risks in their lending businesses is 
continually developing (International Finance Corporation 2007; Jeucken & Bouma 
2001; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001; Thompson 1998a). As such, on-going 
monitoring during the life of loans is of significant importance to capture the changes 
and respond accordingly (Barannik 2001; Magalhaes 2001).  
To this end, Stoklosa (2001) presents a comprehensive view arguing that ERM is a 
process of systematically identifying the potential environmental risk events, 
analysing the likelihood of environmental risk events occurring and the significance 
of the consequences if they occur, and managing the resulting level of environmental 
risks to acceptable limits. Therefore, ERM within banks is generally considered as a 
systematic and consistent process of identifying, assessing, controlling and 
monitoring environmental risks facing banks in their lending businesses. 
As for the procedures of ERM, there is relatively consistent view. FDIC (1993, 2006), 
Barannik (2001) and EBRD (2011) systematically recommend elements of the ERM 
procedures of banks. Among them, EBRD (2011) sets out the following ERM 
procedures, which can be considered as a combination of ERM procedures and FDIC 
and Barannik: 
 environmental screening through preliminary identification and assessment of 
environmental risks; environmental screening assigns initial environmental 
risk grades (e.g., low, medium and high), which underpins the decision of 
whether to proceed with a loan application and, if so, to what extent further 
environmental risk evaluation should be undertaken; 
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 environmental risk evaluation in terms of the initial environmental risk 
grades
27
; 
 controlling banks’ exposure to environmental risks to an acceptable range; 
and  
 environmental risk monitoring, which includes on-going monitoring of 
borrowers’ environmental obligation compliance and their business operating 
performance, and evaluating the potential environmental liabilities before 
taking title of any real property
28
. 
However, the majority of the literature regarding ERM in banks’ lending businesses 
focuses on environmental risk identification and assessment 
29
(Coulson & Monks 
1999; Thompson & Cowton 2004). Therefore, there is limited knowledge about 
banks’ environmental risk control and monitoring in the literature. In addition, 
environmental risk control and monitoring have been largely overlooked by banks in 
their ERM practices (Environment and Finance Research Enterprise 1995; Weber, 
Fenchel & Scholz 2008). As such, there is limited knowledge on banks’ 
environmental practices in controlling and monitoring environmental risks. This can 
be partly explained by the lacking of quality environmental data
30
 and appropriate 
analytical instruments required to quantify and price banks’ environmental risk 
exposure (Coulson & Monks 1999; Ernst & Young 2003). Consequentely, there is an 
absence of sufficient control and effective monitoring for environmental risks in 
banks’ lending businesses.  
                                                 
27
 Environmental risk evaluation consists of environmental risk identification and assessment.  
28
 Borrowers’ environmental obligation compliance includes environmental legislation and operating 
license compliance and their compliance with terms and conditions under loan agreements.   
29
 Environmental risk identification and assessment refer to the evaluation regarding the sources of 
environmental risks, the probability of environmental risks events emerging and the consequences if 
they emerge.  
30
 The criteria for quality information include relevant, rich and standardised.  
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In Australia, it is well recognised among banks that environmental risks are likely to 
impact on their lending businesses, which can lead to significant financial and 
reputational consequences (Ernst & Young 2003; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). 
However, no research regarding banks’ ERM in their lending businesses has been 
published in the Australian context.  
Several authors have found that evaluation of environmental risks are being 
increasingly accepted by banks as an essential part of their credit processes 
(Thompson 1998a; Thompson & Cowton 2004; Ward 1996; Weber, Fenchel & 
Scholz 2008). Particularly, Case (1999) argues that the integration of environmental 
risks into banks’ corporate credit processes plays a significant role in the success of 
banks’ ERM. Following this point of view, section 2.4.2 reviews the literature on the 
consideration of environmental risks in banks’ credit processes.  
2.4.2 Integration of ERM into banks’ credit processes 
A global survey on environmental policies and practices of financial institutions by 
the Environment and Finance Research Enterprise (1995) indicates that financial 
institutions are more likely to incorporate environmental risks into their credit risk 
management processes than their overall credit processes. It concludes that 94% of 
the respondents integrate environmental risks into their credit risk management 
processes. Ganzi and Huppman (2006) also provide evidence that environmental 
risks have been incorporated into the credit risk management process by the majority 
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of the world’s large banks31. Banks’ credit risk management aims to ‘…maximise a 
bank’s risk-adjusted rate of return by maintaining credit risk exposure within 
acceptable parameters’ (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2000, p.1). 
According to Weber, Fenchel and Scholz (2008), the process of credit risk 
management can be categorised into five phases: 
 credit risk rating;  
 credit risk costing;  
 credit risk pricing; 
 credit risk monitoring; and  
 work out. 
Credit risk rating involves conducting a credit evaluation to determine the probability 
that a borrowing firm will default on a loan and the expected loss given the default 
(Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). To effectively and efficiently manage credit risk, a 
costing is needed to quantify banks’ credit risk exposure. In the credit risk pricing 
phase, the identified estimated costs will be translated into a premium charged to the 
borrower (Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). Monitoring of credit risk is conducted 
throughout the life of the loan. If there is deterioration of the borrowing firm’s 
capability to repay the loan or it defaults on the loan, a workout program will be put 
in place. The work out program aims to reduce banks’ losses due to credit-related 
issues and to get the borrowing firm back on track (Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008).  
Based on the discussion of the concepts and procedures of ERM in section 2.4.1, it is 
clear that ERM is compatible with the credit risk management process. Both fall into 
                                                 
31
 The study conducted by Ganzi and Huppman (2006) is based on interviews with 38 leading 
financial institutions: ABN Amro, Allianz, Banca Intesa, Banco Santander, Bank of America, Bank of 
Montreal, Barclays, BBVA, BNP Paribas, Chase Morgan, CIBC, Citigroup, CALYON, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Dexia, Dexia Crediop, FMO, Fortis, HSBC, HVB, ING, KBC, KfW, Morley Asset 
Mgt., Lloyds TSB, Och-Ziff Hedge Fund, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
SNS Bank, Societe Generale, Standard Chartered, Unicredito Italiano, West LB, Westpac and two 
others that chose not to be mentioned by name.  
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the procedures of risk identification, assessment, control and monitoring. In addition, 
environmental risks impact on every phase of the credit risk management process 
(Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). Therefore, Weber, Fenchel and Scholz (2008) 
suggest that environmental risks should be integrated into all phases of the credit risk 
management process. By fully embedding ERM into the credit risk management 
process, banks can better manage risks and meet the expectations of their 
stakeholders (Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). 
Although credit risk management is a core component of banks’ credit processes 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2000), integrating environmental risks 
into the credit risk management process mainly reflects banks recognition of credit 
risk related to borrowers’ environmental impacts. For the purpose of effective 
management of banks’ overall risk exposure in corporate lending, environmental 
risks should be integrated into the corporate credit process as ‘business as usual’ 
(Case 1999; Ganzi & Huppman 2006). The EBRD is proactive in promoting 
environmental sustainability in banks’ lending businesses. EBRD (2011) provides a 
manual
32
 for ERM in banks’ corporate credit processes by illustrating banks’ ERM 
procedures and the integration of ERM into each phase of the corporate credit 
process (see Figure 2.3).  
                                                 
32
 This manual is designed for financial institutions supported by EBRD funding and it is also valuable 
and relevant for other financial institutions (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
2011). 
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Credit appraisal stage Corresponding environmental risk management step
Application for credit
Credit appraisal
Credit approval 
(credit committee)
Loan monitoring
Step 1: 
Environmental 
screening
 Reject activities on environmental exclusion list
 Carry out preliminary assessment of 
environmental risk leading to 
       Initial Environmental Risk Rating
Step 2: 
Environmental 
impact and risk 
evaluation
Low risk Medium risk High risk
 Compliance check for all transactions
 Site visit for all transactions
Future investigation by bank staff
Environmental 
review by 
experts
Final Environmental Report
Step 3: 
Environmental risk 
control
 Review Final Environmental Report
 Ensure risk and level of environmental 
knowledge acceptable
 Apply environmental conditions to credit 
agreement
Step 4: 
Environmental 
monitoring
 Monitor environmental compliance, changes in 
legislation, changes in client’s business 
activities
 Consider the potential for environmental liability 
(e.g. through contamination) before taking 
possession of any assets
 
Source: EBRD (2011): Environmental and social risk management manual 
Figure 2.3  Environmental Risk Management and the Corporate Credit Process 
 
Despite the systematic guidance for integrating ERM into banks’ corporate credit 
processes, to the knowledge of the researcher there is no available evidence about 
how and to what extent this manual is implemented by EBRD’s partner banks or by 
banks beyond EBRD countries of operations
33
, including Australia. In addition, 
Weber, Fenchel and Scholz (2008) indicate that the credit risk rating phase is where 
environmental risks are most often considered by European banks; while 
environmental risks are scarcely incorporated in the credit risk costing, pricing and 
                                                 
33
 EBRD countries of operations include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
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monitoring phases. The reasons for this include: a lack of suitable analytical 
instruments for quantifying and pricing environmental risks, integrating 
environmental risks into each phase of the credit risk management process is not 
economically sound, and banks’ credit risk experts do not have sufficient knowledge 
on environmental risks (Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). Given that credit risk 
management is a core component of banks’ credit processes, there is an implication 
that the reasons hindering the integration of environmental risks into credit risk 
management also impede their integration into banks’ corporate credit processes. 
Therefore, due to the absence of any relevant evidence, banks’ environmental 
practices in terms of integrating environmental risks into their corporate credit 
processes remain essentially unknown. 
In the Australian context, Ernst & Young (2003) consult with Australian financial 
institutions regarding the integration of environmental risks in their credit processes. 
The results of the consultation show that approximately 90% of the participating 
Australian financial institutions (banks are included) integrate environmental risks 
into their credit processes, with 57% of them reviewing environmental risks on a 
‘regular’ or ‘routine’ basis. Responding to this trend, recognition that environmental 
risks need to be incorporated in banks’ credit processes has increased in Australia 
(Ernst & Young 2003). However, the actual practice of integrating environmental 
risks into Australian banks’ credit processes remains underdeveloped (Ernst & 
Young 2003; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). As such, more research in this area is 
needed in the Australian context. As an important mechanism to manage 
environmental risks, covenants in bank loan agreements are reviewed in the 
following section (section 2.5).  
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2.5 Covenants in Bank Loan Agreements 
The literature about the classifications and functions of traditional bank loan 
covenants is reviewed in this section. Although environmental covenants are not in 
the form of traditional covenants, they are bank loan covenants in nature. To this end, 
this section provides fundamental knowledge for the discussion of environmental 
covenants (see section 2.6).  
Bank loans usually have covenants imposing requirements or restrictions on 
borrowing firms with the purpose of protecting the interests of banks (Carey et al. 
1993; Mather 1999). Covenants in bank loan agreements are the result of 
negotiations between banks and borrowing firms, and aim to ensure that bank loans 
are and will be financially served as anticipated by banks (Fight 2004). They provide 
frameworks for the financing plans between banks and borrowing firms (Glantz 
2003). Therefore, negotiating practical and effective covenants in loan agreements is 
of significant importance to both banks and borrowing firms (Mather & Peirson 
2006). Section 2.5.1 outlines the classifications of bank loan covenants: a) 
affirmative covenants and negative covenants, and b) financial covenants and non-
financial covenants. The functions of covenants are presented in section 2.5.2.  
2.5.1 Classifications of bank loan covenants 
Generally, covenants in bank loan agreements include affirmative covenants and 
negative covenants (Booth & Chua 1995; Paglia 2007; Strahan 1999). Affirmative 
covenants are requirements that borrowing firms have to meet (Carey et al. 1993; 
Paglia 2007). The requirements can include maintaining borrowing firms’ current 
business and complying with their obligations in terms of applied legislation and 
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bank loan agreements
34
. Negative covenants are used to restrict borrowing firms 
from undertaking certain activities which are likely to impair banks’ interests in their 
lending businesses (Booth & Chua 1995; Glantz 2003; Paglia 2007; Strahan 1999).  
Financial covenants, based on financial statements
35
, are considered as a subset of 
negative covenants (Carey et al. 1993; Paglia 2007). Financial covenants are defined 
as ‘…covenants that use accounting data in their formulation either as an absolute 
amount or as the numerator and/or denominator of a ratio’ (Mather & Peirson 2006, 
p.286). Non-financial covenants are requirements or restrictions on borrowing firms’ 
business activities and/or policies rather than in the form of accounting numbers (e.g., 
requirement for borrowing firms to report periodically and restriction on their asset 
sales)
36
 (Ramsay & Sidhu 1998).  
Based on an examination of a sample of large bank loans in the DealScan database in 
the year 1989
37
, Booth and Chua (1995) find that covenants for large bank loans are 
mainly negative covenants. Further, they conclude that in large bank loans the 
negative covenants are usually financial covenants. Although there is little supportive 
evidence showing that financial covenants take the primary proportion in the applied 
covenants, financial covenants are one of the typical forms of covenants in bank loan 
agreements (Moir & Sudarsanam 2007). Paglia (2007) conducts research on the type 
and frequency of covenants included in large bank loan agreements using 238 large 
bank loans in the TearSheet database from 1992 to 1994
38
. Paglia (2007) provides 
supportive evidence that the majority of covenants for large bank loans are negative 
                                                 
34
 Maintaining current business is the requirement for borrowing firms to stay in the same business.  
35
 Financial statements include the balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement.  
36
 Non-financial covenants can be either affirmative covenants or negative covenants. 
37
 The median loan size of the sample is US $36 million and the mean loan size is $184 million, with 
96% of the sample loans above $1million in size.  
38
 The median loan size of the sample is US $200 million and the mean loan size is $ 431 million.  
54 
 
covenants and that 96.2% of the sample bank loan agreements include financial 
covenants. 
Financial covenants in bank loan agreements are frequently used since they are 
directly measurable and verifiable (Paglia 2007). In addition, financial covenants 
have a lower monitoring cost than non-financial covenants, as there is no incremental 
cost for banks in accessing the required financial statements (Cotter 1998a). Most of 
the research regarding bank loan covenants in the Australian context focuses on 
financial covenants (Cotter 1998a, 1998b; Mather 1999; Mather & Peirson 2006).  
Cotter (1998a) examines the frequently used financial covenants in Australian bank 
loan agreements by conducting interviews with senior corporate bankers from ANZ, 
CBA, NAB and Westpac and analysing the extracts of 23 actual bank loan 
agreements. According both to the interviews and the bank loan agreement analysis,  
Cotter (1998a) finds that leverage and interest coverage covenants are the most 
frequently used in bank loan agreements for listed Australian firms
39
. Mather (1999) 
and Ramsay and Sidhu (1998) investigate the usage of financial covenants in 
Australian bank loan agreements almost at the same time as the research by Cotter 
(1998a) and present consistent findings
40
. In addition, Mather indicates that the 
likelihood of including financial covenants in Australian bank loan agreements 
increases with the loan size and Australian banks are more likely to include financial 
covenants in loan agreements for unsecured loans.  
                                                 
39
 Leverage ratio=Total liabilities to total tangible assets; Interest coverage ratio=Earnings before 
Interest and Taxes (EBIT) to interest expenses.  
40
 The research by Mather (1999) is based on interviews with 48 bank loan officers from 19 Australian 
and foreign trading banks and divisions of banks in Melbourne and Sydney. The sample used by 
Ramsay and Sidhu (1998) comprises 14 Australian bank loan agreements and 2 law firm standard loan 
agreements.  
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Mather and Peirson (2006) add to the reliability of the extant information about bank 
loan covenants by analysing a comparatively large sample of Australian bank loan 
agreements in a more recent period (41 Australian bank loan agreements dated 
between 1993-2000). They indicate that the restrictions on interest cover ratios and 
leverage ratios are the most commonly used financial covenants. This conclusion 
confirms the findings about financial covenants usage in Australian bank loan 
agreements in previous research (Cotter 1998a; Mather 1999; Ramsay & Sidhu 1998).  
In addition to financial covenants, Ramsay and Sidhu (1998) provide evidence on the 
use of non-financial covenants in Australian bank loan agreements. They indicate 
that non-financial covenants are most pervasively used in Australian bank loans in 
relation to bonding activities, financing, and production and investment
41
. However, 
the results are based on a small sample (14 bank loan agreements) (Mather & Peirson 
2006), and thus difficult to generalise. As this study focuses on environmental 
covenants which are only employed by a small amount of Australian banks, it is 
reasonable to have a small sample size. In addition, there is no conclusion about 
specific non-financial covenants that are the most frequently used in Australian bank 
loan agreements.  
With the exception of Cotter (1998b), Ramsay and Sidhu (1998), Mather (1999), and 
Mather and Peirson (2006), there has been little research investigating covenants 
included in Australian bank loan agreements. This can be partly explained by the 
private nature of bank loan agreements and thereby a lack of available data relevant 
to bank loan covenants (Mather 1999; Ramsay & Sidhu 1998). To understand why 
                                                 
41
 Non-financial covenants on bonding activities can include requirements for borrowing firms to 
report periodically, to comply with environmental legislation, to make their asset movements notified, 
to purchase insurance, to hedge exposures and to provide the application of proceeds from asset sales. 
Non-financial covenants for production and investment involve requirements for banks’ approval of 
asset purchase, new acquisition and any changes in the nature of business (Ramsay & Sidhu 1998). 
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banks include covenants in loan agreements, the functions of bank loan covenants are 
examined in the following section.  
2.5.2 Functions of bank loan covenants 
The information asymmetry between shareholders and creditors is one of the 
pervasive imperfections inherent in capital markets. Due to the information 
asymmetry, firm managers (acting on behalf of shareholders) have an information 
advantage regarding the borrowing firms, and are likely to undertake activities that 
benefit shareholders by expropriating wealth from creditors (referred to as banks in 
this study) (Smith & Warner 1979). Without sufficient control and monitoring, these 
activities can be either unobservable by banks or beyond their control, thereby 
leading to wealth transfer from banks to shareholders of borrowing firms (Bazzana 
2010; Carey et al. 1993; Mather 1999).  
Covenants provide a mechanism for controlling these wealth transfer activities, and 
thus alleviating the conflict of interest between borrowing firms and banks (Bazzana 
2010; Carey et al. 1993; El-Gazzar & Pastena 1991; Paglia 2007; Smith & Warner 
1979). Covenants play an ex post role whereby banks have rights/authorities to force 
borrowing firms into bankruptcy, renegotiate the contract terms, put more restrictions 
on firms or call in the loans when covenants are breached (Carey et al. 1993; Paglia 
2007). These authors also indicate that covenants play an ex ante role by placing 
requirements or restrictions to constrain borrowing firms’ ability to engage in 
activities that are detrimental to banks’ interests (Carey et al. 1993; Paglia 2007). 
Particularly, through the control of asset substitution and underinvestment, covenants 
can help enhance borrowing firm value (Carey et al. 1993; Smith & Warner 1979). 
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The enhanced firm value benefits banks by strengthening their claims on borrowing 
firms’ assets (Carey et al. 1993; Smith & Warner 1979).  
Furthermore, bank loan covenants can work as a monitoring strategy for banks 
during the life of loans (Bazzana 2010; Carey et al. 1993). Covenants provide early 
warning signals of the deterioration and/or changes of borrowing firms’ performance 
by including a buffer in the restrictiveness of covenants
42
 (Cotter 1998b; Day & 
Taylor 1998; Dichev & Skinner 2002). If covenants are violated, banks have the 
opportunity to react before the borrowing firms actually default on their loans, and 
thus banks are able to maintain close scrutiny over the borrowing firms during the 
life of loans (Dichev & Skinner 2002). Consequently, covenants are considered to be 
an important mechanism in controlling and monitoring risks for banks in their 
lending businesses (Bazzana 2010; Paglia 2007).  
In the Australian context, Cotter (1998a) indicates that providing early warning 
signals for current and potential concerns during the life of loans is the purpose of 
including covenants. The establishment of bank loan covenants is based on banks’ 
risk exposure that results from the likelihood of wealth transferring from banks to 
shareholders of borrowing firms (Cotter 1998a; Mather 1999). Knowledge about the 
establishment process of bank loan covenants is of significant importance to the 
management of environmental risks. However, little is known about this 
establishment process. Other than the research of Cotter (1998a), there is little 
literature investigating the functions of bank loan covenants in Australia. In addition, 
the research of Cotter was conducted before the year 1998 and the macroeconomic, 
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 A buffer in the restrictiveness of a covenant refers to the room between the restrictive level of the 
covenant and the unacceptable situation of a borrower. 
58 
 
institutional and regulatory situations have changed since that time 
43
(Mather & 
Peirson 2006). Banks’ knowledge regarding covenants is expected to evolve 
accordingly.  
Apart from traditional risks facing banks, environmental risks, stemming from 
environmental impacts of borrowing firms, are another risk banks need to consider in 
their lending businesses
44
 (Coulson & Monks 1999; Ernst & Young 2003). Therefore, 
whether and how bank loan covenants are used for managing environmental risks 
facing banks in their lending businesses are worth noting. There is research 
indicating that loan covenants are one of the most powerful and the most widely used 
tools to manage environmental risks in banks’ lending businesses45 (BankTrack 2003; 
Environment and Finance Research Enterprise 1995). In this regard, literature about 
the impact of environmental risks facing banks in their lending businesses on bank 
loan covenants is reviewed in section 2.6.  
2.6 Environmental Covenants 
To gain an understanding of whether and how bank loan covenants are used as a 
mechanism to manage environmental risks, this section reviews the literature about 
environmental covenants in bank loan agreements. To date, there is limited literature 
regarding environmental covenants in bank loan agreements. A large part of the 
available, though limited, literature is on the basis of multilateral development banks, 
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Literature about 
environmental covenants used by multiple development banks is reviewed in section 
                                                 
43
 An example of the changes is the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in the late 2000s and the 
development of Basel III in response to the GFC.  
44
 Traditional risks refer to mainstream risks such as tax, regulatory, credit and operational risk. 
45
 Managing environmental risks refers to controlling and monitoring environmental risks in this study.  
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2.6.1 and section 2.6.2 examines environmental covenants for loans from 
commercial banks. 
2.6.1 Environmental covenants for loans from multilateral development 
banks 
Since the 1970s, the World Bank has been taking environmental issues into its 
consideration in project financing which takes up a large proportion of the World 
Bank’s activities (Bekhechi 1999). Environmental covenants also started to be 
included in the World Bank’s loan agreements during the 1970s (Bekhechi 1999). 
The World Bank’s Environmental Assessment (EA) policy, making environmental 
assessment mandatory, was issued in 1989
46
. The EA policy aims to promote 
environmental sustainability development by preventing, minimizing, mitigating or 
compensating for any environmental and social concerns (World Bank Group 1999). 
Since then, environmental covenants have become a common feature of the World 
Bank’s loan agreements for project financing (Bekhechi 1999).  
According to Bekhechi, an environmental covenant is defined as the expression of a 
promise made by borrowers to take environment-related actions. The inclusion of 
environmental covenants stipulates the borrower ‘…to carry out the project with due 
diligence and due regard to environmental and ecological factors’ (Bekhechi 1999, 
p.302). They can be in the following forms suggested by the World Bank in its 
lending businesses (Bekhechi 1999, p.305):  
                                                 
46
 EA is a process whose breadth, depth and type of analysis depend on the nature, scale and potential 
environmental impact of the proposed project.  EA evaluates a project's potential environmental risks 
and impacts in its area of influence; examines project alternatives; identifies ways of improving 
project selection, siting, planning, design and implementation by preventing, minimizing, mitigating 
or compensating for adverse environmental impacts and enhancing positive impacts; and includes the 
process of mitigating and managing adverse environmental impacts throughout project 
implementation (The World Bank 2012).  
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1) the definition of environmental actions to be taken into the schedule 
related to project description and implementation, including the 
establishment of a specific environmental unit, training of staff, 
recruitment of consultants to advise on environmental issues and solutions; 
2) the preparation and/or implementation of environmental studies, plans or 
policies; 
3) the submission of reports to the Bank at specific periods of project 
implementation; 
4) the carrying out of consultation with stakeholders; 
5) the purchase, installation and operation of specific equipment to fight, 
control or reduce pollution; 
6) the enactment of existing or issuance of new legislations, standards and 
guidelines; 
7) the enforcement of existing or issuance of new legislation, standards and 
guidelines; 
8) provision of resources for environmental purpose; 
9) carrying out of environmental studies, including environmental impact 
assessment; and  
10) the carrying out of  consultation of project affected peoples. 
The ADB has also incorporated environmental issues into its lending businesses to 
encourage sustainable development among its developing member countries
47
. The 
incorporation can be achieved by employing environmental covenants in bank loan 
agreements (Asian Development Bank 1993). The interpretation of environmental 
covenants made by the ADB is ‘…undertakings that a borrower makes in accepting 
a Bank loan, and they reflect the importance that both parties to the loan agreement 
place on environmental matters’ (Asian Development Bank 1993, p.iii). The 
undertakings include both requirements for borrowers to take certain actions and 
restrictions to avoid taking certain actions (Asian Development Bank 1993). 
                                                 
47
 ADB is an international development finance institution whose mission is to help its developing 
member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. More details can be 
sourced from http://www.adb.org.  
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Therefore, it is consistent with and broader than the definition by Bekhechi (1999). 
The foci of the sample environmental covenants in loan agreements provided by 
Asian Development Bank (1993) centre around the following items: 
(1) issuance of environmental policies; 
(2) legislation and regulation compliance; 
(3) external standards application, such as international standards and the ADB 
guidelines; 
(4) environmental considerations in project design and implementation; 
(5) environmental management system; 
(6) clean technologies installation; 
(7) budget allocation for environmental purpose; 
(8) periodic reporting to the Bank; and  
(9) communication with stakeholders.  
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that environmental covenants 
recommended by the World Bank and the ADB have consistent foci which are 
demonstrated as follows:  
 borrowers’ issuance of environmental policies;  
 periodic environmental reporting and applied legislation and regulation 
compliance;  
 environmental management activities (adoption of environmental 
management system and/or environmental management practices such as 
environmental impact assessment);  
 financial resources for environmental purpose, application of environmentally 
friendly technologies; and  
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 stakeholder communications.  
Both Bekhechi (1999) and the Asian Development Bank (1993) argue that the 
formulation of environmental covenants should be customised to borrowers’ 
circumstances. For the World Bank and the ADB, borrowers refer to borrowing 
countries. Therefore, borrowers’ circumstances can include relevant national 
environmental strategy and legislation, and/or the strength of national institutions 
responsible for ensuring the protection and management of the environment.  
As a multilateral development bank, the World Bank’s loan agreements are between 
the World Bank and its member countries’ governments rather than individual firms, 
and thus the World Bank works on a different premise from commercial banks 
(Bekhechi 1999; Sarokin & Schulkin 1991). However, making business profitable is 
an important feature they have in common and the World Bank’s environmental 
practices have had considerable effect on commercial banks (Sarokin & Schulkin 
1991), as has the ADB. According to Jeucken and Bouma (2001), the environmental 
standards and practices from multilateral development banks play a critical role in 
promoting environmental sustainability in commercial banks’ lending businesses. As 
such, environmental covenants in loan agreements from the World Bank and the 
ADB are expected to be models for commercial banks when dealing with 
environmental risks in lending businesses.  
2.6.2 Environmental covenants for loans from commercial banks 
Environmental covenants for project financing 
Project financing, generally targeting large and expensive infrastructures, plays a 
critical role in enhancing financing development in the global market. To cope with 
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the environmental and social issues that project financing may encounter and 
promote environmental sustainability in project financing, the Equator Principles 
were developed (The Equator Principles Association 2011). Principle 8, a significant 
advantage of the Equator Principles, requires the incorporation of environmental 
covenants in loan agreements of banks’ project financing (Equator Principles 
Financial Institutions 2006). Principle 8 states that: 
For Category A and B projects
48
, the borrower will covenant in financing 
documentation: 
a) to comply with all relevant host country social and environmental laws, 
regulations and permits in all material respects; 
b) to comply with the Action Plan (AP)
49
 (where applicable) during the 
construction and operation of the project in all material respects; 
c) to provide periodic reports in a format agreed with Equator Principles 
Financial Institutions (EPFIs) (with the frequency of these reports 
proportionate to the severity of impacts, or as required by law, but not less 
than annually), prepared by in-house staff or third party experts, that i) 
document compliance with the AP (where applicable), and ii) provide 
representation of compliance with relevant local, state and host country 
social and environmental laws, regulations and permits; and 
d) to decommission the facilities, where applicable and appropriate, in 
accordance with an agreed decommissioning plan. 
Where a borrower is not in compliance with its social and environmental 
covenants, EPFIs will work with the borrower to bring it back into 
compliance to the extent feasible, and if the borrower fails to re-establish 
                                                 
48
 Category A refers to ‘Projects with potential significant adverse social or environmental impacts 
that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented’. Category B is ‘Projects with potential limited 
adverse social or environmental impacts that are few in number, generally site-specific, largely 
reversible and readily addressed through mitigation measures’ (Equator Principles Financial 
Institutions 2006).  
49
 The Action Plan may range from a brief description of routine mitigation measures to a series of 
documents (e.g., resettlement action plan, indigenous peoples plan, emergency preparedness and 
response plan, decommissioning plan). The level of detail and complexity of the Action Plan and the 
priority of the identified measures and actions will be commensurate with the project’s potential 
impacts and risks (Equator Principles Financial Institutions 2006). 
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compliance within an agreed grace period, EPFIs reserve the right to 
exercise remedies, as they consider appropriate. 
Therefore, the general environmental covenants recommended by the Equator 
Principles include compliance with all relevant environmental legislation, regulations 
and guidelines, the implementation of full Environmental Management Plan towards 
A and B projects as well as periodic reporting on compliance and implementation. 
However, the Equator Principles are voluntary compliance-based and there is no 
mechanism ensuring the implementation of these principles (BankTrack 2003; 
Thomas 2004). Therefore, it is still unclear whether and how banks that adopt the 
Equator Principles incorporate environmental covenants in their loan agreements. 
Furthermore, the Equator Principles are designed for banks’ project financing. 
Although the Equator Principles are suggested to be applied into banks’ other 
lending businesses (BankTrack 2005b, 2005a), very little knowledge is available 
regarding whether and how they are implemented in banks’ corporate lending.  
Environmental covenants for banks’ lending businesses 
Environment and Finance Research Enterprise (1995) conducted a global survey on 
financial institutions’ environmental policies and practices in their lending businesses. 
The results show that 55% of the participants incorporate environmental covenants 
into their loan agreements. There is also argument that the incorporation of 
environmental covenants in corporate loan agreements is likely to be effective in 
mitigating banks’ environmental risks exposure, and thus contributes to banks’ 
overall risk minimization (Case 1999). In addition, Case (1999) provides specimen 
environmental covenants which are suggested to be incorporated into banks’ 
corporate loan agreements (see Appendix 1). The foci of specimen environmental 
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covenants from Case (1999) are: (1) protecting banks from incurring any direct or 
indirect environmental liabilities resulting from borrowers’ environmental impacts; 
(2) borrowers’ compliance with applied environmental legislation and operating 
permits; and (3) borrowers’ periodic reporting to banks about their environmental 
activities that could impair their ability to repay the loans. Apart from these most 
important and commonly used environmental covenants, there are environmental 
covenants restricting borrowing firms from undertaking certain activities (Case 1999).  
By comparison, in addition to borrowers’ compliance with applied environmental 
legislation and periodic environmental reporting, environmental covenants presented 
by Asian Development Bank (1993), Bekhechi (1999) and the Equator Principles pay 
considerable attention to borrowers’ environmental management practices. The 
specimen environmental covenants provided by Case (1999) do not include 
requirements for borrowing firms to undertake environmental management activities. 
However, Case (1999) indicates that an evaluation of borrowing firms’ 
environmental management practices is required to protect banks from financial 
losses related to borrowing firms’ environmental impacts. Consequently, there is an 
implication that environmental management practices of borrowing firms attract 
significant attention from banks in their corporate lending.  
The specimen environmental covenants provided by Case can be interpreted as the 
expression of promises to take or avoid environment-related actions; that is, they are 
consistent in nature with environmental covenants defined by Asian Development 
Bank (1993). Accordingly, environmental covenants can be interpreted as: An 
environmental covenant in bank loan agreements is the expression of a borrowing 
firm’s promise to take or to avoid certain environmental-related actions.  
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Based on the above discussions, it appears that typical environmental covenants for 
both multilateral development banks and commercial banks are: 
 requirement for compliance with applied environmental obligations 
(environmental legislation, licence to operate, and/or undertakings in bank 
loan agreements apart from covenants); 
 requirement for periodic environmental reporting to inform banks of 
borrowers’ environmental practices as part of the on-going loan monitoring 
process; and  
 requirement for certain environmental management practices by borrowers. 
Accordingly, typical environmental covenants are affirmative non-financial 
covenants. However, there is little research providing explanations for it and 
investigating the process of establishing these environmental covenants. In addition, 
no research has been done examining the effectiveness of the typical environmental 
covenants in managing banks’ environmental risk exposure. 
Consistent with Bekhechi (1999) and Asian Development Bank (1993), Case (1999) 
also indicates that environmental covenants need to be negotiated against borrowing 
firms’ environmental aspects to better protect banks from environmental risks. 
However, according to Case, the extent that environmental covenants are customised 
in terms of borrowing firms’ specific environmental issues is generally confined to 
which typical environmental covenants should be included. For example, compliance 
with environmental legislation is of particular importance to borrowing firms who 
need environmental authorisations to operate; periodic environmental reporting is 
especially useful in monitoring environmental concerns identified during 
environmental due diligence (Case 1999).  
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Australian evidence on the presence of environmental covenants in bank loan 
agreements is provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000). The survey by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers reveals that the most frequently used mechanism by 
Australian banks to manage their environmental risk exposure is environmental 
covenants. However, the form, contents, functions and establishment process of 
environmental covenants
50
 in Australian bank loan agreements remain unknown. 
Apart from the research of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), there is no published 
literature investigating environmental covenants in Australian banks’ lending 
businesses. Consequently, further research regarding environmental covenants in 
bank loan agreements is needed in the Australian context.  
In addition to environmental covenants in bank loan agreements, the cost of bank 
loans is expected to be used in managing environmental risks by incorporating an 
environmental risk premium (Barannik 2001). To this end, the impact of 
environmental risks on the cost of bank loans is discussed in the following section.  
2.7 Environmental Risks and the Cost of Bank Loans 
Section 2.7.1 demonstrates the determinants of the cost of bank loans; this aims to 
provide a basis that whether environmental risks are likely to be considered as one of 
the factors of the cost of bank loans in previous literature. Following this, section 
2.7.2 reviews the literature regarding the association between environmental risks 
facing banks and the cost of bank loans.  
                                                 
50
 The contents of covenants refer to borrowing firms’ activities that restrictions or requirements are 
placed on; that is, what a covenant is about. 
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2.7.1 Determinants of the cost of bank loans  
According to Merton (1974), the price of corporate debt draws essentially on the 
following items: (1) the required rate of return on risk free debt (e.g., government 
bonds or very high-grade corporate bonds); (2) the debt agreement terms (e.g., 
maturity, covenants); and (3) default risk arising from the probability of a firm’s 
failure to fulfil its obligations according to the agreement. Of these items, the 
determinant of a firm’s cost of debt is the firm’s default risk (Bhojraj & Sengupta 
2003; Longstaff, Mithal & Neis 2005; Merton 1974; Sharfman & Fernando 2008). 
Default risk derives from the possibility of a borrower’s insolvency on its debt and 
obligations (Crosbie & Bohn 2003). Credit risk is also frequently mentioned in 
previous literature which mostly refers to ‘…the potential that a bank borrower or 
counterparty will fail to meet its obligation in accordance with agreed terms’ (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2000, p.1). In this context, default risk and credit 
risk can be used interchangeably. This dissertation uses credit risk for consistency, 
and defines it as the likelihood that a borrowing firm fails to fulfil its obligations on 
the loan.  
Credit risk has been the leading risk for banks and has been the focus of banks’ 
lending businesses (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2000; Santomero 
1997). Ganzi et al. (1998) also state that borrowers’ ability to repay banks in full 
their principal plus interest obligations is the focus of banks’ lending businesses. 
Firms with higher credit risk are likely to pay a higher cost of bank loans to 
compensate for the extra credit risk banks incur (Morgan & Ashcraft 2003; Sharfman 
& Fernando 2008; Strahan 1999). The credit risk facing banks is identified by Case 
(1999, p.33) as:  
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 the customer credit quality, which in turn is measured by the credit grade-
an objective assessment of the probability of default by either an internal 
system or (for investment grade borrowers) the ‘rating’ of an external 
credit agency, such as Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s. Typically, 
internal system use increasingly complex mathematical models to predict 
the probability of default, which take into account a combination of 
quantitative factors (such as balance sheet size and strength, profitability, 
capital gearing) and qualitative ones (such as management, financial 
reporting, industry sector prospects); 
 the degree of loss on default, which is dependent upon the realisation 
values of collateral/security held. Generally ‘default values’ for the 
degree of loss are assumed based upon statistical evidence of actual, 
historical, realisations and losses.  
Therefore, the determinants of credit risk facing banks include both quantitative 
factors that are incorporated in banks’ internal credit rating models, and qualitative 
factors requiring banks’ subjective judgements51. One of the primary quantitative 
considerations is borrowing firms’ financial strengths, such as profitability, cash flow, 
capitalisation and balance sheet strength. The quality of borrowing firms’ 
management and banks’ perceptions towards the industries’ prospects are two 
primary qualitative considerations.  
The Principles for the Management of Credit Risk developed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) demonstrates that all current and 
potential credit risk factors need to be identified and assessed to effectively manage 
credit risk in banks’ lending businesses 52. As discussed in section 2.2, environmental 
risks facing banks in their lending businesses can impact on banks through credit risk. 
                                                 
51
 Detailed discussions of the factors in determining banks’ credit risk are beyond the scope of this 
study. 
52
 According to the interpretation of credit risk from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2000), credit risk can be translated to default risk.  
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Therefore, as one of the credit risk factors, environmental risks are suggested to be 
integrated into banks’ credit risk management in previous literature (Thompson & 
Cowton 2004; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). Consequently, environmental risks 
are likely to be reflected in the cost of bank loans. Section 2.7.2 examines the 
association between environmental risks and the cost of bank loans.  
2.7.2 Association between environmental risks and the cost of bank loans 
Goss and Roberts (2011) examine the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and the cost of bank loans based on a sample of 3996 loans to 
1265 US firms from 1991 to 2006. They conclude that banks punish firms with 
inferior levels of CSR by charging a higher cost of bank loans. For the worst CSR 
performers, banks charge 18 basis points more. Goss and Roberts (2011) take CSR as 
an overall concept and therefore make no conclusion regarding the impact of just 
environmental risks on the cost of bank loans.  
Specifically in terms of the linkage between environmental risks facng banks in their 
corporate lending and the cost of bank loans, Coulson and Monks (1999) indicate 
that higher environmental risks facing banks are likely to result in a higher cost of 
bank loans. They also provide evidence that the National Westminster Bank and the 
Co-operative Bank offer a lower cost of bank loans for borrowing firms that 
demonstrate environmental sustainability commitment. The implication is that lower 
environmental risks facing banks in their corporate lending are likely to result in a 
lower cost of bank loans for borrowing firms. However, this study is UK-based and it 
is not clear whether the results can be generalized outside the UK.  
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In addition, Case (1999) provides theoretical options to have environmental risks 
facing banks reflected in the cost of bank loans. He states that environmental risks 
facing banks will be incorporated into the cost of bank loans when one or more of the 
following conditions occurs:  
 influencing the internal credit ratings of borrowing firms; 
 influencing the value and saleability of collateral; and 
 influencing the grading of industry prospects.  
However, Case (1999) indicates that, in practice, environmental risks are rarely 
integrated in the cost of bank loans. He provides the following explanations. First, 
due to the lack of relevant environmental data, the financial impact of environmental 
risks is difficult to fully estimate (Case 1999). As such, the integration of 
environmental risks into the cost of bank loans is impeded. Second, there is concern 
that banks are likely to lose their price competitiveness in the loan market if they 
include an environmental risk premium in the cost of bank loans (Case 1999). The 
price competitiveness concern is of more importance in explaining why 
environmental risks are rarely integrated in the cost of bank loans (Case 1999). 
In the Australian context, in a study commissioned by the Minister for the 
Environment and Heritage, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001) evaluate environmental 
practices of Australian financial institutions compared to the global trend of 
environmental sustainability. PricewaterhouseCoopers report that Australian banks 
are not differentiating the cost of bank loans against environmental risks facing 
banks. However, this report is based on a desktop review with only limited 
consultation with representatives from Australian banks (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2001), and thus there is concern that the results are not substantive. With the 
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exception of the report from PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001), there is no evidence in 
Australia in relation to whether and how environmental risks facing banks in their 
lending businesses are related to the cost of bank loans. As such, a proposition is 
developed to investigate whether and how banks’ exposure to environmental risks in 
their corporate lending are associated with the cost of bank loans. This is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3. The following section develops a conceptual framework 
based on previous literature reviewed in this Chapter.  
2.8 Conceptual Framework Based on Previous Literature 
Based on discussion in the above sections, a conceptual framework is developed (see 
Figure 2.4). This conceptual framework is based on banks’ lending businesses rather 
than just corporate lending. In addition, most of the evidence shown in this 
conceptual framework is from banks in the USA, UK and Europe. In spite of these 
shortcomings, the development of the interview checklists for this study is based on 
this conceptual framework, and thus it can be tested in interviews with senior 
executive bankers of major Australian banks. This research aims to form a view 
about whether this conceptual framework is applicable to Australian banks’ 
corporate lending. A second conceptual framework is developed based on the results 
derived from the interviews. A comparison of the two conceptual frameworks is 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, which is inherent in discussion of the results.  
The conceptual framework based on previous literature shows that environmental 
risks impact on banks in their corporate lending through direct risk (lender liability), 
indirect risk (credit risk) and reputational risk. Banks’ exposure to environmental 
risks is the motivation for banks to integrate environmental risks into their corporate 
credit processes. To this end, literature regarding the determinants of banks’ 
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environmental risk exposure is reviewed. Banks’ environmental risk exposure is a 
function of the potential consequences of an environmental risk event, the probability 
of the environmental risk event emerging and borrowing firms’ available financial 
resources to deal with their potential environmental consequences.  
Following this, both banks’ commitments and their practices of integrating 
environmental risks into their credit processes are discussed. The UNEP Statement 
and the Equator Principles represent signatory banks’ environmental commitments to 
dealing with environmental risks. The Equator Principles also provide banks with 
guidance for ERM in their project financing. Recognising that banks’ environmental 
practices are not necessarily related to their environmental commitments (Corporate 
Responsibility Coalition 2005; Rhee & Lee 2003; van Gelder, Herder & 
Kouwenhoven 2010), banks’ environmental practices in managing environmental 
risks are reviewed. Banks’ ERM processes and their integration into the corporate 
credit process are discussed. As an integral part of banks’ ERM, the associations 
between environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank 
loans are then reviewed.  
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Figure 2.4  Conceptual Framework from Previous Literature  
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Bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans are expected to be the mechanisms 
used for controlling and monitoring environmental risks facing banks. Environmental 
covenants are frequently used as a mechanism to manage banks’ environmental risk 
exposure (Environment and Finance Research Enterprise 1995; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000). Environmental covenants that are typically included 
in bank loan agreement include requirements of borrowing firms’ environmental 
obligation compliance, periodic environmental reporting and environmental 
management practices.  
Case (1999) indicates that theoretically environmental risks are reflected in the cost 
of bank loans through their impact on credit ratings of borrowing firms, value and 
saleability of collateral, and perceptions towards industry prospects. However, due to 
the lack of  relevant environmental information and banks’ concern about their loan 
price competitiveness in the market, environmental risks do not generally impact on 
the cost of bank loans in corporate lending (Case 1999).  
2.9 Chapter Summary  
This chapter synthesizes the previous literature relevant to the research problem. It 
reviews environmental risks from banks’ point of view and their integration into 
banks’ corporate credit processes from a broader perspective. The associations 
between environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank 
loans are also reviewed as a specific research focus. Agency theory underpins these 
associations and is explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 also develops the propositions 
and outlines the theoretical framework.  
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
PROPOSITIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
Building on the review of the extant literature in Chapter 2, this chapter sets out the 
theoretical framework and propositions. It commences by restating the research 
problem and questions. Agency theory is then explained in section 3.3 as it relates to 
this research. Based on the discussion in section 3.3, section 3.4 applies agency 
theory to environmental risks. This theory is expected to underpin the presence of 
environmental covenants and the relationship between environmental risks and the 
cost of bank loans. Following this, section 3.5 sets out the development of the 
research propositions. Herein, the theoretical linkages between environmental risks 
and bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans are outlined, and the literature 
underlying the theoretical framework is placed in context. The theoretical framework 
consolidates the literature about environmental risks, banks’ ERM, environmental 
covenants in bank loan agreements and the cost of bank loans. Figure 3.1 graphically 
depicts the structure of this chapter.  
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Figure 3.1  Structure of Chapter 3 
 
3.2 Research Problem and Research Questions 
As indicated in Chapter 1, this study aims to address the research problem:  
How are environmental risks associated with bank loan covenants and the 
cost of bank loans in Australian banks’ corporate lending? 
Two research questions are developed in order to address this research problem. 
    RQ1: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated with bank 
loan covenants? 
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   RQ2: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated with the 
cost of bank loans? 
Agency theory underpins the associations between environmental risks facing banks 
in their corporate lending and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans. 
The following section presents a detailed review of agency theory.  
3.3 Agency Theory  
Agency theory can be used to explain the agency problem that exists in relationship 
between creditors and shareholders of firms and provides insights for the design of 
debt agreements governing the agency relationship. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p.5), an agency relationship is ‘…a contract under which the 
principal(s) engage the agent to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent’. Given the assumptions of 
self-interest and asymmetric information, there is a conflict of interest in the agency 
relationship between creditors and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith & 
Warner 1979). This implies that borrowing firms (on behalf of their shareholders) 
will look after their own interest at the expense of creditors; which is known as the 
agency problem (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith & Warner 1979). According to 
Smith and Warner (1979), there are four main sources of the interest conflict inherent 
in the shareholder-creditor relationship: 
Dividend payout: The dividend payout problem arises when a borrowing firm’s 
shareholders are paid a liquidating dividend
53
 leaving worthless claims for creditors.  
                                                 
53
 Liquidating dividend is a dividend payment to shareholders that exceeds a firm's retained earnings. 
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Claim dilution: The claim dilution problem arises when the manager of a firm issues 
additional debt of the same or higher priority. The existing creditors have to share the 
firm’s assets with more claimants than they otherwise would. 
Asset substitution: Asset substitution results from the substitution of low risk projects 
with high risk projects. It transfers wealth from creditors to shareholders of a 
borrowing firm. Creditors bear all the downside risk of the borrowing firm but do not 
share in its upside profit (Deegan 2009; Peirson 2010). That is, the losses are diluted 
by creditors if the borrowing firm fails on risky projects; while if it succeeds 
creditors only obtain a fixed amount of the profit. To this end, the borrowing firm has 
an incentive to undertake risky activities.  
Underinvestment: According to Myers (1977), the market value of a firm is 
composed of both the present value of its tangible assets and intangible assets. 
Intangible assets are in the form of future investment opportunities. A firm with 
outstanding debt can have incentives to reject a project with positive net present 
value if the project benefits creditors over shareholders. Underinvestment arises 
under this condition. 
If dividend payout and claim dilution happen during the life of debts, there is less 
compensation to the loss given default of creditors than there otherwise would be. As 
such, other things being equal, risks facing creditors are higher. In addition, 
shareholders of a firm share losses with creditors but keep all the upside profits of 
projects or investments (Deegan 2009; Peirson 2010). Therefore, they have a strong 
incentive to increase their risk taking, which is likely to expose creditors to higher 
risks. Accordingly, the conflict of interest between creditors and shareholders 
contributes to risks facing creditors.  
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Agency theory assumes that rational creditors recognise the incentives borrowing 
firms have for wealth exploitation and thus the corresponding risks facing them. To 
this end, creditors will forecast the effects of such actions and price debt accordingly 
(Smith & Warner 1979). The incremental price imposed on the debt as a result is the 
agency cost of debt (Jensen & Meckling 1976). As a consequence, the agency cost of 
debt will be borne by shareholders of firms and thus there is an incentive for them to 
reduce it. Including covenants in debt agreements is an effective way to reduce the 
agency cost of debt (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith & Warner 1979). Covenants 
are used to manage risks facing creditors by imposing limits on borrowing firms’ 
ability to transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders 
54
(Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Smith & Warner 1979).  
One underlying assumption inherent in agency theory is that covenants can induce 
opportunity costs for borrowing firms by constraining their operating flexibility and 
investing opportunities (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith & Warner 1979). The 
opportunity costs are part of the agency cost of debt. Agency cost of debt also 
includes the costs of writing covenants, monitoring borrowing firms’ covenant 
compliance and enforcing covenants in the event of breaching (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). There is a trade-off between the benefits resulting from the constraint of 
covenants and the costs imposed by the covenants (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith 
& Warner 1979). 
Therefore, it is impossible for covenants to completely protect creditors from 
borrowing firms’ incentives to benefit shareholders over creditors (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Smith & Warner 1979). The implication is that despite the inclusion 
                                                 
54
 In this study, one of the assumptions is that banks are risk averse. Banks take measures to control 
their risk exposure with the expectation of reducing the risk exposure as much as they can.  
81 
 
of covenants, they are unlikely to completely align the interests of creditors and 
borrowing firms and thus there is still residual agency cost of debt resulting from the 
residual conflict of interest. The implication is that the residual agency cost of debt is 
reflected in the cost of debt.  
As one of the creditors of firms, banks are expected to derive useful insights from 
agency theory which can be applied in the relationship between themselves and 
borrowing firms. A discussion of agency theory in the context of this study is 
presented in the following section.  
3.4 Application of Agency Theory to Environmental Risks 
In relation to bank loans, the banks that provide loans to firms are principals, and the 
firms acting on behalf of their shareholders are agents. The conflict of interest 
between banks and borrowing firms leads to the potential for borrowing firms to 
make decisions benefiting their shareholders over their lending banks. The conflict of 
interest represents part of the risks facing banks in their lending businesses. However, 
banks are expected to recognise this interest conflict and thus the potential, and to 
take actions to reduce the expected costs of this agency problem.  
A conflict of interest related to environmental aspects is likely to arise where the 
interests of the parties involved in a given environmental issue are not aligned with 
each other (Sloep & Blowers 1996). Take borrowing firms’ environmental disclosure 
as an example. Bankers require more disclosures about borrowing firms’ 
environmental contamination clean-up costs, breaches of environmental standards, 
and contingent liability data when appraising borrowing firms’ credit worthiness 
(Thompson & Cowton 2004). However, the majority of the environmental 
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information disclosed by borrowing firms is positive and favourable to borrowing 
firms’ reputation (Clarkson, Overell & Chapple 2011; Deegan & Gordon 1996; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996; Frost  & English 2002). This implies that environmental 
disclosure is self-laudatory in nature rather than objective (Deegan & Rankin 1996), 
and it is not necessarily indicative of the underlying environmental performance 
(Clarkson, Overell & Chapple 2011). Another example is borrowing firms’ 
environmental management. Banks expect high quality environmental management 
of borrowing firms to reduce the probability of environmental risk events occurring 
(Coulson & Monks 1999; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2011; 
Sharfman & Fernando 2008). Although borrowing firms are likely to have 
environmental policies and commitments to managing environmental issues, their 
environmental management practices are not necessarily reflective of their 
environmental policies and commitments (Case 1999; Corporate Responsibility 
Coalition 2005; Rhee & Lee 2003; van Gelder, Herder & Kouwenhoven 2010).  
Accordingly, by extending loans to a borrowing firm, banks are likely to face 
environmental risks that result from any conflict of interest related to the firm’s 
environmental aspects. Therefore environmental risks facing banks in their lending 
businesses contribute to the agency cost of debt (see Figure 3.2). According to 
agency theory, one way to reduce the agency cost of debt is to include covenants in 
bank loan agreements limiting managerial behaviours that benefit shareholders of 
borrowing firms over banks. Covenants aiming to align the conflict of interest related 
to environmental aspects are expected to be included in bank loan agreements; that is, 
environmental covenants that are used to manage environmental risks are expected to 
be put in place.  
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Figure 3.2  Theoretical Framework 
 
Similar to traditional covenants, there are costs attached to the presence of 
environmental covenants. Accordingly, environmental covenants are unlikely to 
completely protect banks from environmental risks that result from the interest 
conflict between banks and borrowing firms in terms of environmental aspects. Thus, 
there is still a residual agency cost of debt resulting from the residual conflict of 
interest in terms of environmental aspects. As implied by agency theory, the residual 
agency cost of debt is expected to be priced into the cost of bank loans. Three 
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research propositions are developed based on the theoretical framework shown above. 
These propositions address the research questions and the research problem, and are 
developed in the following section.  
3.5 Proposition Development 
Section 3.5.1 articulates the rationale for the presence of environmental covenants in 
bank loan agreements. Following this, the question of whether environmental 
covenants are customised in terms of environmental risks facing banks is discussed 
in section 3.5.2.  
3.5.1 Environmental covenants in bank loan agreements 
There is a growing body of increasingly restrictive environmental legislation 
worldwide, as well as increased scrutiny into environmental issues from businesses’ 
stakeholders (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen & Hughes 2004; Case 1999; Charter & 
Polonsky 1999; Connors & Sliva-Gao 2008; Environmental Capital Markets 
Committee 2000; Ernst & Young 2003). As discussed in Chapter 2, under these 
circumstances environmental risks manifest themselves as direct risk (lender 
liability), indirect risk (credit risk) and reputational risk in banks’ lending businesses.  
Lender liability is likely to be borne by banks under environmental legislation, and 
can take the form of clean-up and/or remediation costs for the environmental damage 
caused by borrowing firms. Banks are expected to take actions to protect themselves 
from the costs of lender liability which are usually significant. In addition, banks’ 
environmental risk exposure that results from borrowing firms’ environmental 
activities can lead to incremental credit risk for banks (Case 1999; Greene 2006; 
Thompson 1998a). On one side, with the growing body of restrictive environmental 
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legislation, borrowing firms have increased exposure to environmental costs which 
impair their ability to repay loans according to bank loan agreements (Case 1999). 
On the other side, if real properties held as collateral by banks are environmentally 
contaminated, banks will suffer lower security from the impaired value and 
saleability of the contaminated collateral. There is evidence that banks are 
increasingly integrating environmental risks into their credit risk evaluation 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001; Thompson & Cowton 2004; Weber, Fenchel & 
Scholz 2008).  
Environmental risks can impair banks’ reputation, which is known as reputational 
risk. Businesses’ reputation is a composition of perceptions from the businesses’ key 
stakeholders who play a significant role in their long-term viability (Fombrun 1996). 
Given the increasing scrutiny into environmental aspects from businesses’ 
stakeholders, environmental aspects have been an important element of businesses’ 
reputation since the 1990s (Fombrun 1996; Miles & Covin 2000).  
Based on the above discussions, environmental risks are an integral part of banks’ 
overall risks that result from the conflict of interest between banks and borrowing 
firms. According to agency theory, covenants are included in bank loan agreements 
to alleviate the conflict of interest and thus manage the corresponding risks. 
Therefore, covenants that are designed to manage environmental risks are expected 
to be included in bank loan agreements. According to the definition of environmental 
covenants provided in section 2.6 of Chapter 2, these covenants are known as 
environmental covenants. Previous literature provides evidence that environmental 
covenants are one of the most valuable and widely used tools to manage 
environmental risks in banks’ lending businesses (BankTrack 2003; Environment 
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and Finance Research Enterprise 1995). EBRD (2011) further provides a real 
example showing the value of environmental covenants (see Appendix 2). The above 
discussion leads to Proposition 1a: 
Proposition 1a: There are environmental covenants in bank loan agreements to 
manage environmental risks. 
3.5.2 Customised environmental covenants 
As discussed above, the inclusion of bank loan covenants aims to minimise the 
conflict of interest between banks and borrowing firms. The conflict of interest in 
turn depends on borrowing firms’ circumstances that are likely to expose banks to 
risks
55
(Mather & Peirson 2006; Moir & Sudarsanam 2007). Bank loan covenants are 
directly negotiated between banks and borrowing firms and they are renegotiation-
flexible (Carey et al. 1993; Dichev & Skinner 2002; Mather 1999; Mather & Peirson 
2006; Moir & Sudarsanam 2007). As such, there is an optimal structure of bank loan 
covenants that effectively manages the conflict of interest between banks and 
borrowing firms
56
 (Mather & Peirson 2006; Moir & Sudarsanam 2007). The optimal 
structure of bank loan covenants is tailored in terms of banks’ risk exposure, and it is 
demanded by banks and agreed to by borrowing firms
57
 (Moir & Sudarsanam 2007).  
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 Borrowing firms’ circumstances involve their business nature and financial performance, as well as 
the situations about the macroeconomics, market, industry and legislation under which borrowing 
firms are operating. 
56
 The structure of bank loan covenants consists of the content and restrictiveness of the covenants. 
The content refers to borrowing firms’ activities that restrictions or requirements are placed on and the 
restrictiveness is composed of the tightness and number of bank loan covenants.  
57
 There is evidence that covenants are calibrated based on banks’ risk exposure. El-Gazzar and 
Pastena (1991) find that there are more restrictive covenants for borrowing firms exposing banks to 
higher risks, and those exposing banks to lower risks are able to negotiate less restrictive covenants. 
Cotter (1998b) argues that the choice of covenants to be included in bank loan agreements is based on 
banks’ financial risk exposure.  
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Accordingly, to effectively manage environmental risks facing banks in their 
corporate lending, environmental covenants in bank loan agreements are expected to 
be tailored in terms of banks’ environmental risk exposure. As discussed in Chapter 
2, banks’ environmental risk exposure is determined by the potential consequences 
of a borrowing firm’s environmental issues, and the borrowing firm’s management 
and financial capability to deal with the environmental issues. To a certain extent, 
Case (1999) provides supporting argument that environmental covenants in corporate 
loan agreements need to be negotiated based on a firm’s specific environmental 
issues. The above discussion leads to Proposition 1b: 
Proposition 1b: Environmental covenants are customised in terms of 
environmental risks facing banks. 
3.5.3 The cost of bank loans 
The inclusion of a covenant in a bank loan agreement depends on the trade-off 
between the marginal benefit from the constraint of the covenant and the marginal 
cost imposed by the inclusion of the covenant (Bradley & Roberts 2004; Smith & 
Warner 1979). According to agency theory, including a set of detailed and wide-
ranging bank loan covenants that aims to eliminate risks facing banks is extremely 
costly. Therefore, covenants will not be able to completely protect banks from their 
risk exposure (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Accordingly, there remain residual risks 
facing banks even when there are covenants in bank loan agreements. The agency 
cost of debt corresponding to the residual risks is expected to be reflected in the cost 
of bank loans.  
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There are three scenarios in which a relationship between environmental risks facing 
banks and the cost of bank loans are predicted. Assuming that there are two 
borrowing firms, and other things being equal, firm A exposes banks to lower 
environmental risks, while the loan to firm B leads to higher environmental risks. 
Scenario 1: Supposing there are environmental covenants in bank loan agreements, 
but they are not customised to banks’ environmental risk exposure in their corporate 
lending. As discussed above, banks are expected to recognise the conflict of interest 
related to environmental aspects and therefore they are likely to take actions to 
minimise the conflict. The costs induced by these actions are part of the agency cost 
of debt. Other things being equal, higher environmental risks facing banks lead to 
higher agency cost of debt. The same amount of agency cost of debt is assumed to be 
reduced by environmental covenants that are not differentiated in terms of 
environmental risks facing banks. As such, there is less residual agency cost of debt 
for firm A than that for firm B. The residual agency cost of debt is expected to be 
priced into the cost of bank loans. Therefore, under this scenario, lower 
environmental risk exposure is anticipated to result in a lower cost of bank loans and 
a higher cost of bank loans are expected to be imposed on firm B.  
Scenario 2: Supposing there are environmental covenants in bank loan agreements 
and they are tailored towards environmental risks facing banks. As such, 
environmental covenants place different constraint on firm A and firm B. Supposing 
environmental covenants with higher constraint are included in bank loan agreements 
for firm B. These environmental covenants reduce banks’ environmental risk 
exposure from firm B to the same extent as the residual environmental risk exposure 
from firm A. Accordingly, there is the same amount of agency cost of debt that 
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results from the same amount of residual environmental risk exposure.  However, the 
cost of bank loan for firm B is not the same as that for firm A at this point. Higher 
enforcing costs, monitoring costs and opportunity costs induced by the incremental 
constraint from environmental covenants for firm B are added to the total agency 
cost of debt incurred by firm B. These incremental costs offset part of the benefit 
from including environmental covenants with higher constraint for firm B. Therefore, 
the total agency cost of debt for firm B is still higher than that for firm A, which 
indicates a higher cost of bank loans for firm B. Another supposition is that there are 
environmental covenants with higher constraint for firm B than those for firm A, but 
banks’ residual environmental risk exposure related to firm B is still higher than that 
resulting from firm A. Under this scenario, firm B would still expect a higher cost of 
debt than firm A 
58
.  
Scenario 3: Supposing there are no environmental covenants in bank loan 
agreements. With no environmental covenant mitigating the agency cost of debt, the 
agency cost of debt resulting from banks’ environmental risk exposure will be fully 
priced into the cost of bank loans. Other things being equal, firm A will have a lower 
agency cost of debt than firm B. Accordingly, lower environmental risk exposure for 
banks is likely to correspond to a lower cost of bank loans, ceteris paribus. Together, 
the above discussions under three scenarios rationalise Proposition 2: 
Proposition 2: Environmental risks facing banks are factored into the cost of bank 
loans. 
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 More residual environmental risk exposure resulting from firm B leads to a higher residual agency 
cost of debt. There is also incremental agency cost of debt imposed by the incremental constraint of 
environmental covenants for firm B. Consequently, higher agency cost of debt is incurred by firm B, 
which leads to a higher cost of bank loans for firm B. As a result, lower environmental risks facing 
banks are expected to result in a lower cost of bank loans for firm A; higher environmental risk 
exposure for banks are likely to result in a higher cost of bank loans for firm B. 
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3.6 Chapter Summary 
To investigate environmental risks facing banks in their corporate lending, the 
conflict of interest between banks and borrowing firms is an important consideration. 
Agency theory is typically used to depict the shareholder-creditor relationship, which 
rationalises the usage of covenants and the cost of debt as protections for creditors’ 
interests. This chapter develops propositions on the basis that agency theory is likely 
to be useful in explaining the relationship between banks (creditors) and borrowing 
firms (on behalf of their shareholders) in relation to environmental risks. The 
following chapter presents the research methodology used to address the propositions 
and thus the research problem.  
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CHAPTER 4   RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 details the theoretical framework and develops propositions grounded in 
agency theory and the relevant literature. This chapter outlines the research 
methodology adopted for this study and the methods employed to address the 
research propositions and the research questions. The research methodology and the 
research design are informed by the research paradigm underlying this study
59
. 
Research paradigms provide conceptual and practical implications for a researcher’s 
methodological choices in a research design (Creswell 2007; Guba 1990). This 
chapter begins by providing a rationale for the underlying research paradigm, 
research methodology and research design adopted in this study (Creswell 2007; 
Guba 1990). Although a detailed examination of research paradigms is well beyond 
the research scope, a brief overview is presented to provide an adequate context for 
the approach taken in this study. Following this, the research design is described in 
terms of how the chosen research methodology is implemented. The research design 
includes the sampling methods and strategies, methods and procedures for data 
collection and data analysis. Finally, a summary of this chapter is presented to 
synthesise the main points of the chapter. The structure of Chapter 4 is outlined in 
Figure 4.1. 
 
                                                 
59
 Research methodology is defined as a conceptualised strategy to approach this study. By research 
design, this study refers to a logical process of how research methodology is empirically implemented 
in a specific study, which connects research paradigms to practices. 
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Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 4.1  Structure of Chapter 4 
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4.2 Research Paradigms 
This section provides an overview of research paradigms and justifies the utility of 
the phenomenological paradigm for the purpose of this study. The rationale for using 
a qualitative methodology is also presented.  
4.2.1 Introduction of research paradigms 
A research paradigm is a set of basic beliefs or philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of reality and how researchers can understand that reality from a given 
research perspective (Creswell 2007; Guba 1990; Guba & Lincoln 1994; Healy & 
Perry 2000; Myers 2008; Patton 2002). There are long-standing arguments between 
paradigmatic and methodological dimensions within both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to research, leading to inconsistent paradigm categorisations (Patton 
2002). Interchangeable usage of different terms intertwined with the long-standing 
debates has led to confusion about how paradigms should be interpreted, categorised 
and applied (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002). Although a detailed 
examination of research paradigms and categorisations are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, a brief review is presented below to justify the research paradigm that 
underpins this study and the research methods adopted to best address the research 
problem. 
Guba and Lincoln (2005) classify research paradigms into positivism, postpositivism, 
critical theory, constructivism and participatory, while Neuman (2006) classifies 
three main research paradigms as positivist, interpretive and critical theory. Neuman 
(2006) stresses that positivist and interpretive approaches are central to contemporary 
research. Alternatively, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (2002) argue that there 
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are two traditional competing research paradigms—positivism and social 
constructionism
60
.  
However, there are overlaps between and among the categorisations of research 
paradigms (Klenke 2008; Patton 2002). Critical theory is composed of feminism, 
materialism and the participatory paradigm, which represents personal choices of 
researchers within certain paradigms and thus lacks clarity in distinguishing between 
paradigms (Creswell 2007; Denzin & Lincoln 2011; Klenke 2008). To some extent, 
postpositivism can be considered as the modified version of positivism (Guba 1990). 
Both positivism and postpositivism assert that reality exists externally and 
objectively, and the knowledge of reality is value-free from researchers and the 
participants; and they insist reality can be studied in science that ultimately aims to 
predict and control phenomena (Guba 1990; Guba & Lincoln 2005; Patton 2002). 
What constructivism, social constructionism and the interpretive paradigm share in 
common is their phenomenological base. Phenomenology assumes that reality is 
subjective and thus has multiple co-constructed realities by researchers and 
participants in natural settings. Therefore, in this study the approach taken is 
consistent with Patton (2002) who concludes that there are two historically 
competing research paradigms, positivism and phenomenology (see Table 4.1).  
 
 
 
                                                 
60
 Constructionism has been considered as an interpretive approach consistent with Habermas (1970). 
It is often used interchangeably with constructivism despite the distinctions between them (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002). The discussion regarding the distinctions is far beyond the scope of this 
study.  
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Table 4.1 Conceptual Principles for Phenomenological and Positivism 
Paradigms  
Philosophical 
assumptions 
Phenomenological paradigm Positivism paradigm 
Nature of the reality 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple, as seen by participants 
in the study 
Reality is objective and single, 
and it exists externally 
 
How to know about the 
reality 
Researcher attempts to lessen 
distance between 
himself/herself and that being 
researched 
Researcher acknowledges that 
research is value laden and that 
biases are present, while taking 
a neutral nonjudgmental stance 
toward whatever emerging ideas 
Researcher uses inductive logic, 
studies the phenomenon within 
its context, and uses an 
emerging design 
Researchers maintains a distance 
with that being researched  
Value, biases and confounding 
factors can be avoid by 
manipulations 
Researcher uses deductive logic 
and a pre-determined design 
 Knowledge of reality is 
conventionally summarised in the 
form of time- and context-free 
generalizations 
Source: Creswell (2007), Patton (2002), Lincoln and Guba (2005; 1985) 
Positivism primarily involves deductive reasoning and a quantitative approach. It 
assumes that the reality is objectively given which is independent of the interest of 
the researchers and the instruments used by the researchers (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
& Lowe 2002; Guba & Lincoln 1994; Myers 2008). Researchers holding positivism 
assert primarily quantitative measurements and analyses towards the phenomena 
under study, as well as cause-effect relationships (Denzin & Lincoln 2011; Patton 
2002). It typically emphasizes a pre-determined research design within which the 
generalisations of knowledge are deductive and time- and context-free (Guba 1990; 
Guba & Lincoln 1994). Given the nature of this study, a quantitative deductive study 
underpinned by a positive paradigm is not appropriate. 
By comprarision, the phenomenological paradigm assumes that the social reality 
subjectively exists and the knowledge of the reality is constructed through the 
interactions between researchers and the participants in natural settings (Klenke 2008; 
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Patton 2002). Therefore, researchers with a phenomenological paradigm focus on 
holistically understanding the phenomena under study by inductively investigating 
how experiences regarding the phenomena are perceived and given meaning within 
context (Healy & Perry 2000; Maxwell 2005; Patton 2002). Thus, a 
phenomenological paradigm is best suited to an emerging research design that uses 
inductive and qualitative approaches as is the case in this study.   
4.2.2 Phenomenological paradigm underlying this study and the research 
methodology adopted 
Justification of the phenomenological paradigm underlying this study 
The approach taken in this study sits within a phenomenological paradigm which 
informs the legitimacy and rationale of this study (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 
2002; Patton 2002). The researcher’s philosophical assumptions to the social world 
are consistent with the phenomenological paradigm. This study seeks an in-depth 
understanding of whether and how environmental risks are associated with covenants 
and the cost of bank loans in corporate lending by Australian banks. This 
understanding requires the researcher to interpret bankers’ experiences of corporate 
loan extension and for those interpretations to be as close to the constructions 
originally presented by the bankers as possible. To achieve an informed and 
sophiciticated interpretation of bankers’ experiences and perceptions, the researcher 
needs to put herself ‘in other person’s shoes’ which suggests close personal 
interactions with the participating bankers (Patton 2002). This is consistent with and 
reflective of a phenomenological paradigm which focuses on capturing the holistic 
process of how people’s experiences are perceived and given meaning (Denzin & 
Lincoln 2011; Patton 2002). In addition, given that the data are sourced from 
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participating bankers’ perceptions using face-to-face interviews, it is not possible that 
the researcher can detach herself from the process of collecting information and the 
interpretation of the information. As such, this study does not fit into the principles 
of positivism which emphasise objectivity and value-free interpretations.  
This study is based on Australian banks which sit in a different context from their 
counterparts in the USA, Europe and UK. Although environmental legislation in 
Australia is strict, there is some doubt about the extent to which it is implemented, 
and environmental disclosure regulation is less developed when compared to that in 
the USA, Europe and UK (Ernst & Young 2003; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). In 
addition, the Australian banking market is smaller and has relatively fewer players 
compared to that in the USA, Europe and UK (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). The 
unique context is critical for the comprehensive understanding of the integration of 
environmental risks into Australian banks’ corporate credit processes. Furthermore, 
the awareness of environmental risks among Australian banks is increasing and the 
significance of environmental risks to banks is developing (Ernst & Young 2003). 
This is expected to impact on the role environmental risks play in Australian banks’ 
corporate credit processes. Therefore, by focusing on the dynamic process of how 
bankers perceive and make sense of their experiences, the phenomenological 
paradigm better underpins this study than positivism which stresses time and context-
free generalisations (Patton 2002).  
Justification of the qualitative methodology adopted 
Committing to the phenomenological paradigm does not necessarily mean a 
qualitative methodology is employed and a quantitative methodology is excluded. 
Unconsciously adhering to methodology that is dictated by a paradigm is likely to 
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result in a reduction of adaptability and appropriateness of the methodology, and thus 
lead to bias (Patton 2002). The researcher advocates a paradigm-directed 
methodological appropriateness rather than a paradigm-dictated methodology, which 
is consistent with the view of Patton (2002). This study could have been conducted 
by employing a quantitative methodology or a mixed methodology. However, given 
the research problem and that the available sources of data do not lend themselves to 
a purely quantitative methodology or a mixed methodology, a qualitative 
methodology is considered the most appropriate approach.  
First, to address the research problem, descriptions are required of Australian banks’ 
corporate credit processes, environmental risks, as well as the impact environmental 
risks have on covenants and the cost of bank loans. These descriptions are obtained 
by investigating and interpreting bankers’ relevant perceptions and experiences. A 
qualitative approach offers effective ways to generate information which is in-depth, 
detailed, context based and nuance-considered (Patton 2002). To this end, a 
qualitative approach enables comprehensive and in-depth investigations and 
informed interpretations of phenomena in relation to the research problem.  
Second, a qualitative approach is characteristics of exploration and discovery, and 
focuses on responsiveness (Denzin & Lincoln 2011; Patton 2002). Accordingly, a 
qualitative approach is especially appropriate for research which is new or has little 
relevant previous literature (Myers 2008). There is limited research about banks’ 
evaluation of environmental risks, as well as the associations between environmental 
risks and bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans in the Australian context. In 
addition, databases of relevant environmental data are scarce in Australia. By 
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following a qualitative approach, exploration of participating bankers’ perceptions, 
experiences and judgement regarding the research problem are allowed.  
Third, the perceptions, judgement and interpretations of bankers about their 
experiences of integrating environmental risks into the corporate credit process are 
subjective, complex and not observable. That is, the information required to address 
the research problem is in the form of contextualised data rather than standardised 
numerical data. In addition, they are grounded in the macroeconomic, institutional 
and regulatory contexts that Australian banks operate in. Therefore, they are difficult 
to be pre-determined, numerically measured and controlled. A quantitative approach 
that aims to statistically analyse numerical data and identify causes of an observed 
phenomenon by controlling all relevant variables is as a result not applied (Creswell 
2009; Neuman 2006). Furthermore, the understanding of bankers’ perceptions, 
judgement and interpretations about their relevant experiences requires the 
researcher’s personal interaction with the participating bankers in the natural setting. 
However, the personal interaction is excluded by a quantitative approach.  
Fourth, Australian banks operate in different macroeconomic, institutional and 
regulatory contexts to their counterparts in the USA, Europe and UK. In addition, the 
contexts are continually developing. This is likely to influence the way banks 
integrate environmental risks into their corporate credit processes, and thus new 
insights are expected to emerge as this study unfolds. Therefore, to better address the 
research problem, the researcher was required to be open to any relevant emerging 
information and be immersed in the natural setting and the extracted information. A 
quantitative approach from a scientific view stresses deduction, making the context 
and meanings masked (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Marshall & Rossman 2006; Patton 
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2002). With this approach, it is likely that this study would ignore highly relevant 
information that are not predicted and quantified in terms of the ways bank loan 
covenants and the cost of bank loans are established and how environmental risks are 
integrated in the corporate credit process in the Australian context (Lincoln & Guba 
1985; Marshall & Rossman 2006; Patton 2002). In addition, emerging insights would 
be ruled out in a quantitative approach due to its close-ended questions and the 
structured format in data collection (Creswell 2009; Neuman 2006). By comparison, 
a qualitative approach is more appropriate which emphasises understanding the 
complexity of the phenomena under investigation in their natural settings and 
capturing relevant emerging insights (Patton 2002). 
Fifth, a mixed methodology is not appropriate for this study either. This study 
originally planned to adopt a mixed methodology and use a two-stage sequential 
exploratory strategy. This approach would have commenced by exploring the 
research problem through a qualitative approach, followed by subsequent 
quantitative analysis (Creswell 2009). However, as this study unfolded, the 
quantitative component was deemed impractical and not applicable to this study. In 
the first instance, there are very few databases that provide standardised relevant 
environmental data in Australia (Ernst & Young 2003). Furthermore, the interviews 
with senior executive bankers from major Australian banks revealed that the 
associations between environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost 
of bank loans are not linear and the constructs are difficult to quantify. Therefore, it 
is not possible to collect quantifiable environmental data related to the research 
problem from participating banks. Accordingly, attempting to add a quantitative 
component to the methodology is unlikely to contribute to addressing the research 
problem (Encyclopedia of research design  2010).  
101 
 
Last but not least, although there are initial propositions and a predetermined focus 
for the interviews deriving from previous literature and agency theory, it does not 
mean this study should adopt a quantitative methodology or a mixed methodology. 
According to Patton (2002), ‘openness through inductive analysis’ is a strategic ideal 
of a qualitative approach rather than its characteristic, and therefore conducting a 
study inductively in practice is a matter of degree. A qualitative approach is 
primarily inductive, while a deductive approach is allowed to be combined as 
appropriate (Patton 2002). Therefore, this study lends itself to a qualitative 
methodology rather than a quantitative methodology or a mixed methodology. Under 
the guidance of a qualitative methodology, the next section discusses the collection 
of qualitative data. 
4.3 Qualitative Data Collection  
A qualitative approach is used to investigate how environmental risks facing banks 
are associated with bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans. This is achieved 
by gaining an understanding of bankers’ experiences and perceptions in integrating 
environmental risks into the corporate credit process (Creswell 2009). The qualitative 
data collection for this study includes the following elements: 1) sample selection 
which sets the boundaries (section 4.3.1); 2) qualitative data collection through face-
to-face semi-structured interviews (section 4.3.2); 3) qualitative data collection 
procedures that show a flowing picture of data collection for this study (section 
4.3.3); and 4) data administration and ethics (section 4.3.4).  
Sampling is fundamental to the research design and a well-defined sampling process 
plays a significant role in determining the quality of the research (Marshall & 
Rossman 2006). Therefore, sampling decisions should be made at the outset of the 
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research design and thus are the starting point of the data collection procedures in 
this study (Marshall & Rossman 2006).  
4.3.1 Sampling methods and strategies 
This study adopts a qualitative approach from a phenomenological perspective, 
which indicates a procedure of studying information-rich bankers in-depth through 
extensive interactions between the researcher and the bankers (Patton 2002; Rubin & 
Rubin 2005). A purposive sampling method and a snowball sampling strategy were 
employed to identify the most knowledgeable bankers who are best able to illuminate 
the research questions.  
Justification of the usage of a purposive sampling method and a snowball 
sampling strategy 
The purpose of this study is to generate extensive understanding about environmental 
risks in banks’ corporate credit processes and particularly their associations with 
bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans. Therefore, the research requires the 
selection of bankers who are experts in the corporate credit process and the 
integration of environmental risks into this process (Neuman 2006; Patton 2002). 
Targeting a group of bankers that represent a statistically accurate sample of the 
entire population of bankers for generalizations is not the focus of this study. The 
sample bankers need high level expertise about environmental risks in the corporate 
credit process and an in-depth understanding of their associations with bank loan 
covenants and the cost of bank loans. As such, by selecting the most knowledgeable 
bankers to gain insights and thus achieve an extensive understanding of the research 
problem, a purposive sampling method is considered appropriate (Neuman 2006; 
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Patton 2002). In addition, major Australian banks are the sample units of analysis 
and the expert senior executive bankers are chosen as representatives of the banks 
they work for. Thus the utility of purposive sampling is supported by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2009) who claim that purposive sampling is particularly appropriate when 
information-rich individuals are chosen to represent the targeted organisations.  
Purposive sampling methods comprise of various strategies, each of which serves a 
different purpose. Among these strategies, snowball sampling is designed to identify 
a sample with specific characteristics, knowledge and/or skill and is adopted by this 
study (Neuman 2006; Patton 2002). There is limited literature on whether and how 
environmental risks are integrated in major Australian banks’ corporate credit 
processes. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether there are positions in major 
Australian banks that are responsible for managing environmental risks in corporate 
lending; and if so, whether they are positions set specially for managing 
environmental risks in corporate lending or are more generic credit positions whose 
incumbents have the power to make corporate lending decisions. Given this limited 
knowledge, it was difficult for the researcher to identify who should be the target 
bankers that are able to provide rich information as required to address the research 
problem. In addition, bankers who have the power to make decisions on corporate 
lending or bankers who are responsible for dealing with environmental risks in the 
corporate credit process should be senior executives of banks. Accordingly, gaining 
access to them is difficult and time-consuming. Consequently, there is limited 
information regarding the ERM personnel in major Australian banks and it was not 
possible to decide the precise sample size ahead of time (Neuman 2006; Patton 2002). 
Accordingly, a flexible and emergent sampling strategy is required. 
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The characteristics of snowball sampling make it useful for identifying the most 
expert and knowledgeable bankers in major Australian banks. Snowball sampling is 
particularly appropriate for this study as the most suitable bankers are hard to 
identify and gain access to (Neuman 2006; Patton 2002).  
Procedures of the snowball sampling process 
The snowball sampling process started with two suitable bankers that the researcher 
was able to gain access to and then spread out through the networks initiated by these 
initial bankers. The snowball sampling process is multistage, which stops either 
when the sample network closes or when it is at the limits of a study’s ability to 
handle it (Neuman 2006; Patton 2002). Specific to this study, the sample network 
closed in the second phase of interviewing when no new bankers in major Australian 
banks were recommended by the interviewed bankers.  
In this study, banks are the units of analysis. In the first instance, the selection of 
banks as sample units was required. The four major Australian banks, ANZ, CBA, 
NAB and Westpac, were targeted. There are two groups of banks in the Australian 
debt market: high lending volume banks and other banks. High lending volume 
banks are the four major Australian banks. They dominate in the Australian banking 
sector and have the largest market share in corporate lending (Australian Trade 
Commission 2011a). Other banks are much smaller in both size and lending volume 
in the market. In addition, the linkage between banks’ corporate lending and the 
environment are the most prominent in large banks (Thompson 1998a). The 
explanation is that large banks have better capability to attract large borrowing firms 
and extend a large amount of funds which are likely to have more impact on the 
environment (Thompson 1998a). Furthermore, the four major Australian banks are 
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active in the global environmental initiatives of financial institutions. ANZ, CBA, 
NAB and Westpac are the only four signatory Australian banks of the UNEP 
Statement. The Equator Principles, providing financial institutions a benchmark for 
ERM in their project financing, are adopted by ANZ, NAB and Westpac.  
There is limited knowledge regarding how environmental risks are integrated into 
major Australian banks’ corporate credit processes. The associations between 
environmental risks facing banks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank 
loans remain unknown in the Australian context. Therefore, it is not possible to 
determine the exact senior executive positions in these banks that have knowledge of 
integrating environmental risks into banks’ corporate credit processes before data 
collection starts. Consequently, one or two senior executives who are likely to have 
the power to make corporate lending decisions in each major Australian bank were 
targeted at the outset
61
.  
Emails seeking opportunities for interviews, together with a brief overview of this 
study, were first sent to senior executive bankers who are likely to be responsible for 
corporate lending decision-making in the four major Australian banks. Two of the 
bankers from different banks replied. One of them (referred to as Banker 1) 
consented to a face-to-face interview
62
 and the other replied with a recommendation 
of a senior executive banker responsible for managing environmental risks in this 
                                                 
61
 As this study aims to investigate environmental risks in banks’ corporate credit processes, the 
interviewees need to be someone who is familiar with the considerations in the corporate credit 
process. Senior executives in banks’ sustainability area know environmental risks well at the strategic 
level; however, they might not have sufficient knowledge regarding the specific corporate credit 
process; while a manager at the operating level might not have as comprehensive knowledge as the 
senior executive who can make corporate lending decisions. Therefore, a banker making corporate 
lending decisions is most likely the one who has sophisticated knowledge of the corporate credit 
process, and environmental risks as well as their associations with bank loan covenants and the cost of 
bank loans.  
62
 Banker 1 brought another banker (referred to as Banker 2) who deals with environmental risks in 
this bank’s lending businesses to the interview. That is, the first interview was with two bankers.  
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bank’s lending businesses. A phone call was made by the latter banker and the 
interview was agreed to by the recommended senior executive (referred to as Banker 
3). Starting with the initial senior executives and with the guidance of the snowball 
sampling strategy, two more senior executives in two major Australian banks were 
accessed. The first senior executive (referred to as Banker 4) is a senior executive 
decision-maker for corporate lending who also deals with environmental risks in 
corporate lending and the second one (referred to as Banker 5) is responsible for 
group risks of the bank
63
.  
Following the initial interviews and concurrent data transcription, the researcher 
realised that to address the research problem, more information would be needed to 
achieve the required depth, detail and richness. Accordingly, using the snowball 
sampling strategy, the sample was enlarged to include three more expert bankers in 
senior executive positions from the three participating banks as the second phase of 
interviewing. One banker (referred to as Banker 6) is in the position of corporate 
lending decision-making, another one (referred to as Banker 7) works as a risk 
manager and the third one (referred to as Banker 8) is in charge of environmental 
risks of the bank. In addition, Banker 4 offered a second chance for a further 
interview which was included in the second phase of interviewing. This banker also 
reviewed the guiding topics and key issues in the interview checklist used in the 
phase one interviews, which made the updated interview checklist more practical and 
applicable. This updated interview checklist was used for all of the second phase 
interviews.  
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 Banker 3 and Banker 4 are from the same bank. Banker 5 is from a different major Australian bank 
to Bankers 1, 2, 3, and 4. In summary, the first round interviews were conducted with five bankers 
from three major Australian banks.  
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Using the snowball sampling strategy, the researcher was able to enlarge the sample 
network by probing more senior executive bankers who have expert knowledge 
about environmental risks in banks’ corporate lending. As a result, deeper insights 
into the research problem were obtained. As more bankers with relevant knowledge 
were brought into the network, an in-depth understanding of whether and how 
environmental risks are integrated into banks’ corporate credit processes was 
obtained. Although the researcher made every effort to have all major Australian 
banks involved, only three of the four banks participated in this study; that is, the 
response rate is 75%. Based on the snowball sampling strategy outlined in this 
section, the data collection procedures are outlined in the following section. 
4.3.2 Qualitative data collection methods  
A qualitative approach from a phenomenological perspective aims to explore a 
deeper understanding of bankers’ experiences and perceptions in integrating 
environmental risks into the corporate credit process in the Australian context 
(Marshall & Rossman 2006). To achieve this deeper understanding, qualitative data 
needs to be gathered which is in-depth, detailed, context based and nuance-
considered. There are three main methods to collect qualitative data: observations, 
open-ended interviews and written documents (Creswell 2009; Patton 2002) (see 
Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2 Qualitative Data Collection Methods and Options within Methods 
Qualitative data 
collection methods 
Descriptions Options within types 
Observation 
Fieldwork descriptions of observable 
human experience, e.g., activities, 
interpersonal interactions, organizational 
or community processes.  
Data consists of field notes: rich, detailed 
descriptions, including the context within 
which the observations are made. 
Observation-when watching 
from the outside 
Participant observation –not 
only observe people doing 
things, but participate to 
some extent in these 
activities as well 
Open-ended 
interviews 
Open-ended questions and probes yield in-
depth responses about people’s experience 
and perceptions.  
Data consists of verbatim quotations with 
sufficient context to be interpretable. 
one-in-one, in person 
interview 
Focus group interview 
Telephone interview  
E-mail internet interview 
Written documents 
Written materials and other documents 
which can be sourced from organizational, 
clinical or programs records; official 
publications and reports; and written 
responses to open-ended surveys.  
Data consists of excerpts from documents 
captured in a way that records and 
preserves context. 
Public documents, such as 
minutes of meetings or 
newspapers 
Private  documents, such as 
journals, diaries or letters 
Source: Myers (2008), Creswell (2009) and Patton (2002) 
Justifications of the methods adopted by this study for collecting qualitative data 
As mentioned earlier, to understand how environmental risks facing banks are 
associated with bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans, this study 
investigates the corporate credit processes of major Australian banks. Data were 
collected through semi-structured interviews with the senior executive bankers who 
are responsible for corporate lending or ERM in lending. The interviews were 
conducted face-to-face. Due to the involvement of bankers’ perceptions, values and 
worldviews in the investigation process, open-ended interviews with the bankers at 
senior executive level are considered to be the most appropriate in capturing a deeper 
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understanding about the integration of environmental risks into banks’ corporate 
credit processes (Marshall & Rossman 2006; Patton 2002). 
Open-ended interviews are productive in yielding abundant useful information and 
consist of three strategies (see Table 4.3) serving different purposes (Leedy & 
Ormrod 2009). They play a significant role in collecting qualitative data in business 
and management disciplines by ‘…permitting us to see that which is not ordinarily 
on view and examine that which is looked at but seldom seen’ (Marshall & Rossman 
2006; Myers 2008; Rubin & Rubin 2005, p.vii). Open-ended interviews are 
particularly useful to gain an understanding of how environmental risks impact on 
banks’ corporate credit processes in the Australian context. At present there is 
limited knowledge in this area.  
Semi-structured, rather than structured or unstructured interviews were chosen as the 
most suitable type of open-ended interviews. Structured open-ended interviews are 
not appropriate for this study due to the constraint they are likely to impose on the 
natural flow of the interviews (Patton 2002). In addition, bias that results from the 
interviewer’s opinions, experiences and knowledge in designing the instruments for 
interviews are likely to emerge during structured open-ended interviews (Myers 
2008; Patton 2002). The constraint and bias will reduce the validity and reliability of 
the data. Unstructured interviews do not fit into this study either. With unstructured 
interviews, questions can be asked in different ways for different bankers, which can 
lead to a lack of comparability and reliability of the collected data (Patton 2002; 
Rubin & Rubin 2005).  
To obtain the required information about whether and how environmental risks are 
integrated into banks’ corporate credit processes in sufficient depth and detail, major 
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areas and topics in interviews need to be identified and followed up (Rubin & Rubin 
2005). The semi-structured interview is the basic form of open-ended interview in a 
qualitative study. It outlines central topics and issues which are flexible in both 
wording and sequencing and new foci are allowed to emerge in the course of data 
collection (Patton 2002; Sarantakos 1998). The structured component of the semi-
structured interview ensures the data from different bankers are collected in a 
systematic and comparable way, which enhances the reliability of data. The 
unstructured component allows new insights to emerge, current foci to be adjusted, 
and follow-up questions probing depth and detail to be asked as an integral part of 
the interview process (Kumar 2010; Patton 2002). The unstructured component helps 
improve data validity.  
Through semi-structured interviews, specific and rich descriptions of the bankers’ 
experiences and perceptions on the integration of environmental risks into banks’ 
corporate credit processes were obtained. Accordingly, an understanding about how 
environmental risks facing banks in their corporate lending are associated with bank 
loan covenants and the cost of bank loans was captured (Rubin & Rubin 2005).  
Furthermore, banks’ published environmental policies, corporate responsibility 
reports and website publications related to environmental risks in corporate lending 
were reviewed substantially for the purpose of developing interview checklists. This 
process added insights into and formed the basis of the guiding topics and the key 
issues for the interview checklists. Before interviews were conducted, very limited 
knowledge about the research problem existed. Therefore, the researcher 
comprehensively reviewed these documents and website publications without 
designing a review checklist that pre-determines the foci of the reviewing. By not 
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using a review checklist, the researcher obtained a holistic view of banks’ 
environmental policies and commitments and gained rich information. Given this 
substantial work before conducting interviews with bankers, relevant environmental 
information in these documents and website publications was well-reflected in 
interview checklists and tested by the interviews. Therefore, the review of the 
published environmental policies, corporate responsibility reports and banks’ website 
information plays a significant role in the soundness of the interview checklists and 
hence the quality of the interview data.  
The data triangulation through the review of the published environmental 
information and the interviews with senior executive bankers helps to improve the 
reliability of the collected data by testing consistency among the data that results 
from these two sources (Creswell 2009; Neuman 2006; Patton 2002). At the same 
time, the data triangulation enhances the data validity by providing a cross-data 
validity check
64
. At the end of each interview the banker was asked whether a blank 
corporate loan application form is available. However, they indicated that there is no 
such application form for corporate lending. 
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 Reliability and validity do not have the same meaning in qualitative research as they have in 
quantitative research. In qualitative research, researchers conceptualise reliability as dependability and 
consistency. They consider a range of data sources and employ multiple methods to enhance 
reliability. Validity stresses authenticity which means offering a fair, honest and balanced account of 
social life from the viewpoint of the people who live it every day. To improve validity, qualitative 
researchers focus on the extent to which their interpretations of phenomena under investigation reflect 
what is actually occurring (Neuman 2006). 
112 
 
Table 4.3  Strategies of Open-Ended Interviews 
Strategies of open-ended 
interviews 
Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages 
Unstructured interviews 
Questions emerge from the 
immediate context and are 
asked in the natural course of 
things 
There is no predetermination of 
question topics or wording 
Maximum flexibility, spontaneity, and 
responsiveness to individual differences and 
situational changes 
Questions can be personalised to deepen 
communication with the interviewees by 
increasing the salience and relevance of 
questions 
It is possible to make use of the immediate 
surroundings and situation to increase the 
concreteness and immediacy of the interview 
questions 
Time-consuming 
Much more conversational skill requirement to 
the interviewers to reduce the interviewers bias 
Sensitive to individual and situation difference 
Lack of comparability of both the questions 
asked and the responses  
Data organization and analysis can be quite 
difficult 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Topics and issues to be covered 
are specified in advance, in 
outline form 
Interviewer decides sequence and 
wording of questions in the 
course of the interview 
New questions might emerge 
during the conversation 
 
Well-planned in using the limited available 
time 
The data collection for each participant is 
systematic and comprehensive by delimiting 
in advance the focused subjects 
Allowing interviewers to build a conversation, 
to word questions spontaneously, and to 
establish a conversation style within focused 
subjects 
Allowing interviewees’ perceptions and 
experiences emerge 
Logic gaps in data can be anticipated and 
closed 
Important and salient topics may be 
inadvertently omitted 
Interviewer flexibility in sequencing and 
wording questions can result in substantially 
different responses from different 
perspectives, thus reducing the comparability 
of responses 
There is likelihood that more information will 
be collected from some participants than from 
others, which stipulates the concern about the 
reliability of the conclusion 
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Structured open-ended 
interviews 
The use of pre-formulated 
questions, strict regulated with 
regard to the order of the 
questions, and sometimes 
regulated with regard to the time 
available 
Questions are worded in a 
completely open-ended format 
 
The interview is highly focused so that 
interviewing time is used efficiently 
The reliability  and comparability of the data 
is enhanced 
It provides uniform information thereby the 
data analysis is easier 
 
Lack of flexibility and emergent questions are 
not allowed 
It does not permit the interviewer to pursue 
topics or issues that were not anticipated when 
the interview was written, and thus the 
flexibility and emergent themes 
It reduces the extent to which individual 
differences and circumstances can be queried                        
Sources: Patton (2002) and Myers (2008) 
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Data collection instruments 
Data are collected in the context of major Australian banks’ corporate lending, with 
the aim of gaining an extensive understanding on environmental risks and their 
associations with bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans. There are two 
interview checklists (interview checklist 1 and 2) used as data collection instruments 
for the semi-structured interviews. Interview checklist 1 is used in the first phase of 
interviewing and interview checklist 2 is for the second phase of interviewing.  
The interview checklists are designed to generate information regarding 
environmental risks, their integration into the corporate credit processes of major 
Australian banks, and particularly their impact on bank loan covenants and the cost 
of bank loans. By delimiting guiding topics in interview checklists, more systematic 
and comprehensive information is obtained than otherwise would be (Patton 2002). 
The interview checklists are accompanied by a consent form (Appendix 3) required 
by the Human Research Ethics of the University of Southern Queensland (USQ). A 
cover letter (Appendix 4) is attached and it provides a self-introduction by the 
researcher, together with an overview of the research purpose, benefits of 
participation and ethical clearance.  
Interview checklist 1 (Appendix 5) was employed to collect data from senior 
executive bankers in Phase one interviewing. The senior executive bankers are 
familiar with both the policies (including environmental policies) of their banks and 
the integration of environmental risks into their banks’ corporate credit processes in 
practice. The development of interview checklist 1 is based on the conceptual 
framework from previous literature and the review of banks’ published 
environmental policies, corporate responsibility reports and website publications 
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related to environmental risks. Interview checklist 1 consists of five guiding topics, 
starting with broad general questions and then narrowing down to key issues. 
Adjustments to the guiding topics and key issues are allowed where necessary in the 
course of data collection.  
The first and second guiding topics seek general information on banks’ lending 
businesses and how a corporate loan application is processed (the corporate credit 
process); the third one addresses the negotiation process for corporate loan 
agreements. The last two guiding topics cover environmental risks in banks’ 
corporate lending, risk management of the banks (ERM is included), as well as 
whether and how environmental risks facing banks impact on bank loan covenants 
and the cost of bank loans. At the end of each interview, the banker was asked 
whether he/she would like to raise any relevant issues that were not covered by the 
interview. This was to make sure that the interview encompassed all valuable 
information required to address the research problem.    
After the first phase of interviewing with senior executive bankers of the three major 
Australian banks, the collected data was analysed and aggregated. Emerging themes 
were captured by the analysis and included in the aggregated results. A draft of 
interview checklist 2 was developed based on the aggregated results from the first 
phase of interviewing. The researcher then discussed the guiding topics and key 
issues included in the draft checklist with Banker 4 who participated in the first 
phase of interviewing. This banker read through all of the guiding topics and key 
issues in the draft to ensure they were properly articulated and covered the main 
environmental aspects in corporate lending. The interview checklist for the second 
phase of interviewing was finalised following this banker’s review, which is known 
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as interview checklist 2 (Appendix 6). It is similar to interview checklist 1, except for 
some minor adjustments to the guiding topics and key issues, as well as the inclusion 
of several emergent themes from the first phase of interviewing. Table 4.4 below 
shows how the guiding topics and key issues in interview checklist 2 link with the 
research questions
65
. The strategies and procedures for data collection and data 
analysis from the first phase of interviewing were replicated in interviews comprising 
Phase two data collection. 
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 Interview checklist 2 is more comprehensive and sophisticated than interview checklist 1. It is an 
updated version of interview checklist 1. Therefore, the link between the guiding questions and key 
issues in interview checklist 2 and the research questions covers and extends that between the guiding 
questions and key issues in interview checklist 1 and the research questions.  
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Table 4.4  Linkage between the Interview Checklist and the Research Questions 
Interview guiding questions Purpose Expected linkage with research questions 
What are the categorisations 
of your bank’s lending 
businesses and how much 
weight is given to each 
categorisation? 
To obtain information on banks’ general lending activities and 
determine whether corporate lending is a considerable proportion of 
banks’ lending businesses 
To identify the dominant products in corporate lending 
To make clear whether corporate loans are usually secured or not 
 
It serves as background knowledge for this study. It also 
contributes to the justification of the research scope. 
It first provides an overview of the categorisations of banks’ 
lending activities, which identifies how significant corporate 
lending is. Under the broad lending framework, further information 
on banks’ corporate lending is then sourced. By understanding the 
products and the security status of corporate lending, it provides 
justification of why this study does not classify the credit process 
and environmental risk management process in terms of products 
and security status of corporate loans. 
How does your bank process 
corporate loan applications? 
(The stages in this process to 
approve corporate loan 
applications) 
To identify the flow of banks’ corporate credit processes (the 
process to approve corporate loan applications) 
To obtain an idea of whether there are environmental 
considerations in the corporate credit process and where they fit in 
To identify the activities in each stage of the corporate credit 
process 
To source information on borrowing firms’ bargaining power and 
its impact on the corporate credit process 
The corporate credit process is where 1) environmental risk 
management, and 2) the impacts of environmental risks on loan 
covenants and the cost of bank loans are investigated.  
First, it demonstrates banks’ corporate credit processes, which 
serves as background information for the research questions and the 
research problem. 
Second, it intends to elicit information on whether and where 
environmental risks are integrated in the corporate credit process. 
 
 
 
What is the process to 
establish corporate loan 
documentations? 
To source the information on bank loan covenants (the provider, 
form, functions, determinants and establishment process)  
To source the information on the cost of bank loans (the 
determinants and  renegotiation process) 
To elicit whether and how environmental risks are reflected in bank 
The establishments of loan covenants and the cost of bank loans 
are included in the corporate credit process.  Information on 
whether environmental risks are reflected by loan covenants and 
loan price is elicited. 
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loans covenants and the cost of bank loans 
To identify the impacts of borrowing firms’ bargaining power on 
loan covenants and the cost of bank loans 
How does your bank assess 
and manage risks in corporate 
lending? 
 
To gain general information on risks considered in corporate 
lending  
To identify whether environmental risks are integrated in the 
corporate credit process and how environmental risks impact on 
other risks 
To investigate the role environmental risks  plays in banks’ 
corporate credit processes 
To elicit banks’ interpretations of the definition, evaluation and 
management of environmental risks 
To obtain qualitative data on how environmental risks are 
associated with loan covenants and the cost of bank loans in 
corporate lending 
It provides a framework for environmental risk management. 
Therefore, information on how environmental risk management fits 
into banks’ corporate credit processes is sourced. 
Address how banks evaluate environmental risks in their corporate 
lending, based on which research question 1 and 2 is expected to 
address.  
RQ1: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated 
with bank loan covenants? 
RQ2: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated 
with the cost of bank loans? 
Are there environmental 
covenants in the loan 
agreements between your 
bank and corporate clients? 
 
To confirm whether and how environmental risks are reflected in 
bank loan covenants 
To elicit knowledge of the form, the content and the level 
(tightness) of environmental covenants 
To gain qualitative data on how environmental covenants are 
customised in terms of environmental risks 
To obtain information on how the application of the Equator 
Principles in project financing impact on corporate lending, 
especially around the introduction of environmental covenants 
Answer research question 1 
 
RQ1: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated 
with bank loan covenants? 
Source: Developed for this study
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4.3.3 Data collection procedures 
Interviews were conducted during the period from September 2010 to June 2011. 
The interview checklists, together with a consent form and a cover letter were sent to 
the senior executive bankers ahead of time. This was to ensure the bankers were 
informed of the research purpose, the benefits of participating and the ethical 
clearance with regard to participants’ rights and confidentiality. This process 
contributed to the consistent understanding of this study by different bankers and to 
the reliability of their responses (Creswell 2009). In turn, the consistent 
understanding and reliable responses helped enhance the reliability of the collected 
data (Creswell 2009). After the bankers consented to participate, the researcher 
organised interviews in terms of time, date and location to align with the availability 
of the bankers.  
Each interview took approximately 75 minutes on average. After a brief introduction 
of the research purposes and the interviewing procedures to follow, bankers were 
asked questions which covered the predetermined guiding topics and the key issues 
in the interview checklist. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is limited knowledge 
about the integration of environmental risks into banks’ corporate credit processes 
and this study is exploratory in nature. Therefore, to elicit more informative data, the 
researcher did not comment or make judgements on bankers’ responses during the 
interviews and new themes were allowed to emerge. The sequence and the wording 
of guiding topics and the subsequent key issues were dependent on where the 
bankers led the interview to. As such, the interviews flowed naturally. This approach 
contributed to generating rich and nuance-considered information required for a 
deeper understanding and enhanced the validity of data. The natural flow of the 
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interviews also helped to mitigate bias resulting from the involvement of the 
researcher’s opinions and thus contributed to the data validity. Follow-up questions 
were asked seeking depth, detail and clarification where necessary (Patton 2002). 
Interviews were recorded using a digital recorder for the purpose of data 
interpretation and data rechecking during and after the data collection. The recording 
of interviews was permitted by each banker. Recording enabled the researcher to 
interact with bankers more actively during interviews and thus allowed the researcher 
to formulate appropriate follow-up questions where necessary (Patton 2002). In 
addition, it enhanced the accuracy of the collected data (Myers 2008; Patton 2002). 
Apart from interview recordings, interview notes were also taken. Interview notes 
were in the form of key phrases and major points from the bankers’ responses 
(Patton 2002; Sarantakos 1998). They were used as memos for the researcher to 
formulate follow-up questions during interviews. Taking interview notes is also 
expected to be a signal for bankers; that is, it indicates what they are saying is of 
significant importance to the researcher and thereby encourages more responses 
(Patton 2002).  
Interviews were transcribed as soon as possible after each interview to enhance the 
data validity (Neuman 2006; Patton 2002). The recordings and their corresponding 
transcriptions were then sent to the researcher’s supervisors for checking. This led to 
a sound basis for the subsequent data analysis. Once each data transcription was 
checked by the supervisors, information was classified into each key issue under the 
guiding topics of the employed interview checklist. The relevant emergent themes 
from each interview were also captured and included in the following interviews for 
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verification. This is the initial data analysis for each interview during the data 
collection procedure (see details in section 4.4.2).  
The classified data and the emergent themes for each interview were then sent to the 
corresponding banker for review and clarification, which added rigor and validity to 
the data (Patton 2002). Once the researcher received every banker’s review and 
clarification, summarising and aggregating based on all the revised data were 
undertaken (see details in section 4.4.2).  Interview checklist 2 was then developed 
based on interview checklist 1, the aggregated results of the first phase of 
interviewing and a review of the draft checklist from Banker 4. This process helped 
elicit more specific, detailed and in-depth information on the integration of 
environmental risks into major Australian banks’ corporate credit processes. 
Accordingly, the validity of this study was enhanced. The second phase of 
interviewing replicated the data collection procedures in the first phase of 
interviewing.  
4.3.4 Data administration and ethics 
Due to the involvement of human participants, ethics clarification is required by the 
Human Research Ethics Committee of the USQ. This study was granted Human 
Ethics Clearance (Appendix 7) on 26 February, 2010 given the appropriate ethical 
considerations regarding voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity, 
deception and reporting accuracy. Guided by these ethical considerations, this study 
was conducted using sound ethical practices. Bankers were informed of the research 
purpose and procedures; and that there were no anticipated physical, psychological 
or economic risks to them. Their participation was completely voluntary and they 
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had the right to refuse to answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any 
time.  
The confidentiality of bankers was respected and protected. The consent forms from 
bankers were stored in a locked cabinet. The responses from bankers were recorded 
by the researcher under the permission of the bankers. The recordings, the 
subsequent data transcripts and summary in terms of the guiding topics and the key 
issues in interview checklists were kept in a separate hard drive which was also 
locked in a cabinet. All data were coded to ensure the anonymity of both the bankers 
and the banks they belong to. The names of the bankers or the banks were also not 
identified in the aggregated results. Following the interviews with bankers, 
qualitative data analysis was conducted to interpret bankers’ experiences of 
integrating environmental risks into their banks’ corporate credit processes. 
Qualitative data analysis is described in section 4.4.  
4.4 Qualitative Data Analysis  
Although in qualitative research there is no clear distinction between data collection 
and data analysis, the analysis that happens during the data collection process is 
usually incomplete and incomprehensive (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002; 
Patton 2002). To systematically analyse the collected data and advance knowledge 
regarding the integration of environmental risks into major Australian banks’ 
corporate credit processes, data analysis methods and procedures are described in 
this section.  
Qualitative data analysis is a process of endowing raw data with order, structure and 
interpretation, which transforms the qualitative data into meaningful information 
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(Marshall & Rossman 2006; Myers 2008). Qualitative data analysis demonstrates 
how the raw data regarding environmental risks in major Australian banks’ corporate 
lending are transformed into meaningful and convincing interpretations with the 
methods employed and the procedures followed.  
4.4.1 Justification for manual data analysis 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p.16) argue that there are ‘…few agree-on canons for 
qualitative data analysis, in the sense of shared ground rules for drawing 
conclusions and verifying their sturdiness’. This view is grounded in the fact that 
qualitative data are derived from the phenomenological paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln 
2011; Richardson 2000). The phenomenological paradigm underlying this study 
questions any methods of revealing an ultimate truth and asserts that ‘No specific 
method or practice can be privileged over another’ (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, p.6; 
Richardson 2000). In addition, standardised qualitative analysis methods are likely to 
constrain the effectiveness of the researcher’s investigation on the research problem 
given her unique intellectual competence, investigatory style and the available 
resources (Coffey & Atkinson 1996). With a phenomenological perspective, this 
study therefore employs ‘…a wide range of interconnected methods, hoping always 
to get a better fix on the subject matter at hand’ (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, p.3). 
Furthermore, given that every stage of the qualitative approach relies on a 
researcher’s experiences, worldviews and competence, the appropriateness of the 
qualitative data analysis methods and procedures adopted by this study depend on the 
experience and capability of the researcher (Patton 2002). Consequently, the 
qualitative data analysis in this study aims to generate detail-rich, context-sensitive 
and bankers’ experience-reflective interpretations about the integration of 
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environmental risks into major Australian banks’ corporate credit processes with the 
researcher’s full effort (Neuman 2006; Patton 2002). 
The qualitative data analysis was conducted manually. The researcher’s experiences, 
perceptions, judgement and understandings were involved in interpreting 
interviewees’ responses. Computer packages for qualitative data analysis (e.g., NVivo 
and Atlas/ti) are available, which make the processing of non-numerical unstructured 
data computerised. However, they are more desirable in studies that have ‘…too 
much data for a single person to reasonably code’ (Myers 2008, p.178). This study 
only has a small number (8) of interviews and thereby it requires the researcher’s 
critical judgement and comprehensive interpretation of the responses from the eight 
bankers. A qualitative data analysis software package is unlikely to achieve the 
comprehensive and critical judgement and understanding required to address the 
research problem (Myers 2008). This view is supported by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
and Lowe (2002, p.129) who argue that qualitative data analysis with a computerised 
software package is likely to overlook the ‘…understandings of the quality of ideas 
and experiences’. In addition, qualitative data analysis software is not sufficiently 
context-sensitive to capture the clues provided by the non-verbal data such as the 
bankers’ facial expressions or body language during interviews. As such, to interpret 
specific and rich descriptions in a comprehensive and systematic way, the researcher 
manually conducted the qualitative data analysis.  
There is potential researcher bias in qualitative data analysis given the involvement 
of the researcher’s perceptions, judgement and interpretations in the analytical 
process. Acknowledging the potential biases, the researcher has made every effort to 
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minimise them and enhance the reliability of the results throughout the analytical 
process. The procedures of data analysis are outlined in section 4.4.2. 
4.4.2 On-going qualitative data analysis throughout this study  
There is no clear distinction between data collection and data analysis in qualitative 
research (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002; Miles & Huberman 1994; Patton 
2002). Five phases of qualitative data analysis and two phases of qualitative data 
collection were undertaken in this study (see Figure 4.2). Qualitative data analysis 
spread across this study, with the first three phases being concurrent with the two 
phases of data collection and the other two phases of data analysis undertaken after 
the data collection (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002; Neuman 2006). The data 
analysis concurrent with the data collection allowed the identification of emerging 
themes as well as their verification in the following interviews (see Figure 4.3) 
(Miles & Huberman 1994; Rubin & Rubin 2005). Therefore, based on the themes 
and patterns illuminating the research problem, this study builds coherent and 
comprehensive understandings towards environmental risks in major Australian 
banks’ corporate lending and their impacts on bank loan covenants and the cost of 
bank loans.  
Phase one 
data 
collection
Phase one 
data analysis
Phase two 
data analysis
Phase two 
data 
collection
Phase three 
data analysis
Phase four data 
analysis
Phase five 
data analysis
 
Source: Developed for this study  
Figure 4.2  Relationship between Data Collection and Data Analysis  
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As shown in Figure 4.3 below, there are eight interviews: four are in Phase one data 
collection and the other four are in Phase two data collection. Phase one and Phase 
two data collection employ the same strategies and procedures; the difference is that 
interview checklist 2 is used in Phase two data collection and is based on the 
aggregated results from the first phase of interviewing.  
The first phase of data analysis was conducted concurrently with the first phase of 
interviewing and Phase three data analysis was undertaken concurrently with the 
second phase of interviewing. These two phases of data analysis are preliminary 
analysis, which only involves data transcribing and open coding. Phase two data 
analysis led to aggregated results related to the interviews with Bankers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
5. Data collected from the interviews with Bankers 4, 6, 7 and 8 were classified in 
terms of interview checklist 2, which formed the basis for the fourth phase of data 
analysis. The final phase of data analysis (Phase five data analysis) resulted in the 
overall aggregated results, which was based on the two sets of aggregated results 
resulting from the two phases of interviewing. Phase two, Phase four and Phase five 
data analysis share the same analytic strategy and procedures.  
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Interview 
with Banker 
1 and 2
Data 
analysis
Interview 
with Banker 
3
Data 
analysis
Interview 
with Banker 
4
Data 
analysis
Aggregated 
results 1
Existing 
themes in 
interview 
checklist 1
Emerging 
themes 
and 
patterns
Interview 
checklist 
2
Interview with 
Banker 4
Interview 
with Banker 
5
Data 
analysis
Data 
analysis
Interview with 
Banker 6
Data 
analysis
Interview with 
Banker 7
Data 
analysis
Interview with 
Banker 8 
Data 
analysis
Interview 
checklist 
1
Aggregated 
results 2
Aggregated results
Phase 1 
data 
collection
Phase 1 
data 
analysis
Phase 2 
data 
analysis
Phase 2 
data 
collection
Phase 3 
data 
analysis
Phase 4 
data 
analysis
Phase 5 data 
analysis
Review 
from 
Banker 4
 
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 4.3  Data Collection and Data Analysis  
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The qualitative data analysis procedures used in this study are adapted from those 
provided by Creswell (2009) and Neuman (2006) (see Figure 4.4). The procedures 
started with transcribing and organising the data immediately after each interview. 
Second, the transcription for each interview was summarised in terms of the guiding 
topics and key issues in the applied interview checklist, and emerging themes were 
captured. This was done as soon as possible after each interview, which contributed 
to the accuracy of the data and thus the data validity (Neuman 2006). Summaries 
were then sent back to corresponding bankers for review, which contributed to the 
accuracy and rigor of the data. Meanwhile, each summary was finalised before the 
following interviews so that emerging themes could be included in the following 
interviews as additional questions for the purpose of verification. The researcher paid 
as much care as possible to ensure the interviews flowed naturally even when 
additional questions were included.    
Transcribing and organising 
interview data  
Open coding
Themes
Patterns: 
Interrelating 
themes
Axial coding
Selective 
coding
Interpreting the meaning of 
themes/descriptions
Validating the 
accuracy of the 
information
 
Source: Adapted from Creswell (2009, p.185) and Neuman (2006, p.511) 
Figure 4.4  Qualitative Data Analysis Procedures  
 
129 
 
 
Next is the process of coding which condenses the mass of data into ‘…conceptual 
categories and create themes or concepts’ (Neuman 2006, p.510). There are three 
levels of coding: open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Neuman 2006).  
Open coding 
Coding in Phase one and Phase three data analysis is open coding which is the first 
attempt to condense the mass of data by categorising the summaries into initial 
themes (Neuman 2006). The initial themes of this study result from research 
questions, prior literatures, terminologies used by participating bankers and emerging 
insights from the data. In the open coding process, the researcher moved back and 
forth between the themes and their corresponding details, making sure the initial 
themes were appropriately extracted and ‘…captured the richness of the phenomenon’ 
(Neuman 2006, p.512). However, open coding does not elaborate on initial themes 
and thus does not identify the conceptual and structural connections among these 
themes (Neuman 2006). Axial coding was conducted to achieve this.  
Axial coding  
Axial coding is the second level of qualitative data coding, which was undertaken in 
both Phase two and Phase four data analysis. It requires the researcher to categorise 
and conceptualise the initial themes resulting from the open coding process (Miles & 
Huberman 1994; Neuman 2006). The categorisation and conceptualisation involved 
clustering similar initial themes together, dividing themes with multiple levels into 
subcategories, sorting closely related themes into a broader theme and structuring the 
themes in terms of their conceptual linkages (Miles & Huberman 1994; Neuman 
2006). In the process of axial coding, data were further condensed and categorised, 
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and core themes of this study were identified. In addition, reliability of this study was 
enhanced in the process of consolidating similar and closely related initial themes 
into core themes (Neuman 2006). The multiple evidence where these initial themes 
are extracted is considered sound support for the core themes (Neuman 2006).  
Selective coding
66
 
Selective coding, the last level of coding, was conducted in Phase five data analysis. 
Selective coding involved examining both the transcribed data and the themes 
identified by open coding and axial coding. It aims to identify systematic information 
that is able to illustrate the core themes as well as the conceptual and structural 
interrelationship among them (which is referred to as ‘pattern’) (Neuman 2006).  
The three levels of systematic coding (open coding, axial coding and selective coding) 
result in the identification of core themes and patterns for this study. In the process of 
coding, the names and positions of bankers were not identified and they were listed 
as Bankers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 to ensure confidentiality. Interpretations of 
themes and patterns are demonstrated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
4.5 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 4 explains and justifies the research methodology and the research methods 
employed in this study. Given that research paradigms are of significant importance 
to a researcher’s methodological choices, various research paradigms are evaluated 
and the phenomenological paradigm is considered the most appropriate for this study. 
                                                 
66
 The design of this study is based on the theoretical framework which is presented in Chapter 3 and 
the interviews are semi-structured. Therefore, the core themes and their conceptual linkages deriving 
from axial coding are already the single storyline of this study.  
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Adhering to the view of paradigm-directed methodological appropriateness, the 
qualitative approach is justified as the most appropriate research methodology. Face-
to-face semi-structured interviews are chosen as the qualitative data source. There 
are two interview checklists used as the instruments in interviews, the design of 
which is closely aligned with the research questions. As this study involves human 
beings, ethical considerations are clarified by specifying the measures taken for 
qualitative data administration and explaining the rights of the participating bankers.  
As presented in Figure 4.3, qualitative data analysis is undertaken both concurrently 
and after data collection. Acknowledging that there are no agreed-upon rules for 
qualitative data analysis, the researcher analysed the interview data manually seeking 
in-depth and comprehensive understanding of environmental risks in major 
Australian banks’ corporate lending, their integration into the corporate credit 
process and particularly their impacts on bank loan covenants and the cost of bank 
loans. This chapter outlines the frameworks to obtain the required data addressing the 
research problem and to analyse the collected data; the results of the data analysis are 
presented in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5   DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 details the research methods chosen to best answer the research questions 
and thus address the research problem. The aim of chapter 5 is to present the results 
of investigations into the integration of environmental risks into major Australian 
banks’ corporate credit processes, particularly the associations between 
environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans.  
This chapter commences with a broader picture which incorporates general 
information about major Australian banks’ corporate lending and their corporate 
credit processes (section 5.2). This broader picture serves as the matrix for the 
associations between environmental risks and 1) loan covenants, and 2) the cost of 
bank loans. Section 5.3 reports on results regarding environmental risks facing major 
Australian banks in corporate lending. Section 5.4 introduces ERM in major 
Australian banks’ corporate lending and demonstrates how ERM is integrated into 
their corporate credit processes. Particularly, findings about the associations between 
environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans are 
also presented in section 5.4. Section 5.5 provides findings about major Australian 
banks’ evolution towards environmental sustainability in their corporate lending 
which is an emerging theme. Additional analysis of this emerging theme is presented 
in section 5.6. This is followed by a summary of the key research findings. A 
discussion of these results in the context of the prior literature is left for Chapter 6. 
The structure of this chapter is demonstrated in Figure 5.1:  
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Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.1  Structure of Chapter 5 
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5.2 Corporate Lending  
This study focuses on major Australian banks’ corporate lending. Accordingly, 
section 5.2.1 presents the findings regarding senior executive bankers’ fundamental 
views on corporate lending, which justifies the focus on corporate loans. Section 
5.2.2 further demonstrates how a corporate loan application of a corporate customer 
is processed, which is known as the corporate credit process.  
5.2.1 General information on corporate lending 
Exploratory interviews with senior executive bankers
67
 indicate that major Australian 
banks generally segment their majority lending businesses into personal lending, 
business lending and corporate lending
68
(see Figure 5.2). Personal lending is 
principally lending to individuals (e.g., car loans, home loans) and business lending 
predominately deals with small and medium sized businesses which are privately 
owned. Personal and business loans are generally secured by customers’ properties. 
As one of the majority lending businesses of major Australian banks, corporate 
lending usually has two components: one is lending to mid-sized corporate customers, 
and the other is loans extended to banks’ top tier corporate customers69. Bankers 
indicate that project finance is a form of ‘specialised lending activity’, which usually 
involves equity investors and a syndicate of banks and/or other financial 
                                                 
67
 Senior executive bankers, participating bankers and bankers in this study are used interchangeably, 
and refer to the interviewees.  
68
 There are different bases to segment banks’ lending business; one bank uses turnover of customers 
and the other two banks segment their lending business with the size of loans extended to customers. 
Even for turnover, there are different references under different circumstances. Therefore, this study 
does not delve into this aspect.  
69
 Mid-sized corporate customers can be listed companies on Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), 
but not all of the mid-sized customers are listed companies on ASX. Top tier corporate customers 
refer to large companies, e.g., ASX 200, Top 200 or the equivalent companies.  
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institutions
70
. Bankers further state that although project finance is also one focus of 
major Australian banks, it is ‘…only a small portion of banks’ overall lending’. In 
one bank, project finance takes up less than 2% of its total loans. The proportions 
project finance takes in other banks are similar.  
Personal lending Business lendingCorporate lending
Mid-sized 
corporate 
customers
Large corporate 
customers
Individual 
customers
Banks’ lending businesses
Business 
customers
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.2  Banks’ Segmentation of Lending Businesses 
 
Banks aim to provide a broad spectrum of corporate loan products. Relationship 
managers customise loan products specific to their corporate customers’ needs based 
on banks’ policies and corporate customers’ overall positions. Loans for mid-sized 
corporate customers are generally secured, while those for the top tier corporate 
customers are predominately unsecured and are usually cash flow based. 
Bankers state that whether the corporate customers are mid-sized corporate or large 
corporate as banks’ top tier corporate customers, the same process is followed when 
approving corporate loan applications; that is, the corporate credit process is the 
                                                 
70
 For specialised lending, the primary or only source of cash flow is income from the asset being 
financed. Specialised lending is a collective term for a couple of financing forms. 
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same for all corporate customers. However, the activities undertaken in the process 
are tailored specifically to the corporate customers and the transactions.  
5.2.2 The corporate credit process  
According to bankers, both existing corporate customers and prospective corporate 
customers go through the same corporate credit process in major Australian banks; 
the difference is on ‘the level of rigor and depth’ of the corporate credit process71.  
Credit screening stage — On-boarding decisions 
Bankers indicate that for a prospective corporate customer, ‘full customer evaluation’ 
is required (see Figure 5.3). Accordingly, in the words of one banker, ‘…there needs 
to be an assessment of a prospective corporate customer’s suitability before taking it 
on board’72. This view is supported by bankers in the other two banks and is defined 
as credit screening. They indicate that the screening is conducted at industry/sector, 
prospective corporate customer and transaction level against the bank’s strategy, 
credit policy and reputational focus. The screening leads to a view on whether any 
identified risks are beyond the bank’s risk appetite 73 . As a result, on-boarding 
decisions are made.  
 
                                                 
71
 For the purpose of this study, the focus is on the corporate credit process and ERM for new 
corporate customers.  
72
 According to bankers, taking a prospective corporate customer ‘on-board’ refers to a bank’s 
decision to initiate a relationship with the prospective corporate customer and the subsequent decision 
to proceed to a transaction with the corporate customer.   
73
 A bank’s risk appetite refers to the amount and type of risk that the bank is prepared to pursue, 
retain or take. It is a core instrument aligning a bank’s strategy, capital allocation and risks. 
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Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.3  The Corporate Credit Process 
 
The first banker discussed above classifies the assessment of prospective corporate 
customers’ suitability as a separate stage from the bank’s corporate credit process; 
while credit screening is considered as an integral part of the corporate credit process 
in the latter two banks. Bankers of the latter two banks describe the screening as the 
‘…origination stage which is the starting point of [the bank’s] corporate credit 
process’. However, whether this preliminary stage is considered as a separate stage 
or an integral part of a bank’s corporate credit process, it sets ‘threshold 
requirements’ for prospective corporate customers. In addition, bankers indicate that 
activities undertaken in making a corporate lending decision are not linear and can 
The corporate 
credit process 
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happen concurrently. That is, it is difficult to draw a line between activities in the 
preliminary stage and those in other stages of banks’ corporate credit processes.  
Furthermore, bankers point out that ‘…part of the risks are identified and assessed 
during the process [credit screening]’ and thus the results of the initial screening are 
part of the credit submission’ 74 . Thereby, it is not appropriate to make a clear 
distinction between credit screening and other stages in banks’ corporate credit 
processes. Consequently, for the purpose of this study, credit screening is considered 
as the first stage in banks’ corporate credit processes. Credit screening generally 
involves: 
 …the initial investigations on the customers’ licences to operate, their 
compliance with relevant obligations, the nature of the customers’ businesses, 
whether the customers’ operations are consistent with the bank’s strategy, 
credit policy and guidelines, whether there is potential reputational risk 
exposure for the bank that is beyond its risk tolerance
75
. 
Banks are likely to reject prospective corporate customers’ loan applications at the 
outset if any of the following situations exist: 
 prospective corporate customers are in breach of any applied legislation;  
 potential reputational risk is beyond the bank’s acceptable range; and 
 transactions with the prospective corporate customers are contrary to the 
bank’s values and policies. 
Banks’ credit policies play a critical role in credit screening by ‘…establishing the 
bank’s risk appetite and the acceptable range of loan applications’. They set the 
                                                 
74
 Credit submission is the credit report that results from credit evaluation (both preliminary 
evaluation and further credit evaluation) and is prepared for the Credit Officers to approve.  
75
 For the purpose of this study, risk tolerance, risk appetite and the acceptable range of risks have the 
same meaning, and are regulated by the bank’s relevant policies.  
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threshold requirements for prospective corporate customers. Once the transactions 
with prospective corporate customers are viewed as suitable, credit analysis that 
shapes the credit submission can be conducted.  
Credit analysis stage — Credit submission  
Credit submission generally requires: 
…comprehensive evaluation of the Probability of Default (credit rating) 76 
and the Loss Given Default, as well as a resultant loan structure where loan 
covenants, loan pricing and capital allocation are included. 
As stated by bankers, ‘The evaluation of the Probability of Default and the Loss 
Given Default is the centrepiece and the fundamental part of the credit submission’. 
The Probability of Default (PD) measures the probability that a corporate customer 
will default on its loan over given time horizons, and is manifested in the credit 
rating of the corporate customer. The Loss Given Default (LGD) measures a bank’s 
credit loss in the event of loan default. The PD and the LGD co-determine the 
creditworthiness of a corporate customer. To determine the PD and the LGD, credit 
analysis needs to identify and assess risks and risk mitigations
77
. Therefore, the 
factors considered in credit analysis are surrounding the drivers for risks and risk 
mitigations (see Figure 5.4). 
                                                 
76
 Credit rating reflects a bank’s estimation of borrowing firms’ willingness and capability to meet 
their financial obligations in full and on time (Standard & Poor’s 2011). 
77
 According to Basel II, insurance, guarantees, hedging and collateral are all considered as risk 
mitigations. For the purpose of this study, risk mitigations refer to collateral pledged by corporate 
customers that aims to reduce the consequences if a risk event occurs. Insurance, guarantees and 
hedging are classified into risk transfer and thus are beyond the scope of this study.  
 
140 
 
 
Industry characteristics
Economy and market 
conditions
Financial status
Capability to withstand 
deteriorating circumstances
Management 
Competitiveness in peer 
groups
Credit rating 
(Probability of 
Default PD)
Loss Given 
Default 
(LGD)
Status of collateral: 
Value, quality, liquidity and 
banks’ ability to exercise their 
rights on the collateral in event 
of default
Creditworthiness 
of corporate 
customers
Qualitative & 
Quantitative 
Analysis
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.4  Factors Determining the Credit Risk Profile of Corporate 
Customers 
 
Bankers state that there is analysis around the economic and market situations 
affecting a corporate customer, the industry the corporate customer sits in, the 
corporate customer’s current and expected financial status, its capability to withstand 
deteriorating circumstances and the quality of its management. Peer analysis is also 
undertaken as part of the credit analysis to ‘…evaluate the corporate customer’s 
competitiveness and soundness among its peers in the same industry’. According to 
the information sourced from bankers, credit analysis is ‘quantitatively and 
qualitatively balanced’. Quantitatively, banks have ‘…internal risk models which 
come up with a credit rating for each corporate customer’; and this is a standardised 
process. However, the credit rating is not altogether risk model-driven; it is also 
supported by ‘expert judgement’. Based on comprehensive understandings of 
corporate customers and transactions as well as past experiences regarding the 
corporate credit process, credit analysts and credit officers make qualitative 
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judgements on the credit ratings emanating from risk models. Adjustments to the 
credit ratings from the internal risk models are allowed where appropriate. 
As for the LGD, one banker states that ‘What can offset the LGD to some extent is 
the collateral [pledged by corporate customers]’. This statement is supported by 
bankers from the other two banks. These bankers indicate that collateral that has high 
value, high quality and high liquidity can, to a large degree, reduce the LGD. To 
determine the LGD, there is analysis on the status of collateral pledged by corporate 
customers. When referring to the status of collateral, it usually includes the value and 
liquidity of collateral and banks’ ability to exercise their rights in the event of default. 
Based on the credit analysis on risks and risk mitigations, and the negotiation 
between a bank and its corporate customer, the loan structure for approval is 
proposed
78
. It aims to minimise the bank’s potential losses and maximise protection 
for the bank’s interests for the particular case. Once the credit submission is ready, 
the corporate credit process goes to credit approval stage.  
Credit approval stage  
According to bankers, a credit approval decision is made ‘…on the basis that risks 
have been effectively analysed and appropriately mitigated, in accordance with the 
bank’s strategy, credit policy and relevant standards, to be compatible with the 
bank’s risk appetite’. Once a corporate loan application is approved by a bank based 
on the credit submission, the agreed loan structure should be documented as a legal 
agreement between the bank and its corporate customer.  
                                                 
78
 For the purpose of this study, a loan structure involves loan amount, loan price, loan covenants and 
other terms and conditions.  
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Documentation stage  
In the documentation stage, the cost of bank loans, loan covenants and other terms 
and conditions under which a corporate loan is extended are documented as a 
corporate loan agreement. The legal agreement protects a bank’s interests in 
corporate lending.  
Loan monitoring stage  
Loan monitoring starts once loans are disbursed. It involves regular reviews of ‘…the 
changes of corporate customers’ circumstances (i.e. macroeconomics, regulation, 
industry/sector prospect, markets, and financial status and management of corporate 
customers), and their on-going compliance with relevant legislation and loan 
agreement items’. Loan monitoring aims to ensure the on-going performance of 
corporate customers is consistent with banks’ expectations and compatible with 
banks’ risk appetites. The primary monitoring tools of banks are ‘…the applied 
legislation on corporate customers and loan agreements bonding the bank and 
corporate customers’. During the life of a loan, problem management is needed 
when a risk event occurs. The detail of problem management is beyond the scope of 
this study and is not provided.   
Bankers further add that although there can be a flow chart for banks’ corporate 
credit processes as shown in Figure 5.3, the activities undertaken in the processes are 
not linear. These activities can be undertaken concurrently and back and forth in the 
corporate credit process (see Figure 5.5).  
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Figure 5.5  Activities in the Corporate Credit Process 
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As shown in Figure 5.5, there is a preliminary assessment of prospective corporate 
customers to evaluate whether they are suitable for banks; that is, a screening process 
for prospective corporate customers. If a bank decides to proceed with a prospective 
corporate customer, the results of the preliminary assessment will be considered as 
the basis for the subsequent credit analysis and added as part of the credit submission. 
Credit analysis is conducted regarding the PD and the LGD. On the basis of the 
credit analysis, the bank is able to negotiate the cost of bank loans, loan covenants 
and amount, as well as other terms and conditions to be included in the bank loan 
agreement. Credit analysis and the subsequent negotiation between the bank and the 
corporate customer regarding loan structure form the credit submission. Once the 
credit submission is approved by the Credit Officer, the proposed loan structure is 
documented as a legal contract which is known as a bank loan agreement. A bank 
loan agreement is used as a dominant tool in the loan monitoring stage. Given that 
circumstances of corporate customers change during the life of loans, loan 
monitoring, a post-transaction stage, is carried out as an on-going process. 
The above discussions centre around the corporate credit process related to 
traditional risks for banks. Section 5.3 presents the rationale for the integration of 
environmental risks into banks’ corporate credit processes.  
5.3 Environmental Risks in Banks’ Corporate Lending 
This section presents bankers’ views of environmental risks in banks’ corporate 
lending. Section 5.3.1 demonstrates the findings about the definition and dimensions 
of environmental risks. Findings about the attributes of environmental risks are 
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outlined in section 5.3.2. Following this, bankers’ perceptions about the determinants 
of environmental risks facing banks are provided in section 5.3.3.  
5.3.1 Definition and dimensions of environmental risks 
One banker provides a general definition of environmental risks:  
 Environmental risks result from the impacts corporate customers are going 
to have on the environment, which are driven by environmental legislation 
and stakeholders’ environmental awareness. 
Definitions of environmental risks from other bankers are consistent with this 
statement. Bankers indicate that environmental risks are unlikely to be quantified and 
quarantined from other risks in corporate lending. From a banker’s point of view, 
environmental risks in corporate lending manifest themselves by way of lender 
liability, credit risk and reputational risk for banks
79
(see Figure 5.6).  
Environmental legislation
Stakeholders’ 
environmental awareness
Environmental risks
Lender liability
Credit risk
Reputational risk
 
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.6  Drivers and Dimensions of Environmental Risks 
 
 
                                                 
79
 During the interviews, bankers confirm that lender liability is also referred to as direct risk; and 
credit risk can be used interchangeably with indirect risk.  
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Lender liability 
Banks are concerned with lender liability which is usually in the form of clean-up 
costs for environmental damage and other environmental claims under applied 
environmental legislation. These costs and claims result from corporate customers’ 
environmental impacts but are borne by banks when corporate customers are 
insolvent. The likelihood of lender liability is evaluated via environmental due 
diligence to ensure there is no potential lender liability for banks within banks’ 
predicative ranges. Further, if a corporate loan comes to the point of default, banks 
need to consider how to exercise rights on the corporate customer and/or its assets to 
avoid lender liability. However, to the bankers’ knowledge, there is no known case 
of a bank incurring lender liability due to loans extended to its corporate customers 
in Australia.  
According to the bankers interviewed, ‘Environmental risks can have considerable 
impacts on corporate customers’ financial positions and can ruin the customers’ 
reputation overnight’. Major Australian banks are more concerned with credit risk 
and reputational risk that result from corporate customers’ environmental issues.  
Credit risk  
One banker points out that ‘The bank’s concern from a credit risk point of view is 
predominantly on the probability that environmental issues will force corporate 
customers to default on their bank loans’. There is consensus among bankers on this 
point of view. Bankers indicate that this probability is primarily driven by 
environmental legislation and the explanations for it are provided. Tighter 
environmental legislation can ‘…result in increasing costs of the enterprises’ 
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business (e.g., enterprises need to have different premises and management systems 
to manage pollution for water, air and land, or charges for emissions to water, air 
and land are increased)’. Bankers state that the higher costs imposed by the tighter 
environmental legislation are likely to be passed on to consumers through the sales of 
corporate customers’ goods and services. Consequently, tighter environmental 
legislation is likely to ‘…lead to a higher cost on the goods and services of 
enterprises that are involved in environmentally sensitive activities’. The higher 
prices of goods and services are likely to impair corporate customers’ 
competitiveness and profitability in the market.  
In addition, under environmental legislation, considerable environmental sanctions 
and claims are likely to be imposed on corporate customers who engage in 
environmentally sensitive activities. These sanctions and claims ‘…negatively impact 
on the corporate customers’ financial volatility and thus on their profitability and 
competitiveness’. As a consequence, corporate customers’ capability to repay their 
loans is impaired. One banker further states that: 
Environmental risks may also show themselves in insurance cost that is 
against environmental risk events; insurance cost is likely to have impacts on 
corporate customers’ cash flows and therefore have impacts on their overall 
credit standings.  
There is no discussion around insurance cost against environmental issues from other 
bankers. However, by influencing credit ratings of corporate customers, insurance 
cost is likely to impact on corporate customers’ capability to repay bank loans.  
Furthermore, the values and saleability of real properties can be impaired by 
contamination on the real properties. If real properties held as collateral by banks are 
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contaminated, the LGD for banks is higher. Bankers also indicate that banks will not 
accept contaminated real properties as collateral for loans under any condition. 
However, there are some cases where contamination of collateral occurs during the 
life of loans, and this is described by bankers as ‘a disaster’ for banks. 
Reputational risk 
Reputational risk evaluation is considered as an integral part of banks’ corporate 
credit processes. The reputation of banks is vulnerable to environmental scrutiny 
from the public and NGOs if they associate with transactions that cause 
environmental risk events or businesses with unfavourable environmental reputation. 
Accordingly, banks are likely to incur reputational risk due to these associations.  
All participating bankers state that ‘Reputational risk is judgemental and is not 
included in the bank’s risk models’. It is not possible for banks to quantify 
reputational risk, where reputational risk committees or their delegates are needed to 
make corporate lending decisions regarding reputational risk. One banker indicates 
that: 
 If the bank has the view that a corporate customer’s business may present 
reputational risk for it, the reputational risk aspects of the particular 
corporate customer or transaction will be referenced to a reputational risk 
committee or its delegate to make a lending decision. The reputation risk 
committee is chaired by the Chief Risk Officer of the bank.  
The other banks have consistent systems to deal with reputational risk. Bankers 
indicate that reputation risk committees conduct evaluation at industry, corporate 
customer and transaction level in accordance with banks’ policies and other relevant 
standards. The reputation risk committees are at the highest level of banks, and 
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involve senior executives and Chief Credit Officers. Generally, banks ‘…tend to 
steer clear from highly controversial customers and transactions’. 
5.3.2 Attributes of environmental risks 
Bankers articulate that the emergence of environmental risk events is much more 
dramatic than any other risk events. For example, when a corporate customer’s 
revenue trends downwards, it is a signal of a financial risk event for banks. Banks 
will accordingly take actions before the financial situation of the corporate customer 
becomes unacceptable. However, there is usually a lack of such a signal for the 
emergence of an environmental risk event. In addition, bankers indicate that the 
consequences of an emerging environmental risk event are often catastrophic.  
Consequently, it is unlikely that environmental risks are ‘…to be precisely 
contemplated in corporate customers’ financial forecasts as well as in the bank’s 
credit approval process’ 80 . As such, environmental risks are considered a non-
financial evaluation for corporate customers and transactions. Bankers indicate that 
as a qualitative input into credit analysis, environmental risks are likely to impact on 
the creditworthiness of corporate customers in certain circumstances.  
5.3.3 Determinants of banks’ exposure to environmental risks  
There is consensus among bankers that: 
 The industry/sector a corporate customer belongs to, the quality of its 
management towards environmental issues and its financial resources to deal 
with environmental impacts are the key considerations when determining the 
bank’s environmental risk exposure. 
                                                 
80
 Bankers indicate that the credit process and the credit approval process are used interchangeably. 
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Industries/sectors that corporate customers belong to 
Bankers have a consistent view that ‘…environmental risks are usually associated 
with industries/sectors that corporate customers sit in’. They also indicate that the 
significance of the consequences if an environmental risk event occurs depends on 
the industry/sector that a corporate customer belongs to. They provide further 
explanation as follows:  
Corporate customers in environmentally sensitive industries/sectors are 
dealing with operations and/or products that can have catastrophic 
contamination on the environment in various forms. Therefore, other things 
being equal, the probability that environmental impacts force the corporate 
customers to default on their bank loans is higher. Accordingly, the bank 
assigns much higher weight on environmental issues of these corporate 
customers than those of corporate customers in environmentally friendly 
industries/sectors. 
An example is provided by one banker to support the above explanation:   
…for example, if an environmental incident is caused by a corporate 
customer in the oil and gas industry, there will be a massive environmental 
claim (e.g., clean-up and remediation costs) against the corporate customer. 
The financial viability and volatility of that corporate customer will be largely 
affected. 
However, bankers comment that it does not mean banks prefer not to lend to 
corporate customers in environmentally sensitive industries/sectors. Corporate 
customers in environmentally sensitive industries/sectors do not necessarily expose 
banks to environmental risks that are beyond their acceptable ranges.  
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Quality of corporate customers’ environmental management and their financial 
capability 
There is consensus among bankers that: 
Significant environmental issues of corporate customers do not necessarily 
mean that the bank won’t finance the corporate customers or will impose 
punitive higher prices [cost of bank loans]. The key dimensions are the 
quality of their environmental management, how experienced the management 
is, as well as whether the corporate customers make commitments and have 
sufficient financial resources to manage emerging environmental issues. We 
[the bank] are prepared to take on environmental risks as long as we are 
comfortable with the corporate customers’ environmental management and 
their financial capacity to deal with emerging environmental issues. 
Bankers provide consistent explanations for this opinion. They indicate that 
corporate customers’ environmental management has a critical impact on the 
probability that environmental risk events occur. This is evidenced in the words of 
one banker: 
 If corporate customers have been managing their environmental issues well 
and environmental risk events are not emerging, the probability of 
environmental risk events actually emerging is lower than their peers that do 
not have such good track records. 
According to the bankers interviewed, in addition to checks on the track records of 
corporate customers’ environmental management, a prospective assessment of their 
environmental management is required. With regard to the factors involved in the 
assessment of corporate customers’ environmental management (see Figure 5.7), 
there is consensus among bankers that: 
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When assessing the track record of a corporate customer’s environmental 
management, the considerations are mainly the corporate customer’s 
financial statements and compliance regime it has in place. If a bank loan is 
of large amount, it [the bank] is likely to get independent consultancies to 
review them [statements and compliance regime] both when the bank takes 
the corporate customer on-board and on an ongoing basis to pick up any 
environmental issues. 
The bank also does prospective evaluation, involving what environmental 
issues there are and what resources do the corporate customer needs to fix 
the environmental issues without taking the credit to the level that the bank is 
not comfortable with. 
…[The bank] will see who are in the main management and board of 
directors now, have they been in the positions in the past, and will they 
change going forward. If a key person in management or board of directors of 
a corporate customer leaves, the bank will take it as a trigger to relook at the 
corporate customer’s management. 
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management 
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Forecast scenarios
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Potential environmental 
issues
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Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.7 Factors in the Assessment of Corporate Customers’ Environmental 
Management 
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In spite of the statements above, bankers indicate that these factors are not solely 
sufficient to determine the quality of corporate customers’ environmental 
management. To this end, bankers add that dialogue or discussions between banks 
and corporate customers are of significant importance by providing banks with 
further opportunities to better understand corporate customers’ environmental 
management. Based on the retrospective and prospective assessment of corporate 
customers’ environmental management, as well as the dialogue/discussions, banks 
can make judgements on the quality of corporate customers’ environmental 
management. 
Bankers further indicate that robust financial capability of corporate customers in 
dealing with environmental issues can, to a certain degree, offset the consequences of 
emerging environmental risk events. Therefore, corporate customers’ financial 
capability can play an important role in determining banks’ exposure to 
environmental risks.  
However, bankers emphasise that if significant potential reputational risk exists, 
banks choose not to lend at the outset even though corporate customers have sound 
environmental management and sufficient financial resources to manage their 
environmental issues (see details in section 5.4.1). The reason for this is that ‘…the 
bank could never charge enough for the impact on its reputation’.  
Based on the findings outlined in section 5.3, environmental risks are likely to 
expose banks to significant financial and reputational losses in both the short- and 
long-term in corporate lending. In the words of one banker, ‘The consideration of 
environmental issues is critical for any organisations’ viability under the tighter 
environmental legislation and the increasing scrutiny from stakeholders’. To 
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mitigate the impacts resulting from environmental risks and make more responsible 
corporate lending decisions, ERM in banks’ corporate credit processes is of 
paramount importance. The findings about banks’ ERM are documented in section 
5.4.  
5.4 ERM in the Corporate Credit Process 
There is a consistent view among bankers that: 
When the bank is looking at environmental risks, the most important thing is 
that the bank has a general framework that everyone understands. The 
framework is compiled from the thoughts of people that really understand the 
sector and the transaction, so that environmental risks can be identified and 
dealt with appropriately and effectively. 
To this end, bankers further indicate that ERM in banks’ corporate lending is 
composed of: 
 Initial environmental risk identification and assessment based on readily 
available information of corporate customers. This leads to the decision on 
whether to proceed with a loan application and to what extent further 
environmental risk evaluation should be undertaken if the loan application is 
to proceed. 
 Identifying the potential environmental risk events based on further 
environmental risk investigation. 
 Assessing the likelihood of environmental risk events occurring, the 
significance of the consequences if environmental risk events emerge and 
corporate customers’ financial resources that are allocated to their 
environmental impacts. 
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 Controlling banks’ exposure to environmental risks within their acceptable 
limits. 
 Monitoring environmental risks on an on-going basis, which includes the 
continuous evaluation on environmental conditions of corporate customers 
and any real property held as collateral.   
These components are specified in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. In addition, in the 
words of one banker, ‘Environmental risks are different from traditional risks, but 
they are one risk of many and the bank considers them as one critical input into the 
credit approval process’. This point of view is supported by other bankers who 
indicate that environmental risks are a highly influential indicator in banks’ corporate 
credit processes. Accordingly, bankers claim that ERM is considered an integral part 
of banks’ corporate credit processes; that is, ERM is inherent in every stage of banks’ 
corporate credit processes (see Figure 5.8). 
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Figure 5.8  ERM in the Corporate Credit Process 
 
5.4.1 Preliminary environmental analysis  
As discussed in section 5.2.2, there is a credit screening process where preliminary 
assessments for prospective corporate customers and transactions are undertaken. 
Corresponding to this, there is a preliminary environmental analysis stage in the 
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ERM process. In the preliminary environmental analysis stage, banks’ strategies, 
values and environmental policies play a fundamental role by setting threshold 
requirements for prospective corporate customers. Bankers have consistent views 
that: 
 …[the bank ] has to consider prospective corporate customers’ activities 
against our [the bank] own corporate responsibility and whether they [the 
prospective corporate customers] are operating in a manner that is consistent 
with our values.  
Additionally, bankers indicate that there are group environmental policies that 
provide guidance for integrating environmental risks into banks’ lending businesses. 
They serve as ‘…overarching frameworks to screen and filter prospective corporate 
customers in terms of their environmental issues’. In addition to an overarching 
environmental policy, one bank has specific environmental policies for particular 
environmentally sensitive industries/sectors 
81
(e.g., water, forestry and forest, and 
energy). The specific environmental policies are used by this bank to screen and 
filter prospective corporate customers in these particular industries/sectors.  
To obtain the information required by the preliminary environmental analysis, banks 
provide prospective corporate customers with questionnaires. The structural 
questions in banks’ questionnaires generally cover the following factors: 
It [the questionnaire] aims to identify environmental issues of prospective 
corporate customers and transactions, applied environmental legislation, the 
way prospective corporate customers are going to manage environmental 
                                                 
81
 According to the bankers interviewed, ‘…extending loans to corporate customers in 
environmentally sensitive industries/sectors is more likely to expose the bank to medium or high 
environmental risks’. 
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issues in their businesses, and also their commitment and financial capacity 
to managing these issues. 
Through questionnaires, banks can obtain initial understandings of ‘…prospective 
corporate customers’ nature of business, their legislative compliance and their 
environmental management’. On the basis of the initial understandings, banks are 
able to screen prospective corporate customers against their strategies, values and 
environmental policies. The screening leads to two levels of initial decision-making. 
The first level leads to a decision about whether a bank should reject a prospective 
corporate customer or not. If the bank decides to on-board the prospective corporate 
customer, a subsequent decision is needed to determine the grade of environmental 
risks (low, medium and high) the corporate customer is likely to expose the bank to
82
. 
This initial environmental risk grade determines the level and rigor of the subsequent 
environmental analysis undertaken for the corporate customer.  
Discussion with bankers indicates that from an environmental point of view, if a 
prospective corporate customer is in breach of any applied environmental obligations, 
banks generally choose not to lend in the first place. If a prospective corporate 
customer has a poor track record of compliance with applied environmental 
obligations, banks either reject the prospective corporate customer or consider it as a 
corporate customer that exposes banks to medium or high environmental risks. In 
addition, bankers have a consistent view that ‘The bank chooses not to lend if it has 
an initial perception that they [prospective corporate customers] don’t have 
responsible and adequate environmental management’. Furthermore, there is 
                                                 
82
 The environmental risk grade is an initial classification, which might be changed in the 
environmental risk evaluation stage. In the preliminary environmental analysis stage, the analysis is 
usually based on information that is easily to access, such as a desk-top review and the questionnaire 
survey.  
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consensus among bankers that ‘The bank usually avoids associating with companies 
with unfavourable environmental reputation, as reputation can be destroyed 
overnight but takes long term to build.’  
Once a prospective corporate customer is considered as suitable and an initial 
environmental risk grade is assigned, the following stage is to evaluate 
environmental risks facing banks. The results of the evaluation are an input into the 
credit submission of the corporate credit process.  
5.4.2 Environmental risk evaluation 
Bankers articulate that environmental risk evaluation is an integral part of credit 
analysis in the corporate credit process and the results of environmental risk 
evaluation are included in the credit submission. Bankers consider environmental 
risk evaluation to be a similar process to other traditional risk evaluation in the 
corporate credit process. This is evidenced in a statement:  
With environmental risks, the same thing, the bank needs to understand 
environmental issues a corporate customer and a transaction face with, how 
environmental issues are managed by the corporate customer, and what are 
the likely changes of environmental aspects of the corporate customer during 
the life of the loan. The bank also needs to understand whether environmental 
risks the bank is exposed to are consistent with environmental risks that it has 
supported. 
Accordingly, environmental risk evaluation aims to: 
 …gain a good understanding of a corporate customer’s environmental 
aspects, its compliance with applied environmental legislation, its capability 
to manage environmental issues and its financial resources to address the 
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environmental consequences resulting from emerging environmental risk 
events.  
As mentioned in section 5.4.1, the initial environmental risk grade resulting from 
preliminary environmental analysis determines the form, level and rigor of the 
activities in the environmental risk evaluation stage. The evaluation of environmental 
risks is more detailed, more rigorous and involves more actions when dealing with 
corporate customers who are likely to expose banks to medium and high 
environmental risks
83
. Bankers have a consistent view that: 
Environmental obligation compliance check is for all corporate customers. 
Environmental investigations by the bank’s analysts and/or credit officers are 
conducted for corporate customers that are likely to expose us [the bank] to 
medium and high environmental risks. Independent external environmental 
impact assessment and site inspections are likely to be conducted where 
appropriate when dealing with corporate customers in environmentally 
sensitive industries/sectors. 
According to the bankers interviewed, most environmental issues are governed by 
the compliance framework under Australian environmental legislation and reviewed 
regularly by government authorities. All companies are required to comply with 
applied environmental legislation from their local government, state government and 
federal government. It is a minimum requirement for corporate customers.  
From a retrospective perspective, banks are looking at corporate customers’ track 
records of their compliance with applied environmental legislation. If environmental 
legislation was breached, details about the reasons, levels and resultant management 
                                                 
83
 Corporate customers in environmentally sensitive industries/sectors usually expose banks to 
medium and high environmental risks. Corporate customers in environmentally friendly 
industries/sectors usually expose banks to low environmental risks; in certain circumstances, they can 
also expose banks to medium environmental risks, e.g., when corporate customers have poor quality 
of environmental management.  
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are required. For corporate customers exposing banks to medium and high 
environmental risks, banks also ask for notices from environmental authorities such 
as the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)
84
. Furthermore, banks forecast the 
changes of the applied environmental legislation and their impact on corporate 
customers’ ability to repay bank loans. Therefore, banks conduct environmental 
obligation compliance checks by ‘…reviewing whether and to what extent the 
compliance framework has been adhered to [by corporate customers]’ and 
‘…predicting the impact that potential changes of environmental legislation are 
going to have on corporate customers’ repayment ability’.  
For corporate customers that are likely to expose banks to medium and high 
environmental risks, there is investigation around corporate customers’ 
environmental aspects undertaken by banks’ analysts and/or credit officers. 
Independent external environmental impact assessment and site inspections are also 
undertaken for these corporate customers. The environmental investigation by bank 
staff involves analytical instruments and expert judgement, and independent external 
environmental impact assessment and site inspections require environmental 
expertise. Accordingly, a detailed discussion of those aspects is not provided by 
bankers and is beyond the scope of this study. On the basis of an appropriate 
environmental risk evaluation, banks are likely to effectively manage their 
environmental risk exposure. 
                                                 
84
 The notices are for these corporate customers’ environmental offences. Generally, environmental 
authorities like the EPA always keep an eye on environmentally sensitive industries/sectors. They 
regularly report on any emerging environmental risk event. 
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5.4.3 Environmental risk control and monitoring 
Bankers indicate that environmental covenants in loan agreements and regular 
reviews of corporate customers’ environmental aspects are the widely used 
mechanisms to control and monitor environmental risks. Additionally, two bankers 
suggest the inclusion of a Material Adverse Change Clause in loan agreements to 
manage environmental risks. However, the cost of bank loans is not considered by 
bankers as a mechanism to control or monitor environmental risks facing banks.  
Section 5.4.3.1 provides findings about the form, contents, determinants and 
functions of bank loan covenants. Following these, findings about environmental 
covenants are presented in section 5.4.3.2. Bankers’ opinions on regular reviews to 
control and monitor environmental risks are provided in section 5.4.3.3. The 
rationale by bankers for using the Material Adverse Change Clause to manage 
environmental risks is provided in section 5.4.3.4.  
5.4.3.1 Bank loan covenants  
Loan covenants are required by major Australian banks in corporate lending, as 
‘…they [covenants] protect the bank’s interests from the deterioration of corporate 
customers’ financial status and/or changes of corporate customers’ circumstances’. 
In this regard, bankers indicate that loan covenants need to be ‘practical and 
effective’. To achieve this, bankers claim that it is necessary to ‘…undertake 
comprehensive credit analysis of particular corporate customers and transactions, 
which addresses each risk, risk mitigation, and justifies why the transactions with the 
corporate customers meet required credit and economic requirements’.  
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The form and contents of loan covenants 
As indicated by bankers, covenants in corporate loan agreements are predominantly 
financial covenants. Bankers provide consistent explanations that ‘They [financial 
covenants] are quantitative and objective, thereby are easier to measure and 
monitor’. One banker states that: 
Covenants for corporate lending predominantly rely on the balance sheet 
strength of corporate customers. They are normally gearing covenants, cash 
flow covenants or interest cover covenants. Gearing covenants are used more 
frequently’85.  
Consistent with this banker’s viewpoint, other bankers also point out that loan 
covenants are generally balance sheet covenants, which are typically in the form of 
gearing covenants, interest cover covenants or debt service cover covenants (cash 
flow cover covenants).  
Bankers indicate that covenants mentioned above are only the key covenants in 
major Australian banks’ corporate lending; other covenants that are customised in 
terms of the particular circumstances of corporate customers are also applied
86
. As 
stated by one banker and supported by opinions of other bankers, ‘There is always 
scope for either a credit officer or a relationship manager adding covenants that are 
specific to that particular corporate customer and transaction’. As such, there are 
                                                 
85
According to bankers, gearing can be either net debt over net debt plus equity, or a net debt over 
EBITDA (Earnings before interest and taxes, less depreciation and amortization). Increased gearing 
raises the probability of financial distress of corporate customers.  
86
 One banker provides examples of specific covenants: supply bank with a copy of audited financial 
accounts at an agreed frequency and within a reasonable timeframe of the date to which the accounts 
relate; advise bank of any Event of Default, Review Event or Potential Event of Default occurring; 
material litigation, asset write-downs, any material change in its business, the nature of its business, or 
its internal management; any change in its ownership or control; maintain adequate environmental risk 
management and comply with all relevant environmental laws; no disposal of substantial assets or 
grant security over assets to another party without the bank’s consent. 
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numerous contextual judgements deployed in the establishment process of loan 
covenants.  
Determinants of bank loan covenants 
Bankers indicate that ‘It [the setting of covenants] is predominantly determined by a 
combination of the bank’s policies and the circumstances of a corporate customer’87. 
According to bankers, covenants in corporate loan agreements usually have three 
components: a standard suite of covenants stipulated by banks’ policies that every 
corporate customer has to abide by, the industry/sector-based covenants for corporate 
customers in particular industries/sectors, and specific covenants customised to 
particular corporate customers. Figure 5.9 depicts the determinants of bank loan 
covenants.  
Bank’s 
policies
Loan covenants
Bargaining power
Others
Credit availability 
for corporate 
customers
Financial strength and 
management quality of 
corporate customers 
Supply and demand of 
credit in market
The content 
of covenants
The tightness of 
covenants 
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.9  Determinants of Loan Covenants 
                                                 
87
 Setting of covenants or covenant setting refers to the contents and tightness of covenants. 
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In the words of one banker, ‘There are not a lot of arguments about which covenants 
a corporate customer should have in a loan agreement, but about the level [tightness] 
of covenants’. Other bankers also comment that the negotiations of loan covenants 
between banks and corporate customers focus on the level (tightness) of covenants 
banks can impose. Banks measure the tightness of covenants by the latitude for 
corporate customers to run their businesses without breaching their covenants. With 
tight covenants, ‘…there is not much latitude for them [corporate customers] to go 
around in running their businesses’.  
Bankers consider bargaining power of corporate customers as the determinant of the 
level (tightness) of covenants in corporate loan agreements. This is evidenced in the 
following statements from three bankers:  
The primary determinant of the strength of a covenant package a corporate 
customer can negotiate is its bargaining power.  
 Generally, covenants for corporate customers in the top end market are weak 
[soft] because they [top end market corporate customers] have strong 
bargaining power. 
 Corporate customers with strong bargaining power are likely to have softer 
covenants, as they are usually experienced and advanced in management. 
Bankers describe bargaining power as ‘…the extent to which the bank is prepared to 
give something up to win or retain a corporate customer’. The reason corporate 
customers with stronger bargaining power are able to negotiate softer covenants is 
also provided by bankers. Bankers indicate that corporate customers with strong 
bargaining power are likely to have less volatile cash flows, higher competitiveness 
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compared to their peers, better capability of management and favourable perceptions 
from their stakeholders.  
Bankers indicate that bargaining power of corporate customers needs to be 
considered on the basis of banks’ ‘policy stance and appetite stance’. Corporate 
customers’ overall positions also have a critical role to play in determining their 
bargaining power. To this end, discussion with bankers indicates that ‘Bargaining 
power of a corporate customer is predominately measured by the relative strength of 
the corporate customer and the competition among banks bidding for the corporate 
customer’88. The supply and demand effect in the market and the relative strength of 
a corporate customer determine the competition among banks bidding for the 
corporate customer and thus determine the credit availability for it. Bankers add that 
external credit ratings of corporate customers from rating agencies (e.g., Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s) can be used as one reference to evaluate corporate customers’ 
bargaining power. In addition, there is consensus among bankers that ‘…profitable 
opportunities that corporate customers might present to the bank’, to a certain degree, 
influence the bargaining power of corporate customers. Furthermore, quality of 
environmental management by corporate customers contributes to their bargaining 
power (see details in section 5.4.3.2).   
From the perspective of bankers, bargaining power of corporate customers is ‘highly 
contextual and dynamic’ and ‘The bank has a lot of market insights into what’s 
happening in the market and thus understands the bargaining powers of its 
customers’. That is, critical and comprehensive judgements in contexts by banks are 
involved in determining bargaining power. Therefore, a thorough evaluation of 
                                                 
88
 The relative strength of a corporate customer involves the analysis on the corporate customer’s 
financial strength and management quality.  
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bargaining power of corporate customers is beyond the research scope. This study 
only focuses on documenting the determinants of bargaining power mentioned by 
bankers (see Figure 5.10).  
Relative strength of 
corporate customers
Credit availability for 
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market
Supply and demand of 
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Bargaining power of 
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Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.10 Determinants of Corporate Customers’ Bargaining Power 
 
It is worth noting that covenants are not able to provide banks with complete 
protection from risks. According to bankers, it is unlikely that covenants are able to 
cover every potential risk. Bankers indicate that the circumstances of a corporate 
customer are changing over time and the changes are not always predictable by 
banks. In addition, they emphasise that bank loan covenants need to be practical and 
effective; too much constraint will be costly and inapplicable.   
Functions of loan covenants 
There is consensus among bankers that ‘Covenants are around managing risks, 
which allows the bank to keep an eye on its corporate customers and have authority 
to act and/or react’. Exploratory interviews with bankers reveal that there are several 
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approaches through which loan covenants provide protections for banks’ interests in 
their corporate lending (see Figure 5.11).   
Loan covenants
Early warning signals for 
corporate customers’ defaulting 
on loans
Set the floor for 
corporate customers’ 
management and 
performance
Incentivise corporate customers 
to take or avoid certain activities
Trigger for dialogue or 
renegotiations
Provide protections for banks’ 
interests
Providing banks with authority to 
act
Providing banks with authority 
to react when there is default
Monitoring corporate customers’ 
practices and performance
 
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.11  Functions of Loan Covenants 
 
According to bankers, covenants indicate whether a corporate customer is 
performing as anticipated by banks and ‘…provide the bank with the authority/rights 
to react for remediating the deteriorations of the corporate customer’s financial 
position or the changes in the circumstances [of the corporate customer] before [the 
corporate customer] defaulting on the loan’. Accordingly, covenants can provide 
banks with ‘early warning signals’ for corporate customers’ defaulting on their loans. 
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Bankers further provide consistent opinions that loan covenants work as early 
warning signals. In the words of one banker: 
Bank sets the level [tightness] of covenants including buffers, which provides 
early warning signals for the bank to react before situations become 
unacceptable. For example, there might be interest cover covenants or 
covenants requiring that a corporate customer has to maintain a certain 
amount of capital. Because of the buffers inherent in the level of covenants, 
when the corporate customer breaches those covenants, it is still likely to 
have room away from defaulting on its loans. 
Due to the early warning signals, banks are able to ‘…set the floor for corporate 
customers’ management and performance’ and ‘…work as drivers for dialogue or 
negotiations between the bank and corporate customers’. In this regard, a statement 
from one banker and supported by other bankers’ views is: 
If their [corporate customers’] management quality deteriorates and thus 
their performance trends downwards to a certain degree, covenants will be 
breached. What the covenants can do is provide a mechanism to trigger 
discussions between the corporate customers and the bank. 
By triggering dialogue or discussions between corporate customers and banks, 
covenants in turn provide banks with an opportunity to gain a further understanding 
of the corporate customers’ management quality. This viewpoint is well-reflected in 
one banker’s statement: 
The qualitative inputs [into the credit submission] such as the quality of 
corporate customers’ management are difficult to measure. The dialogue or 
discussions between the bank and corporate customers provide opportunities 
for the bank to have a better understanding on the corporate customers and 
their management quality. Through the dialogue or discussions with 
customers, the bank is able to form perceptions or judgements on the 
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corporate customers’ management quality and decide whether to trust the 
corporate customers or not. 
In addition, exploratory interviews with bankers reveal that banks are ‘…empowered 
to incentivise corporate customers to take certain actions or to avoid certain 
activities’ by including particular covenants in loan agreements. The particular 
covenants can include requirements for corporate customers to provide banks with 
periodic financial reporting or not to sell assets without permission from banks. 
Furthermore, when corporate customers become insolvent, covenants are likely to 
provide banks with authority to react to minimise their losses.  
Section 5.4.3.1 reports findings about the form, contents, determinants and functions 
of traditional bank loan covenants. Covenants related to environmental aspects are 
delineated by bankers in the following section.  
5.4.3.2 Environmental covenants  
All bankers indicate that there are environmental covenants in corporate loan 
agreements that are used to manage environmental risks facing banks. Bankers 
further point out that the establishment process of environmental covenants is similar 
to that of traditional covenants in bank loan agreements. They indicate that 
environmental covenants are established based on a comprehensive analysis of 
environmental aspects at industry/sector, corporate customer and transaction level.  
The form and contents of environmental covenants 
As stated by one banker and supported by the points of view of other bankers, ‘There 
are environmental covenants in bank loan contracts, but they are not in the form of 
financial covenants’. Bankers explain that the consequences of an emerging 
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environmental risk event are usually catastrophic, and thus the resultant 
variability/volatility of cash flows is likely to go beyond a bank’s acceptable range. 
In addition, environmental issues of corporate customers are not ‘cash flow dynamics’ 
although they can result in massive financial consequences for corporate customers. 
Accordingly, banks are not able to fold their environmental risk exposure into 
accounting numbers, and thus environmental covenants are non-financial covenants. 
Furthermore, bankers provide information about typical environmental covenants in 
corporate loan agreements. There is consensus among bankers:  
Given that a lot of environmental aspects are already governed by the 
compliance framework, environmental covenants are typically a requirement 
for corporate customers to comply with environmental legislation or to 
maintain their operating certificates. What we [the bank] want is to make sure 
the compliance framework has been adhered to [by corporate customers]. 
They also indicate that providing banks with a periodic environmental report is 
another typical environmental covenant for corporate customers. With this 
environmental covenant, banks are able to regularly review corporate customers’ 
practices and performance related to environmental aspects. Interviews with bankers 
reveal that environmental covenants in corporate loan agreements are largely typical 
environmental covenants. The explanation is demonstrated below: 
Environmental issues have so much to cover, e.g. polluting the water, air, soil, 
knocking down the trees. There are so many issues under the environment and 
there is no way we [the bank] can put specific environmental covenants in 
terms of these environmental issues in a loan document. 
However, bankers have consistent opinions that ‘…whether and to what extent 
environmental covenants go beyond the typical requirements of environmental 
 
172 
 
 
disclosure and corporate customers’ compliance with their environmental 
obligations is determined by the particular circumstances of corporate customers’. 
Following this point of view, bankers consistently articulate that:  
 We [the bank] would customise the structure of environmental covenants 
based on a thorough understanding of environmental issues inherent in the 
industries/sectors, corporate customers and the transactions. There are 
different environmental issues (type and significance) in different 
industries/sectors and for different corporate customers. So the first thing is 
we [the bank] need to understand the industries/sectors and the corporate 
customers, and what environmental issues there are. We [the bank] then need 
to look at the actual deals [transactions] that are being done and what 
environmental issues they [transactions] are giving rise to. 
To support this articulation, bankers provide specimens of specific environmental 
covenants. In the words of one banker: 
Most mining projects have rehabilitation liabilities. Environmental covenants 
are likely to be in place on a mining operation to make sure that the corporate 
customer retains sufficient cash to meet its environmental liabilities at the end 
of the period [of the operation]. When financing a power station, the bank can 
put covenants claiming that the bank will refinance the customer only on the 
basis that the customer invests in renewable energy technology. 
The tightness of environmental covenants  
All bankers claim that environmental covenants are not only customised by their 
contents, but the tightness of environmental covenants is also tailored in terms of 
banks’ environmental risk exposure. This point of view is evidenced in a statement 
by one banker: 
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If a corporate customer is in an environmentally friendly industry, the bank 
generally relies on the corporate customer’s compliance with applied 
environmental legislation and its [operating] licence. But there are also 
corporate customers that the bank wants to understand how they get to 
comply depending on the environmental risks they expose the bank to. For 
corporate customers in environmentally sensitive industries, the bank would 
introduce environmental covenants that enable it to examine the corporate 
customers’ compliance with their environmental obligations more regularly 
and ask for more disclosures and more regular reviews on what the corporate 
customers are doing to manage their environmental issues. 
As stated in section 5.4.3.1, a corporate customer with strong bargaining power is 
likely to have softer covenants which provide the corporate customer with more 
latitude to run its business without breaching the covenants. Bankers indicate that a 
corporate customer with strong bargaining power is also likely to have softer 
environmental covenants in loan agreements. The implication is that banks’ 
environmental risk exposure is likely to be lower when extending loans to a 
corporate customer with strong bargaining power. An explanation for this is also 
provided by bankers.  
The industry/sector in which a corporate customer sits, the quality of the corporate 
customer’s environmental management, and its financial resources to deal with 
environmental issues determine banks’ exposure to environmental risks (see details 
in section 5.3.3). With regard to environmental aspects of a corporate customer and 
its bargaining power, there is consensus among bankers that: 
Corporate customers’ management of environmental issues go into 
bargaining power as well. If we [the bank] have customers that have stronger 
bargaining power but significant environmental issues, my experience with 
these corporate customers is that they are very big and very well capitalised 
 
174 
 
 
and they are very sophisticated. On the whole they are leading the world in 
managing environmental issues. 
Customers with strong bargaining power usually are advanced and 
sophisticated in evaluating and managing environmental issues. From those 
customers, the financial system learns a lot; they are mostly the ones that 
trended towards best practice
89
 in environmental management. 
Functions of environmental covenants 
Bankers point out that environmental covenants, structured around banks’ exposure 
to environmental risks, are designed to make sure banks have the authority to take 
actions if environmental risks facing them become more than what they forecast at 
loan origination. Bankers further indicate that environmental covenants are necessary 
for banks to monitor corporate customers’ environmental practices and performance 
as an on-going process. In the words of one banker: 
We [the bank] think it is appropriate to apply environmental covenants for 
monitoring corporate customers’ compliance with applied environmental 
legislation and their operating licences. Environmental covenants are also 
necessary for the bank to review how they [corporate customers] manage 
their environmental issues on a regular basis. 
However, bankers indicate that the emergence of an environmental risk event is more 
dramatic and environmental covenants are not in the form of financial covenants. 
Therefore, it is unlikely for environmental covenants to provide banks with early 
warning signals for the emergence of an environmental risk event. 
                                                 
89
 For the purpose of this study, corporate customers’ best practice in environmental management 
refers to energy and water efficiency, recycling and waste reduction. 
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To this end, bankers point out that environmental covenants alone are not sufficient 
to control and monitor environmental risks given their attributes
90
. Bankers imply 
that environmental covenants and financial covenants can be integrated into one 
systematic mechanism to manage environmental risks. However, they further 
comment that banks are at an early stage in establishing the point where 
environmental covenants and financial covenants are able to cooperate effectively 
and efficiently.  
Under this circumstance, to ensure that corporate customers are performing as banks 
anticipate and that banks are aware of the changes in corporate customers’ credit 
ratings related to environmental aspects, banks need to conduct regular reviews. 
According to bankers, there is ‘…annual review or review that is more often on 
environmental aspects of corporate customers depending on their circumstances’. 
Findings related to regular reviews by banks of their corporate customers are 
discussed in the following section.   
5.4.3.3 Regular review 
Bankers express a consistent view that:  
Once we [the bank] put a deal in place, every year the transaction and the 
corporate customer need to be reviewed. The review allows us [the bank] to 
relook at the corporate customer and the transaction as well as relook at how 
the loan is performing. If we [the bank] are not happy with what the 
corporate customer is doing in terms of managing its environmental issues, 
we [the bank] will look to exit the relationship. 
As for the factors involved in a regular review, there is consensus among bankers: 
                                                 
90
 The attributes of environmental risks is as described in section 5.3.2.  
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We [the bank] review the prospects of the industry a corporate customer sits 
in, financial performance of the corporate customer, its management, its 
competitive practices and we [the bank] look to satisfy ourselves that the 
direction of the corporate customer is relatively consistent with what we [the 
bank] have previously forecast. 
During regular reviews, it is possible that changes in corporate customers’ 
circumstances are identified. As already mentioned in the previous section, it is not 
possible and extremely costly for environmental covenants to cover all 
environmental aspects. Therefore, it is necessary for banks to have the ability and 
authority to conduct investigations into corporate customers where necessary. 
Inspired by this point of view, two bankers suggest that the Material Adverse Change 
Clause can be used to manage environmental risks. Findings about the Material 
Adverse Change Clause can be found in section 5.4.3.4.  
5.4.3.4 Material Adverse Change Clause 
Bankers mention that the inclusion of a Material Adverse Change Clause in loan 
agreements can provide banks with ability and authority to review the circumstances 
of corporate customers where necessary. This is evidenced in the following statement: 
Generally, in most of loan documents [loan agreements] the bank has what’s 
called a Material Adverse Change Clause. Instead of calling the loan 
immediately, the bank has the right to review the loan first if something has 
materially changed during the life of the loan. In such case, the bank normally 
put a time frame to see what the corporate customer is going to do, how it is 
going to fix the issues and what have been changed; the corporate customer 
normally has 30 days or 60 days. At the end of the period, if the bank is still 
not content with the circumstances, the bank can cease the relationship. 
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Bankers interviewed claim that there is no such case to date where a Material 
Adverse Change Clause has been applied to manage environmental risks. However, 
given the attributes of environmental risks, one banker states that ‘I suppose it [the 
Material Adverse Change Clause] can be applied if there is significant 
environmental risks facing the bank’. Another banker from a different bank 
expresses a similar view, while the other bankers do not make statements related to 
the inclusion of a Material Adverse Change Clause in managing environmental risks.  
Section 5.4.3 provides findings in relation to mechanisms to control and monitor 
environmental risks in corporate lending. Following this, section 5.4.4 demonstrates 
the findings about the cost of bank loans and reasons that it is not considered as a 
mechanism to manage banks’ environmental risk exposure in corporate lending.  
5.4.4 Environmental risks and the cost of bank loans 
Determinants of the cost of bank loans 
Bankers view the cost of bank loans as the price banks charge for loans extended to 
customers. Based on the opinions of the bankers interviewed, Figure 5.12 provides a 
diagrammatic view of the factors that determine the cost of bank loans.  
According to bankers, ‘The bank has an internal pricing model, which is 
predominantly the function of the PD and the LGD, thereby it [the cost of bank loans] 
is meant to reflect risks’. Bankers provide extended articulation for this point of view. 
The articulation is well-reflected in a statement of one banker: 
We [the bank] should always be paid by an appropriate risk premium, that is, 
we [the bank] should be paid for the risk we are taking. Thus, if we are 
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lending to a high credit quality borrower [corporate customer], and the 
expected loss given default is low, the price [cost of bank loans] should be a 
lot less than if we are lending to a low credit quality borrower [corporate 
customer] where the expected loss given default is high. What can offset the 
risk premium to some extent is whether the loan is secured or not. This 
impacts the loss given default. If the bank has a very good security so that 
even if the customer can no longer make that payment i.e. defaults, the bank 
will not lose any money because the security is of such high value. Therefore, 
the price of a loan should be determined by the bank’s required return on 
equity, the credit quality of the borrower [corporate customer] and the 
expected loss given default. 
Market forces 
and commercial 
factors
Cost of funds
Status of collateral: 
Value, quality, liquidity and 
banks’ ability to exercise 
their rights on the collateral 
in case of defaulting
Probability of Default Loss Given Default
Industry characteristics
Economy and market conditions
Financial status
Capability to withstand deteriorating 
circumstances
Management 
Competitiveness in peer groups
The cost of bank loans
Risk profile
Environmental risks
Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 5.12  Components of the Cost of Bank Loans 
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However, bankers mention that the cost of bank loans is also influenced, to a large 
degree, by commercial factors and market forces
91
. This is well-reflected in the 
following statements by two bankers:  
Market forces play an important role in determining the cost of bank loans by 
shaping the final cost of bank loans. For example, if the bank prices a loan as 
X while the market suggests a price of 0.5X, the bank is likely to take a lower 
price that is compatible with the price suggested by the market. 
The pricing process is not equivalent to a process that is all about identifying 
risks and making sure they are all mitigated. There are also commercial 
factors there determining the price. For example, if we [the bank] think there 
are additional profitable products we can sell to the customers, we are likely 
to put down the price on the debt to ensure we get the products [profitable 
opportunities]. 
The impact of environmental risks facing banks on the cost of bank loans 
Bankers have a consistent view that ‘…the cost of capital [the cost of bank loans] 
won’t build in a premium for environmental risks unless environmental risks impact 
on credit ratings of corporate customers’. In bankers’ opinions, this is the only way 
that environmental risks facing banks are able to impact on the cost of bank loans. In 
addition, bankers indicate that environmental risks are a qualitative input to the PD. 
To this end, there is consensus among bankers: 
Environmental risks are not directly associated with loan price [the cost of 
bank loans]. They are not built into the bank’s internal risk models. But they 
do come into our [the bank’s] corporate lending decision-making. We [the 
bank] make a value judgement on whether that is a significant exposure to 
                                                 
91
 Market forces refer to the demand and supply of credit in the market.  
 
180 
 
 
environmental risks and may adjust risk grade [credit rating] based on the 
value judgement. 
Bankers further indicate that to have environmental risks reflected in banks’ credit 
rating models for corporate customers, environmental legislation needs to be in place. 
Environmental legislation is likely to result in incremental costs for companies 
involved in environmentally irresponsible activities. The incremental costs can be in 
the form of compliance costs (e.g., companies might need to have different premises 
to manage their contamination). Compliance costs are likely to be passed onto the 
companies’ goods and/or services, resulting in less price competitiveness in the 
market. There can also be environmental liabilities (e.g., environmental sanctions, 
penalties or remediation costs) if companies are not managing their environmental 
issues as required by environmental legislation. The environmental liabilities can 
lead to volatile cash flows of companies and reputational damage, and thereby the 
companies’ credit ratings are influenced. 
Further, bankers claim that buying behaviour of consumers in the market plays a 
significant role. By paying a premium for companies devoting themselves to 
environmentally efficient activities or boycotting companies that are environmentally 
irresponsible, environmental risks facing banks will have a flow impact on corporate 
customers’ credit ratings through credit rating models. This concept is articulated 
clearly in a statement by one banker:  
…to make the financial system differentiate customers exposing the bank to 
significant environmental risks by imposing a higher cost of capital, 
restrictive covenants, and/or set higher entry level to capital, the purchasers 
need to show their disfavour towards the products and services provided by 
these companies. Purchasers’ buying behaviour in the marketplace influences 
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the cash flow profiles of the companies and thus influences the profitability 
and competitiveness of these companies, which will further impact the 
companies’ credit ratings. 
An example provided by a different banker supports the above statement: 
If consumers are prepared to pay a premium for electricity from a renewable 
powered company, this company will generate more cash flows, and become 
more profitable, more sustainable and more competitive in the market [than a 
traditional coal fire powered company]. As a result, it [the renewable 
powered company] will get a better credit rating. 
The impact of environmental covenants on the cost of bank loans  
The bankers interviewed provide inconsistent views about whether the inclusion of 
environmental covenants in corporate loan agreements impact on the cost of bank 
loans. Bankers from two banks indicate that environmental covenants impact on the 
cost of bank loans by influencing the PD and the LGD. They explain that: 
Loan covenants and loan price are interactive with each other at the security 
point of view and a credit rating point of view. 
The setting of covenants is input to both the probability of default and the loss 
given default. Therefore, covenants impact on the loan price [the cost of bank 
loans] in part. 
However, other bankers indicate that environmental covenants do not generally 
impact on the cost of bank loans. One banker states: ‘Personally I don’t think a price 
can be put on covenants because the power and rights to act is worth so much’. This 
is supported by the opinion of another banker: ‘It is difficult to quantify what the 
compliance with environmental covenants means in terms of risk and thus it is 
unlikely to put a value on it’.  
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Section 5.4.4 indicates that the cost of bank loans is primarily determined by the PD 
and the LGD and influenced by commercial factors and market forces. 
Environmental risks will be reflected in the cost of bank loans only when they impact 
on the PD of corporate customers. However, the impact is predicted based on expert 
judgement rather than banks’ credit rating models. As for the impact of 
environmental covenants on the cost of bank loans, inconsistent views among 
bankers are provided. The next section presents a summary of ERM in the corporate 
credit process.  
5.4.5 Summary of ERM in the corporate credit process  
As shown in Table 5.1, there are five stages in banks’ corporate credit processes, 
namely, credit screening, credit analysis, credit approval, loan documentation and 
loan monitoring. Banks’ ERM is embedded in their corporate credit processes. 
Preliminary environmental analysis is an integral part of the credit screening process. 
Environmental risk evaluation is inherent in the credit analysis and its results are 
included in the credit submission. Environmental risk control and monitoring are the 
last two stages corresponding to loan documentation and monitoring. There are 
activities dealing with environmental risks in each stage of ERM.  
The findings show that there are environmental covenants which are not in the form 
of financial covenants. Environmental covenants are established based on a thorough 
understanding of corporate customers, industries/sectors the corporate customers 
belong to and transactions. Additionally, there is consensus among bankers that the 
form and structure of environmental covenants are tailored according to banks’ 
environmental risk exposure. However, environmental covenants do not have the 
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function of providing early warning signals as financial covenants do. To better 
manage environmental risks, regular reviews are conducted by banks, together with 
environmental covenants. The foci of banks’ regular reviews are:  
 corporate customers’ compliance with their environmental obligations; 
 potential changes in relevant environmental legislation and the impact of the 
changes on corporate customers’ loan repayment ability; and 
 corporate customers’ environmental management quality and financial 
capability.
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Table 5.1 The Corporate Credit Process and Environmental Practices of Major Australian Banks 
Stages in banks’ 
corporate credit 
processes 
Phases in the environmental 
risk management Process 
Environmental practices of major Australian banks 
Evolution to environmental 
sustainability 
 
Credit screening 
 
Preliminary environmental 
analysis 
Initial environmental screening and rating based on the information 
collected through desktop review and applied questionnaires. 
 
 
Applying the essence of the 
Equator Principles into banks’ 
corporate lending; 
 
Conduct ERM in the corporate 
credit process as ‘business as 
usual’. 
Credit analysis -credit 
submission 
Environmental risk evaluation 
 
Environmental obligation compliance check for all corporate customers; 
Investigations into environmental aspects by banks’ analysts and/or 
credit officers for corporate customers that expose banks to medium or 
high environmental risks; 
Site inspection and independent external environmental impact 
assessment for corporate customers that expose banks to medium or high 
environmental risks. 
Credit approval – Credit 
submission 
 
 
Environmental risk control; and 
Environmental risk monitoring. 
 
Negotiations regarding bank loan structures (applied environmental 
covenants, appropriate cost of bank loans and the amount of the loans). 
Loan documentation 
 
Documenting the approved loan structure as legal agreements. 
Loan monitoring 
Conduct regular reviews around corporate customers’ compliance with 
environmental obligations, changes of the circumstances of corporate 
customers and the impact of the changes on the corporate customers’ 
loan repayment ability. 
Source: Developed for this study 
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Given the comparatively dramatic emergence and catastrophic consequences of 
environmental risk events, two bankers support the application of a Material Adverse 
Change Clause in managing environmental risks, which has not been put into 
practice and calls for further investigation.  
It is generally assumed that the cost of bank loans should reflect environmental risks 
facing banks. However, environmental risks are not built into the cost of bank loans 
unless they impact on the credit ratings of corporate customers. Whether 
environmental risks impact on corporate customers’ credit ratings and the 
significance of the impact are judgementally determined.  
The evidence presented so far indicates that, as financial intermediaries in the 
economy, banks are on an evolutional journey towards incorporating environmental 
sustainability in their corporate lending. The following section outlines bankers’ 
opinions about the evolution of environmental sustainability in corporate lending.   
5.5 Evolution of Environmental Sustainability in Banks’ Corporate 
Lending 
The environmental sustainability evolution of a bank involves ‘…being more aware 
of environmental risks in the bank’s lending businesses and conducting ERM as 
business as usual. The bankers interviewed indicate that signing up to the Equator 
Principles was a milestone in banks’ journey of environmental sustainability 
evolution. 
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5.5.1 Application of the Equator Principles  
All the participating banks in this study are signatories to the Equator Principles. 
Bankers from two of the participating banks indicate that the Equator Principles 
impact on their banks’ corporate lending. They further indicate that the impact of the 
Equator Principles on banks’ corporate lending requires ‘mindset change’ towards 
environmental risks within banks. They articulate their banks’ practices that are 
being used to achieve the mindset change. This is evidenced in the following 
statement:  
The Equator Principles are all about facilitating a bank’s business by guiding 
the bank to manage environmental risks facing it. They [the Equator 
Principles] were put in place to allow banks to lend in an environmentally 
and socially responsible manner. 
We [the bank] are up skilling relationship managers so that they can have a 
better understanding of the Equator Principles. Through the up skilling 
process the relationship managers will have the ability to apply those 
principles [the Equator Principles] in every transaction they are dealing with. 
In addition, we [the bank] try to capture the important parts of the Equator 
Principles within environmental and social governance risk policy. As such 
our people are able to apply an environmental and social risk lens when they 
look at deals [transactions]. 
The essence of the mindset change towards environmental risks is to have a 
framework that incorporates environmental risks as an integral part of banks’ 
corporate credit processes; that is, considering ERM as ‘business as usual’ in the 
corporate credit process.  
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5.5.2 ERM being ‘business as usual’ 
Banks promote the process of conducting ERM as ‘business as usual’ by engaging 
with corporate customers about managing environmental issues within their 
businesses. In the words of one banker:  
We [the bank] engage with corporate customers; we meet with them regularly 
and talk with them about what they are doing with their environmental 
management. Engaging with corporate customers is critical for the bank. Our 
experience is that they [corporate customers] are the very best sources, they 
are close to environmental issues and they know more about the consequences 
of them. That is the best way for the bank to manage environmental risks 
facing it. If a company that is socially and environmentally irresponsible 
seeks goods and services from the bank, the bank probably will reject the 
company. If an existing customer starts to become socially and 
environmentally irresponsible, the bank will engage with the customer and 
evaluating how it is trending towards best practice. The relationship will be 
ceased if the bank is not comfortable with the results. If they were legitimately 
trying to trend towards best practice, we would help them to trend towards 
best practice. 
Therefore, although banks are not sophisticated and well-developed in implementing 
ERM as ‘business as usual’, they are trying their best in the journey towards 
environmental sustainability. Bankers further indicate that embedding environmental 
considerations in decision-making has become a trend for all businesses. They 
predict that the management of environmental issues in Australian businesses will 
increasingly become ‘business as usual’. The assumption underlying the prediction is 
articulated in the following statement by one banker: 
Companies are mostly aware of environmental issues for the sake of their own 
viability. An emerging environmental risk event can have impact on a 
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company’s cash flow profile, competitiveness compared to its peers, financial 
capability of management and its reputation among stakeholders. Given that 
[the impact], it [the company] tends to be proactive in dealing with 
environmental issues. Therefore, it is not the financial system that influences 
companies’ management of environmental issues; it is their business as usual 
for survival that matters. Whether companies are small or big, environmental 
aspects relate to the viability of their businesses. 
This banker further provides an example in understanding the above statement, 
which is stated as: 
…say the bank is lending to a Thai restaurant or abattoirs. There are council 
regulations about the water consumption of these businesses, which is likely 
to impact on the operating costs of these businesses. Therefore, these 
businesses need to tune environmental aspects into their businesses for long-
term survival. 
Section 5.5 presents banks’ evolution to environmental sustainability in their 
corporate lending. This requires banks to conduct systematic and sophisticated ERM 
in their corporate credit processes and consider the integration of ERM into the 
corporate credit process as ‘business as usual’. In addition to bankers’ responses 
related to addressing the research problem, the results reveal bankers’ opinions about 
their banks’ environmental sustainability transformation in corporate lending. This 
emerges from the results and is discussed in section 5.6.  
5.6 Environmental Sustainability Transformation in Major 
Australian Banks’ Corporate Lending  
Bankers indicate that banks are at an early stage of development towards 
environmental sustainability in corporate lending and they are still evolving in this 
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journey. To provide some context for this emerging theme, some additional analysis 
is undertaken in this chapter. To identify the positions of major Australian banks in 
this journey, this study classifies major Australian banks’ environmental practices 
presented in the results into the stages of the environmental sustainability 
transformation process. The benchmark environmental sustainability transformation 
process is adopted from Jeucken (2001). The stages of this environmental 
sustainability transformation process are outlined in Section 5.6.1. Following this, 
the classification of major Australian banks’ environmental practices into these 
stages is discussed in section 5.6.2.  
5.6.1 Environmental sustainability transformation of banks’ corporate 
lending 
Jeucken (2001) develops a model portraying the stages that banks generally go 
through towards sustainable banking (see Figure 5.13). He indicates that this model 
can not only be used by banks as a whole, it is also applicable for banks’ departments 
in their development towards sustainability. The terms ‘defensive’, ‘preventative’ 
and ‘offensive’ in the model are defined from an environmental perspective (Jeucken 
& Bouma 2001). Consequently, this study uses the model by Jeucken (2001) as a 
benchmark for evaluating the environmental sustainability transformation of major 
Australian banks in corporate lending.  
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Preventative
Defensive banking
Preventative banking
Offensive banking
Sustainable banking
 
Source: Adopted from Jeucken (2001, p.71) 
Figure 5.13 A Typology of Banking and Sustainable Development 
 
As shown in this model, there are four stages in the environmental sustainability 
transformation processes of banks. Defensive banking is the first stage in this journey, 
in which banks view environmental considerations as a burden and thus an additional 
cost. Defensive banks
92
 show their resentment to every environmental attempt of 
legislative bodies and they are not aware of environmental risks in banks’ corporate 
credit processes. Particularly in this stage, ‘…environmental management is seen as 
an avoidable cost’ (Jeucken & Bouma 2001, p.33). The second stage is preventative 
banking, with environmental legislation and the pressures from stakeholders being 
the key drivers for environmental considerations in banks’ corporate lending. Banks 
in this stage do not want to go beyond current environmental legislation or that 
which will be put into effect in the near future. In this stage, banks’ attitude is 
somewhat passive as they only consider the risk side arising from environmental 
issues in their corporate lending. ERM in the corporate credit process is the focus of 
preventative banks.  
                                                 
92
 Defensive banks refer to the banks in defensive stage. 
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In the third stage, offensive banking, banks’ environmental practices are not only 
driven by their environmental risk exposure, they also seek profitable opportunities 
by developing new markets (e.g., environmental technology), products and/or 
services to promote environmentally friendly activities
93
. A win-win situation at the 
micro-level is the key for banks to be offensive in relation to environmental issues in 
corporate lending; namely, ‘…activities that benefit the environment have a pay-off 
period that lies within the required time frame and the level of risk is deemed 
acceptable’ (Jeucken 2001, p.73). Offensive banks are proactive, creative and 
innovative in dealing with environmental risks in corporate lending.  
Sustainable banking includes all elements involved in preventative and offensive 
stages. It requires that ‘…[a bank’s] internal activities meet the requirements of 
sustainable business and in which its external activities (such as lending and 
investments) are focused on valuing and stimulating sustainability among customers 
and other entities in society’ (Jeucken 2001, p.73). In this stage, banks see 
environmental sustainability as an advantage and an opportunity for their 
development and viability. What the banks in environmental sustainability stage are 
looking for is the highest environmentally sustainable rate of return rather than the 
highest financial rate of return (Jeucken & Bouma 2001). Banks are not able to 
achieve environmental sustainability unless environmental risks are completely 
priced by the market. However, according to Jeucken (2001), the role banks want to 
play in society is important in achieving environmental sustainability in corporate 
lending. As such, banks that are ambitious and putting effort into integrating 
                                                 
93
 This study only focuses on major Australian banks’ exposure to environmental risks and their 
management of environmental risks in corporate lending. The profitable opportunities resulting from 
environmental issues are beyond the scope of this study.  
 
192 
 
 
environmental sustainability in their corporate lending, despite not yet being 
sophisticated, can also be considered as environmentally sustainable banks.  
To determine the position where major Australian banks are in the environmental 
sustainability transformation in corporate lending, a SWOT analysis of their 
environmental practices is undertaken in section 5.6.2.  
5.6.2 Major Australian banks in the environmental sustainability 
transformation process 
The SWOT analysis is presented below (see Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2 SWOT Analysis for Environmental Practices in Major Australian 
Banks’ Corporate Lending 
Strength 
 Banks have shown their consciousness of 
building and maintaining their reputation 
through sound environmental practices 
 Banks have integrated environmental 
risks into each stage of the corporate 
credit process  
 There are environmental covenants 
customised in terms of environmental 
risks in bank loan agreements 
 Increasing engagement with corporate 
customers who have well-performed 
environmental management  
 Banks aspire to embed environmental 
sustainability into their values, cultures 
and strategies and they are taking actions 
to achieve this aspiration (e.g., up 
skilling their staff to apply the Equator 
Principles into every transaction ) 
Weakness 
 Disconnection between banks’ 
growing environmental awareness and 
the practices to integrate 
environmental risks in their corporate 
credit processes 
 To what extent banks’ environmental 
practices are reflective of their 
commitments to the Equator Principles 
and UNEP FI is not clear 
 Environmental considerations by 
banks are driven by environmental 
legislation and stakeholders’ 
environmental awareness  
 The impact environmental risks can 
have on the credit ratings of corporate 
customers, and on the cost of bank 
loans is predicted by subjective 
judgements 
Opportunity 
 Banks have the potential to show their 
favourable perceptions towards  
environmentally responsible activities 
and companies, as well as innovative 
technologies  
 Australian government actively involves 
in the UNEP activities regarding 
environmental issues (e.g., cleaner 
production, environmentally responsible 
consumption, and ozone) is helpful in 
fostering a mindset changing in society 
and thus a better understanding on the 
integration of environmental risks into 
banks’ lending decision-making 
 There is a potential for banks to develop 
a systematic mechanism which 
incorporate both environmental and 
financial covenants in managing 
environmental risks 
 The Material Adverse Change Clause 
can be used in managing environmental 
risks 
Threat 
 There is an absence of strict 
environmental legislation enforcement 
in Australia, impairing the 
effectiveness of environmental 
legislation (Ernst & Young 2003; 
International Finance Corporation 
2007; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001) 
 There is an absence of standardised 
environmental information, and thus it 
is difficult to quantify  environmental 
risks 
 There is a lack of analytical tools and 
modelling techniques to support a 
sophisticated integration of 
environmental risks into banks’ 
corporate credit processes 
 
Source: Developed for this study 
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Using the sustainability transformation model in banking from Jeucken (2001) and 
based on the SWOT analysis for major Australian banks’ environmental practices in 
corporate lending, these environmental practices are classified into their 
corresponding stages in the environmental sustainability transformation process (see 
Table 5.3).  
Table 5.3 Classification of Major Australian Banks’ Environmental Practices 
into the Environmental Sustainability Transformation Process 
Environmental sustainability 
transformation in lending 
businesses 
Environmental practices in major Australian banks’ 
corporate lending 
Defensive None 
Preventative None 
 
Preventative & Offensive
94
 
 
 
Banks have integrated environmental risks into each stage of 
the corporate credit process. They are aware of the necessity to 
manage environmental risks as ‘business as usual’ in their 
corporate lending 
There are environmental covenants customised in terms of 
environmental risks in bank loan agreements 
 
Offensive 
 
 
 
 
Banks have shown consciousness of building and maintaining 
their reputation through sound environmental practices 
Offensive & Sustainable Increasing engagement with corporate customers who have 
well-performed environmental management  
Sustainable 
Banks aspire to embed environmental sustainability into their 
values, cultures and strategies and they have taken actions 
towards this aspiration (e.g., up skilling their staff to apply the 
Equator Principles in every transaction ) 
Source: Developed for this study 
Based on the above discussion, this study draws conclusion about the position of 
major Australian banks in the environmental sustainability transformation process in 
terms of their environmental practices in corporate lending. Major Australian banks’ 
environmental considerations and due diligence are still driven by environmental 
                                                 
94
 Environmental practices on the border between preventative and offensive fall in this category. 
They are beyond preventative lending but fall short of offensive lending.  
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legislation and stakeholders’ environmental awareness, which fits into the 
preventative stage. However, most of their environmental practices surpass the 
preventative stage in nature.  
Preventative and offensive  
The signing of the Equator Principles and the UNEP FI indicates banks’ commitment 
to deal with environmental risks proactively and thoroughly, which could have been 
classified into the offensive stage. Given the doubt on the implementation of these 
environmental commitments to date, they are considered as practices beyond 
preventative lending, but yet offensive. The practices in relation to banks’ ERM in 
the corporate credit process and the inclusion of customised environmental covenants 
in corporate loan agreements are also on the border between preventative and 
offensive lending. Aiming to mitigate environmental risks, banks’ ERM should have 
been classified into the preventative stage. It is the intention of banks to integrate 
ERM into their corporate credit processes as ‘business as usual’ that makes this 
practice go beyond purely preventative lending. At the same time, there is a 
disconnection between this intention and their ERM in practice. Consequently, banks’ 
ERM practice is beyond preventative but still does not quite reach the offensive stage.  
With regard to environmental covenants, the results indicate that typical 
environmental covenants focus on environmental obligation (e.g., environmental 
legislation and disclosure requirements) compliance. In addition to this, banks also 
take a step further by customising environmental covenants in terms of 
environmental risks facing them. As such, the inclusion of customised environmental 
covenants in corporate loan agreements belongs to the stage between preventative 
and offensive.  
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Offensive  
Banks are aware of and put effort into building and maintaining their brand values by 
taking measures that benefit the environment, which is a win-win situation in the 
medium to long term. According to Jeucken (2001), these environmental practices 
are considered offensive. 
Offensive and sustainable  
The results indicate that banks are increasingly engaged with their corporate 
customers, and seeking environmental best practice in their corporate lending. 
Corporate customers have a better understanding about the potential consequences of 
their environmental issues and the probability of these environmental risk events 
occurring. Therefore, constructive engagement with corporate customers can make 
banks better informed of environmental risks and generate long-term value for them.  
At the same time, banks also aim to stimulate environmental sustainability among 
these corporate customers. However, the engagement at this stage tends to only focus 
on the niche corporate customers who have high quality environmental management.  
Sustainable 
According to Jeucken (2001), in addition to banks’ environmental practices, their 
aspiration to embed environmental sustainability into their intrinsic values is 
essential to environmentally sustainable banking. The results show that major 
Australian banks have the desire to integrate environmental sustainability into their 
values, cultures, strategies and all activities. As a result, they are applying extra effort 
to turn the aspiration into proactive environmental practices.  
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Section 5.6 provides the discussion and classification of major Australian banks’ 
environmental practices into the stages of the environmental sustainability 
transformation process. On the basis of the discussion and classification, this study 
concludes that major Australian banks are oriented to environmental sustainability in 
corporate lending although their environmental practices are yet to be 
environmentally sustainable. Given that the profitable opportunities resulting from 
environmental issues are beyond the research scope, the conclusion is only based on 
major Australian banks’ practices of ERM in the corporate credit process.  
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The interviews with senior executive bankers from major Australian banks show that 
corporate lending represents an important component of their lending businesses. 
This chapter reports the findings of investigations into major Australian banks’ 
corporate credit processes and their ERM in this process. Specifically, the results in 
relation to the associations between environmental risks, and 1) loan covenants, and 
2) the cost of bank loans are documented in this chapter. In addition, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4, this study follows an emerging research design aiming to extract themes 
and patterns from bankers’ interpretations of their relevant perceptions and 
experiences. Major Australian banks’ environmental sustainability transformation in 
terms of their environmental practices in corporate lending is an emerging theme. To 
this end, this chapter presents additional analysis of this emerging theme. Chapter 6 
provides further discussion regarding the findings presented in this chapter. 
Specifically, Chapter 6 answers each research question and thus addresses the 
research problem.  
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in previous chapters, it is widely accepted that there are heightened 
environmental concerns in the business world due to increasing environmental 
scrutiny from the public and a growing body of increasingly restrictive 
environmental legislation. As one of the critical financial intermediaries in the 
economy, banks are of significant importance in promoting environmental 
sustainability by incorporating a consideration of environmental risks into their 
lending businesses. Corporate lending is an area where banks can have a significant 
impact on the environmental responsibility of borrowing firms. Inspired by these 
perspectives, this study investigates how environmental risks are considered in the 
corporate credit processes of major Australian banks. Of particular relevance are the 
associations between environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost 
of bank loans. This chapter sets out the conclusions for the research problem outlined 
in Chapter 1. 
How are environmental risks associated with bank loan covenants and the 
cost of bank loans in Australian banks’ corporate lending? 
The outline of this chapter is as follows (see also Figure 6.1). A discussion of the 
results based on previous literature and contributions to the literature are elucidated 
in section 6.2. Following this section, implications for practice are discussed in 
section 6.3. The perceived limitations of this study are then outlined in section 6.4, 
followed by a discussion on future research directions in section 6.5.  
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Source: Developed for this study 
Figure 6.1 Structure of Chapter 6 
 
6.2 Discussion of the Results and Contributions to the Literature 
This section discusses the results in the context of prior literature. To start with, the 
results regarding why environmental risks are considered in banks’ corporate credit 
processes and the extent to which they are incorporated into the processes are 
discussed as background to the research questions.  
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6.2.1 Environmental risks in banks’ corporate credit processes  
The results of this study reveal that environmental risks facing banks derive from the 
uncertainties around the financial and reputational impacts that environmental issues 
can have under environmental legislation and stakeholders’ environmental scrutiny. 
This is in alignment with prior literature on environmental risks as presented in 
Chapter 2. In the literature, environmental risks are defined as the uncertainty about 
the future impacts of loans related to environmental issues on banks from both 
financial and reputational perspectives (Case 1999; Thompson 1998b; Weber, Scholz 
& Michalik 2010).  
In addition, this study finds that environmental risks contribute to the overall risks 
that banks are faced with in their corporate lending. However, environmental risks 
are different from traditional risks as environmental risk events usually emerge more 
dramatically and can have catastrophic impacts for banks. That is, environmental 
risks are not a financial driver in most companies, but have the potential to have a 
catastrophic impact on companies’ financial performance. Therefore, it is difficult to 
predict and quantify environmental risks, and thus they cannot be accurately 
contemplated in corporate customers’ financial forecasts. There is previous literature 
providing a dimensional construct for environmental risks which classifies these 
risks as a new set of risks compared to traditional risks (Case 1999; Coulson & 
Dixon 1995; Thompson 1998b; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). However, to the 
knowledge of the researcher, there are few previous studies identifying the attributes 
of environmental risks and thus differentiating environmental risks from traditional 
risks and justifying the unquantifiable nature of environmental risks as this study 
does. 
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Dimensions and determinants of environmental risks facing banks 
As discussed in chapter 2, from a lending bank’s perspective, environmental risks 
impact on banks through direct risk (lender liability), indirect risk (credit risk) and 
reputational risk (Case 1999; Thompson & Cowton 2004). Other things being equal, 
the probability of direct risk (lender liability) being borne by a bank is lower than 
that of indirect risk (credit risk) and reputational risk (Case 1999; Thompson & 
Cowton 2004). The results confirm previous literature in relation to the dimensions 
of environmental risks that manifest in banks’ corporate lending.  
The findings of Ernst & Young (2003) indicate that there is less significance of 
environmental risks for Australian banks than for banks in the USA, Europe and UK. 
This can be explained by the fact that no case has demonstrated significant 
environmental liabilities borne by Australian banks (Ernst & Young 2003). However, 
the research from Ernst & Young does not clearly identify the primary concerns 
leading to the integration of environmental risks into Australian banks’ corporate 
credit processes. This study extends the findings of Ernst & Young on this point. The 
results of this study indicate that among the three dimensions of environmental risks, 
major Australian banks are most concerned with credit risk and reputational risk 
related to environmental aspects of their corporate customers. According to the 
exploratory interviews with bankers, the primary reason for this is that the likelihood 
of environmental liability being borne by banks is rare in Australia, while credit risk 
and reputational risk related to environmental issues occur much more often. The 
results also reveal that major Australian banks have had negative experiences with 
substantial losses that result from corporate customers’ defaulting on their loans. 
Furthermore, NGOs have increasingly criticised major Australian banks’ lending for 
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certain environmentally sensitive activities such as coal-fired power stations, which 
is the ‘soft underbelly’ of these banks’ reputation.  
With regard to the determinants of environmental risks facing banks, the results 
indicate that the industry/sector that a corporate customer belongs to plays a 
fundamental role in determining environmental risks. The assessment of 
environmental issues at the industry/sector level determines the potential 
consequences of environmental risk events. Different industries/sectors have 
different environmental issues which expose banks to different environmental risks 
(the content). In addition, other things being equal, some industries/sectors (e.g., steel 
production, mining, fertiliser or explosives production) expose banks to higher 
environmental risks than other industries (e.g., service industries) due to the activities 
they are involved in.  
The next level of assessment of environmental issues is in terms of the corporate 
customer and the transaction. The quality of corporate customers’ environmental 
management is important in determining the probability of environmental risk events 
emerging. To this end, corporate customers in environmentally sensitive industries 
do not necessarily expose banks to significant environmental risks. That is, if 
corporate customers have been managing their environmental issues well, banks 
assume a lower probability of environmental risk events emerging. The results also 
demonstrate that the financial capacity of corporate customers to deal with 
environmental issues is another factor that has a key impact on environmental risks 
facing banks. This is in line with the research from Weber, Scholz and Michalik 
(2010) who argue that borrowing firms with a sound financial basis are more capable 
of compensating for their potential environmental consequences.  
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Banks need to make sure that corporate customers understand their potential 
environmental consequences, they commit to managing their environmental issues 
and they have adequate management capacity and financial resources in place to 
deploy if necessary. While EBRD (2011) presents similar factors determining banks’ 
exposure to environmental risks, it is an instruction manual for banks having 
partnerships with EBRD rather than a research paper. In addition, although the 
research from Thompson (1998b) indicates that a borrower’s environmental risk 
exposure is a function of both its industry type and the effectiveness of its 
environmental management, the research is from a borrower’s perspective rather than 
from a bank’s standpoint. To the knowledge of the researcher, no known published 
research has comprehensively investigated the determinants of environmental risks 
facing banks in corporate lending in the Australian context as this study does.  
ERM 
Due to the impacts environmental risks can have on banks in corporate lending, there 
are increasing numbers of banks developing mechanisms that aim to adequately and 
appropriately integrate environmental risks into their corporate credit processes and 
thus minimize the adverse environmental impacts on banks (Thompson & Cowton 
2004; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008; Weber, Scholz & Michalik 2010). The results 
of this study provide supportive and extended evidence for this argument. First and 
foremost, the results show that banks conduct ERM to systematically identify, assess, 
control and monitor environmental risks in banks’ corporate lending. Second, the 
results indicate that banks consider ERM as an integral part of the corporate credit 
process and this is required for an adequate risk management of corporate lending. 
That is, banks integrate environmental risks into all phases of their corporate credit 
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processes. The results also reveal that if environmental risks are not considered in all 
phases of banks’ corporate credit processes, banks are running the risk of losing their 
capital, impairing their reputation and impeding their viability by having an 
inadequate risk management system. Furthermore, the activities that are required in 
the procedures of the ERM process are demonstrated in the results (see details in 
section 5.4, Chapter 5).  
The above results are consistent with the procedures and activities of banks’ ERM 
that are provided in the instruction manual by EBRD (2011). EBRD illustrates how 
ERM fits into procedures of the corporate credit process (see details in Figure 2.3) 
and it is reflected in the results of this study. However, there is no known published 
work examining banks’ environmental practices in each phase of the corporate credit 
process. To this end, this study extends prior literature by specifically investigating 
the consideration of environmental risks in each phase of banks’ corporate credit 
processes. Furthermore, although the results indicate that environmental risks are 
difficult to be quarantined from other risks facing banks and are difficult to quantify, 
this study shows that environmental risks are a qualitative input into each phase of 
banks’ corporate credit processes. 
To demonstrate how banks control and monitor environmental risks in the corporate 
credit process, the remainder of section 6.2 presents the results regarding the 
associations between environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost 
of bank loans. Discussion around the results and contributions to the literature are 
also presented in this section.  
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6.2.2 RQ1: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated 
with bank loan covenants? 
To address this research question, there are two propositions formulated as follows:  
P1a: There are environmental covenants in bank loan agreements to manage 
environmental risks. 
The results of this study support P1a, which indicate that environmental covenants in 
loan agreements are one of the mechanisms used to manage environmental risks in 
banks’ corporate lending. This coincides with the point of view from Case (1999) 
who claims that the inclusion of environmental covenants in loan agreements for 
corporate customers involved in environmentally sensitive activities can protect 
banks’ ability to demand loan repayments. In addition, based on a global survey of 
how financial institutions deal with environmental risks, Environment and Finance 
Research Enterprise (1995) concludes that environmental covenants in loan 
agreements are a widely-accepted mechanism for managing environmental risks in 
banks’ lending businesses. Another survey of Australian financial institutions 
arranged by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) identifies a similar trend. That is, 
environmental covenants in loan agreements are frequently used by Australian 
financial institutions to manage environmental risks. 
Previous literature indicates the inclusion and provides examples of environmental 
covenants in banks’ corporate lending. In spite of this, there is limited systematic 
investigation into the form and contents of environmental covenants, or the 
corresponding reasons for their inclusion. This study fills this gap by presenting 
integrated results about the usage, form and contents of environmental covenants. 
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Further, it provides explanations for the form and contents of these environmental 
covenants.   
The results indicate that environmental covenants are not in the form of financial 
covenants. This result is echoed in the specimen environmental clauses (see 
Appendix 1) provided by Case (1999). As the specimen environmental clauses show, 
none of the environmental covenants listed are in the form of financial covenants. 
They take the form of ‘to do’ requirements and ‘not to do’ restrictions for corporate 
customers, such as environmental covenants requiring corporate customers to 
comply with all environmental laws, and restricting them from creating or permitting 
to subsist any statutory charge under environmental laws on any of the properties 
(Case 1999). Similar evidence is also provided by the Asian Development Bank 
(1993) which defines an environmental covenant as a requirement for borrowers to 
take environmental-related activities or a restriction from taking certain 
environmental-related activities. In addition, the results reveal that a typical 
environmental covenant is the requirement for corporate customers to comply with 
applied environmental legislation or to maintain their certificates to operate, or to 
provide banks with periodic environmental reports. This is consistent with previous 
literature. These studies suggest that environmental covenants typically require 
corporate customers to comply with their environmental obligations, and to provide 
banks with periodic environmental reports to inform banks of borrowers’ current and 
on-going environmental practices during the life of loans (Asian Development Bank 
1993; Bekhechi 1999; Case 1999). 
The results further reveal several possible explanations for the form and contents of 
environmental covenants as they manifest in banks’ corporate loan agreements. First 
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and foremost, most environmental risks facing banks in corporate lending are 
governed by an environmental legislation compliance framework. As such, what 
banks do to control and monitor environmental risks is to ensure corporate customers 
are adhering to the compliance framework. This is implied in previous literature 
arguing that the primary driver for banks to incorporate environmental risks into their 
lending businesses is a growing body of increasingly restrictive environmental 
legislation (Ernst & Young 2003; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000, 2001). 
Environmental legislation has continued to adopt a more thorough and sophisticated 
approach that takes a broad range of environmental impacts of businesses into 
consideration (Case 1999).  
Second, as environmental risks involve reputational consequences which have 
considerable long-term influence and are unlikely to be quantified and verified, the 
consequences of emerging environmental risk events tend to be catastrophic. 
Similarly, Ernst & Young (2003) conclude that reputation is increasingly becoming a 
considerable part of the tangible value of Australian businesses. In this regard, 
environmental risks are likely to impose overwhelming losses on banks since they 
have the potential to negatively impact the reputation of banks. Therefore, the 
potential environmental risk exposure of banks is likely to go beyond the range banks 
are able to control by financial ratio dynamics.  
Last but not least, the results indicate that quantifying environmental risks is one of 
the biggest problems banks are faced with due to the lack of measurement 
instruments and standardised environmental information. Additionally, banks are not 
able to accurately predict financial losses resulting from environmental risks until 
environmental risk events actually occur; this implies that banks’ reactions to 
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environmental risks are generally responsive, or at least are not sufficiently proactive. 
There is some Australian evidence supporting this explanation. Environmental 
information required by Australian banks to make lending decsions is scarce and 
even the available information is mostly subjective (Ernst & Young 2003; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000, 2001). In addition, different from traditional risks in 
banks’ corporate lending, there are insufficient measurement instruments such as 
widely-accepted and well-developed economic modelling and market impact 
analysis to support the integration of environmental risks into Australian banks’ 
corporate credit processes (Ernst & Young 2003). To the knowledge of the 
researcher, there is no other literature providing relevent explanations in the 
Australian context apart from Ernst & Young (2003) and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2000, 2001).  
Whether environmental covenants have the same functions as financial covenants is 
worthy of investigation. As stated in section 2.5.2 of Chapter 2, traditional covenants 
are able to protect banks using both ex post and ex ante mechnisms (Bazzana 2010; 
Carey et al. 1993; El-Gazzar & Pastena 1991; Paglia 2007; Smith & Warner 1979). 
In alignment with these previous studies, the results of this study indicate that 
covenants can serve as early warning signals by including buffers in the levels 
(tightness) of covenants. As such, covenants can provide an implied requirement for 
corporate customers’ management and trigger dialogue or negotiations between 
banks and corporate customers when covenants are breached. This, in turn, provides 
an opportunity for banks to make a more comprehensive judgement on the quality of 
corporate customers’ environmental management. Covenants can also empower 
banks with the authority to react to minimise banks’ losses resulting from insolvent 
corporate customers. Furthermore, the results show that covenants can provide 
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incentives or disincentives for corporate customers to undertake certain activities. 
This is to restrict corporate customers’ ability to engage in activities that are 
detrimental to banks from an ex ante perspective.  
With regard to environmental covenants, previous literature merely introduces 
environmental covenants as a mechanism to control and monitor environmental risks; 
while little knowledge exists about how environmental covenants are taken into 
effect in managing environmental risks. The results of this study reveal that given the 
dramatic emergence of environmental risk events and the non-quantifiable nature of 
these risks, environmental covenants are unlikely to work as early warning signals. 
However, environmental covenants can provide an incentive or disincentive for 
corporate cusomers’ environmental-related activities, and provide banks with the 
authority to react when there is a covenant breach or default.  
This study also provides overwhelming consensus that environmental covenants are 
established against banks’ comprehensive environmental evaluations on corporate 
customers and negotiations between banks and corporate customers. This is 
discussed below in relation to the following proposition. 
P1b: Environmental covenants are customised in terms of environmental risks 
facing banks. 
The results are in alignment with P1b, which indicate that both the contents and 
tightness of environmental covenants are customised according to environmental 
risks facing banks in corporate lending. As discussed in Chapter 2, environmental 
risk facing banks is determined by the potential consequences of a borrowing firm’s 
environmental issues, the quality of the borrowing firm’s environmental management 
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and its financial capability to deal with the environmental issues. Therefore, 
evaluations of banks’ environmental risk exposure and the particular circumstances 
of their borrowing firms involve the same process.  
The results further indicate that whether environmental covenants in corporate loan 
agreements go beyond the typical requirements of environmental disclosure and 
environmental obligation compliance is determined by the particular circumstances 
of corporate customers. Consistent evidence of this can be found in previous 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Case (1999) indicates that environmental covenants 
need to be established based on the specifics of each case. By conducting a global 
survey of financial institutions about the way they deal with environmental risks, 
Environment and Finance Research Enterprise (1995) also reveals that 55% of the 
respondents include specific environmental covenants in terms of borrowers’ 
environmental issues in loan agreements. Asian Development Bank (1993) and 
Bekhechi (1999) suggest that specific environmental covenants that are defined in 
detail and to the point should be included in loan agreements to motivate more 
effective and efficient remedial actions. In spite of these studies, little knowledge 
regarding whether and how environmental covenants are customised in terms of 
banks’ environmental risk exposure has been evident in previous literature. 
To this end, the results of this study fill this gap from three dimensions which are the 
establishment process, contents and tightness of environmental covenants. The 
results show that environmental covenants are established based on a comprehensive 
analysis of environmental issues at industry/sector level, corporate customer level, 
and transaction level respectively. On the basis of the comprehensive analysis, 
environmental covenants are formulated in negotiations between banks and their 
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corporate customers. Therefore, similar to the traditional covenants in loan 
agreements, specific environmental covenants (additional to the typical 
environmental covenants mentioned above) are likely to be included in loan 
agreements depending on environmental risks facing banks. There are examples 
provided by bankers to exemplify the results. If banks are providing loans for mining 
companies, environmental covenants are likely to be a requirement for the companies 
to retain sufficient cash to meet their rehabilitation liabilities at the end of the period. 
When financing a power station, there are likely to be environmental covenants 
stating that banks will refinance the customer only on the basis that the customer 
invests in renewable energy technology.  
With regard to the tightness of environmental covenants, this study finds that there 
are differences between corporate customers depending on the extent to which they 
expose banks to environmental risks. For corporate customers involved in 
environmentally sensitive activities such as mining operations, banks are likely to 
require environmental disclosure in more detail and depth and to review corporate 
customers’ activities in managing environmental issues more frequently. The results 
further extend previous literature on environmental covenants by embracing 
bargaining power as the explanation for the tightness of environmental covenants. 
The results suggest that corporate customers with strong bargaining power are able to 
negotiate softer environmental covenants given the underlying assumption that they 
usually follow best practice in managing environmental issues. The explanation for 
the underlying assumption is demonstrated in the results. A corporate customer with 
strong bargaining power is generally characterised as having less volatile cash flows, 
higher competitiveness compared to its peers, better capability of management and a 
good reputation. Considering the impairments environmental issues can have on a 
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company’s cash flow volatility, profitability, competitiveness and reputation and 
therefore on its bargaining power, corporate customers tend to be proactive in their 
environmental management. This explanation is in line with the opinion expressed in 
previous literature in Chapter 2, which claims that environmental issues can 
influence borrowers’ cash flows, liquidity, profitability and reputation (Coulson & 
Dixon 1995; Thompson 1998b; Weber, Scholz & Michalik 2010).  
In sum, research question 1 seeks to address how environmental risks in banks’ 
corporate lending are associated with loan covenants. Based on the literature 
pertaining to research question 1, this study proposes three levels of impacts. These 
are the form (financial covenants and non-financial covenants), the contents and the 
tightness of environmental covenants. The conclusion for research question 1 is that 
there are environmental covenants in loan agreements to manage environmental risks, 
and that these are not in the form of financial covenants. In addition, the contents and 
tightness of environmental covenants are tailored in terms of the particular 
circumstances of each corporate customer and thus are compatible with banks’ 
environmental risk exposure. However, the results further indicate that 
environmental risks cannot be sufficiently managed by just environmental covenants. 
A well-developed system that combines environmental covenants and financial 
covenants in managing environmental risks is a potential solution. The practice that 
banks undertake to compensate for the insufficiency of environmental covenants in 
managing environmental risks is regular reviews. A bank’s regular review is useful 
in keeping an eye on corporate customers’ on-going performance and changes in 
their circumstances.  
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The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 indicates that theoretically the cost of bank 
loans can also be used to manage environmental risks in corporate lending. The 
following section discusses the results regarding the association between 
environmental risks and the cost of bank loans and further articulates the 
contributions of this research.  
6.2.3 RQ2: How are environmental risks in corporate lending associated 
with the cost of bank loans? 
To address this research question, Proposition 2 is considered.  
 P2:  Environmental risks facing banks are factored into the cost of bank loans.  
The results show that Proposition 2 is supported when environmental risks facing 
banks impact on the credit ratings of corporate customers. To the knowledge of this 
researcher, there is very little literature about the consideration of environmental 
risks in the cost of corporate bank loans. The study undertaken by Case (1999) is the 
most thorough in the existing literature. Case (1999) claims that the environmental 
foci of banks in corporate lending involve the evaluations of environmental risks and 
their impact on credit quality of corporate customers. In addition, Case (1999) 
indicates that there is a potential for adjusting the cost of bank loans to take account 
of environmental risks when these risks impact on the credit ratings of corporate 
customers. However, due to the scarcity of quantifiable information regarding 
environmental risks, and banks’ concern with price competitiveness in the market, 
there are few cases of adjusting the cost of bank loans for these risks (Case 1999). 
The findings presented by Case are based on UK banks’ corporate lending. This 
study extends the research by Case in two aspects.  
 
214 
 
 
First, this study investigates the impact of environmental risks on the cost of bank 
loans in the Australian context and yields different results. The results indicate that 
environmental risks facing major Australian banks will be factored into the cost of 
bank loans when environmental risks impact on credit ratings of corporate customers. 
That is, corporate customers who are environmentally irresponsible do not 
necessarily receive a higher cost of bank loans, while corporate customers who are 
environmentally oriented are not necessarily rewarded with a lower cost of bank 
loans. It is the changes to their credit ratings resulting from their environmental-
related activities that lead to changes in the cost of bank loans. Major Australian 
banks each have an internal credit rating model for corporate customers, and 
amendment of the credit ratings on the basis of expert judgements is allowed where 
appropriate. Environmental risks, one of the considerations in non-financial 
evaluations of corporate customers, are included in these subjective judgements 
rather than being a specific input of the credit rating models of major Australian 
banks. Second, the regulatory, economic and institutional circumstances facing banks 
are developing rapidly and thus banks’ lending experiences and practices are 
evolving over time. As such, this study extends the existing literature in terms of 
time period as it is conducted during the years 2010 and 2011. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that to have environmental risks factored into 
Australian banks’ credit rating models for corporate customers, environmental 
legislation and consumers’ buying behaviour play a critical role95. To this end, this 
study fills a gap in previous research by demonstrating a potential way that makes 
                                                 
95
 Buying behaviour is manifested as whether consumers are willing to pay more for environmentally 
friendly products and services. 
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banks’ credit rating models incorporate the impact of environmental risks facing 
them on credit ratings of corporate customers.  
In summary, research question 2 asks how environmental risks are associated with 
the cost of bank loans in banks’ corporate lending. The results show that 
environmental risks will not be factored into the cost of bank loans unless they 
impact on credit ratings of corporate customers. Given that there are certain 
circumstances for environmental risks to be reflected in the cost of bank loans, there 
is not a linear association between the cost of bank loans and environmental risks. 
There is also an indication that the cost of bank loans is not considered as a tool to 
manage environmental risks given that loan pricing is not only a risk-oriented 
process but also a process involving commercial and market considerations. The 
following section brings together the conclusions about the two preceding research 
questions to address the research problem.  
6.2.4 Conceptual framework based on the results  
Addressing the research questions is the initial stage in elucidating the conclusions 
on the research problem. This section provides synthesised conclusions by 
demonstrating a conceptual framework that is based on the results of interviews with 
selected executives in major Australian banks. This conceptual framework is 
confined to corporate lending in the Australian context (see Figure 6.2). This 
framework is a comparison of the conceptual framework presented in Figure 2.4, 
Chapter 2, and demonstrates to what extent the theoretical framework shown in 
Figure 3.2, Chapter 3 is supported by the results. The conceptual framework 
presented in Figure 2.4 derives from previous literature that is based on banks’ 
 
216 
 
 
overall lending businesses across several countries rather than just major Australian 
banks’ corporate lending. The theoretical framework shown in Figure 3.2 derives 
from agency theory and previous literature related to the associations between 
environmental risks and 1) bank loan covenants, and 2) the cost of bank loans.  
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The results support previous literature by indicating that environmental risks 
manifest in three dimensions in major Australian banks’ corporate lending: direct 
risk (lender liability), indirect risk (credit risk) and reputational risk. The results also 
confirm that banks’ environmental risk exposure is determined by the significance of 
the potential financial and reputational consequences of environmental risk events, 
the probability of the environmental risk events occurring and the financial capability 
of corporate customers to deal with their potential environmental consequences. It is 
clearly indicated by this study that high quality environmental management by 
corporate customers lowers the likelihood of environmental risk events occurring, 
ceteris paribus. What makes it rational is the statement that corporate customers 
managing environmental issues well usually have less volatile cash flows, more 
profitability and greater competitiveness. The financial resources that corporate 
customers have available can compensate for the financial consequences of emerging 
environmental risk events to a certain degree.  
Particularly, the results confirm that environmental covenants are used by major 
Australian banks to manage environmental risks facing them in corporate lending. 
This point of view is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical framework 
shown in Figure 3.2 that environmental covenants will be present in bank loan 
agreements. The results indicate that the establishment of environmental covenants is 
based on a process of identifying and assessing environmental risks. That is, the 
contents and tightness of environmental covenants are tailored in terms of banks’ 
environmental risk exposure. For corporate customers who expose banks to low 
environmental risks, environmental covenants are generally the typical 
environmental obligation compliance and periodic environmental reporting 
requirements. For environmental risks that are significant to banks, the contents of 
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environmental covenants are likely to go beyond the typical environmental covenants, 
and environmental covenants are tighter. To assure the applicability and the 
effectiveness of environmental covenants, there are negotiations between banks and 
corporate customers that eventually shape the contents and tightness of 
environmental covenants included in loan agreements. In this regard, the prediction 
that environmental covenants are customised in terms of banks’ environmental risk 
exposure in theoretical framework (Figure 3.2) is supported.  
By comparison, the conceptual framework shown in Figure 2.4 does not provide 
information about the establishment process of environmental covenants. In addition, 
it is indicated in this conceptual framework that environmental covenants do not 
usually go beyond the requirements of environmental obligation compliance, 
periodic environmental reporting and/or to undertaking certain environmental 
management activities. Further, there is no discussion about the tightness of 
environmental covenants in previous literature.  
According to the conceptual framework in Chapter 2, environmental risks are 
theoretically expected to be factored into the cost of bank loans in banks’ lending 
businesses, while they generally have no impact on the cost of bank loans in practice. 
To this end, the conceptual framework based on the results (Figure 6.2) indicates that 
the cost of bank loans is not considered as a mechanism to manage environmental 
risks in major Australian banks’ corporate lending as expected. The cost of bank 
loans will not reflect environmental risks unless environmental risks lead to changes 
in credit ratings of corporate customers. Whether there are changes and the 
significance of the changes are based on the environmental risk identification and 
assessment, and expert judgements from credit analysts and/or Credit Officers. The 
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theoretical framework (Figure 3.2) predicts that environmental risks are factored into 
the cost of bank loans in banks’ lending businesses. Based on the above discussion, 
this prediction is supported only when environmental risks impact on credit ratings 
of borrowing firms.  
Consequently, there are both alignments and divergences between the two conceptual 
frameworks shown in Figure 2.4 and Figure 6.2 respectively. Two propositions in 
theoretical framework (Figure 3.2) are supported by the results, while the third one is 
supported conditionally.  
Major Australian banks’ environmental sustainability transformation in corporate 
lending is analysed as an emerging theme and the results indicate that these banks are 
oriented to environmental sustainability in their corporate lending. To the knowledge 
of this researcher, there is no literature articulating Australian banks’ environmental 
sustainability transformation in terms of their environmental practices in corporate 
lending. To this end, this study, to a certain degree, fills a gap in the extant literature. 
In sum, the results and their contributions to the literature and theory are discussed in 
this section. The next section presents the implications for practice.  
6.3 Implications for Practice 
The results are helpful for the establishment of a more systematic and proactive 
approach to environmental practices in Australian banks’ corporate lending. Several 
implications of the results for practice are discussed as follows.  
First, this study illustrates the way major Australian banks’ ERM fits into each stage 
of the corporate credit process and articulates the activities involved at each stage. As 
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a result, the research is able to inform major Australian banks of their progress on the 
journey towards environmental sustainability in corporate lending. In addition, as the 
aggregated results in relation to environmental practices of participating banks are 
provided, each participating bank is able to obtain insights into improvement 
opportunities regarding its current environmental policies and practices. 
Consequently, this information can inform major Australian banks about what should 
be on the agenda to achieve environmental sustainability in their corporate lending.  
Second, this study presents the attributes of environmental risks and indicates that 
environmental covenants are insufficient to manage environmental risks on their own 
given the attributes of environmental risks. This implies that environmental 
covenants and financial covenants can be integrated into one systematic mechanism 
to manage environmental risks. As such, this study can provide major Australian 
banks with an insight into their future effort in managing environmental risks. This 
study also suggests the application of a Material Adverse Change Clause in 
managing environmental risks. This Clause entitles a bank to the authority in 
reviewing its loan where necessary during the life of the loan.  
Furthermore, this study reveals that environmental risks are not generally factored 
into the cost of bank loans unless they impact on corporate customers’ credit ratings; 
expert judgements that are based on environmental analysis determine whether there 
is an impact and if so, the significance of the impact. In light of this, this study 
provides insights for major Australian banks regarding enhancing their internal credit 
rating criteria by including environmental factors. By indicating that ERM should be 
considered as an integral part of banks’ corporate credit processes and as ‘business as 
usual’, this study implies that personnel who are experts in both the corporate credit 
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process and ERM are needed for the development of banks’ environmental 
sustainability. This has implications for banks’ staff training activities.  
Third, this study provides insights for corporate customers about their environmental 
management policies and practices by indicating which environmental factors major 
Australian banks focus on in corporate lending. This study indicates that corporate 
customers’ environmental management quality and their reputation related to 
environmental issues are what major Australian banks are most concerned about 
from an environmental point of view. Additionally, corporate customers’ bargaining 
power in their relationship with banks and corporate customers’ long-term viability 
are also influenced by these factors. In this regard, corporate customers can benefit 
from cultivating an environmental sustainability culture from executive level 
throughout their organisations. Furthermore, the results rationalize the connection 
between environmental management quality of corporate customers and their access 
to bank loans. With high quality environmental management, corporate customers 
are likely to expose banks to lower environmental risks than they otherwise would. 
Therefore, environmental risks are less likely to impact on the credit ratings of 
corporate customers and banks’ reputation, which leads to easier access to bank loans.  
Last but not least, the results indicate that major Australian banks follow their due 
diligence processes in making corporate lending decisions. Although the due 
diligence process is not sufficiently sophisticated, it is part of the evolution by banks 
towards environmental sustainability. In light of this, this study provides a platform 
for NGOs to understand major Australian banks’ corporate lending decision-making.   
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6.4 Limitations  
Despite the significant contributions of this study, there are a number of limitations. 
First, this study is based on the Australian context which is likely to limit the 
generalizability of the results to other countries. Countries vary in terms of their 
financial markets, environmental legislation and implementation approaches (Ernst 
& Young 2003; Jenkins et al. 2002). In addition, this study focuses on major 
Australian banks’ corporate lending, which involves major listed and non-listed 
companies on banks’ corporate lending books. As such, the results may not be 
applicable for lending to small or medium sized customers. Further, given that there 
are different premises for corporate lending and project financing, it is likely that the 
results cannot be applied to project financing. However, this is of little concern as the 
Equator Principles provide guidance for banks’ ERM in project financing. 
Second, the sample size of this study is small, since it involves only three major 
Australian banks and eight senior executive bankers who are responsible either for 
corporate lending or for ERM. Given that there are four major Australian banks in 
total, the responding rate from the sample banks is 75%. Most of the bankers who are 
familiar with both their banks’ environmental policies and practices in each 
participating bank are included in the interviews, despite their small numbers. In the 
following section, it is suggested that future research should include other Australian 
banks and independent external experts conducting environmental impact 
assessments for banks in corporate lending.  
Third, the data triangulation through a variety of data sources helps to improve the 
reliability of the data by testing consistency among data from different sources, and 
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enhances the data validity by providing cross-data validity checks (Creswell 2009; 
Neuman 2006; Patton 2002). This study relies merely on interview data and no other 
document such as a sample loan agreement from each participating bank is available 
for triangulation, which is likely to cause concern regarding the reliability of the 
results. A review of the published environmental policies, corporate responsibility 
reports and banks’ website information when developing interview checklists help 
improve the reliability of the collected data. However, due to confidentiality and 
market competitiveness concern, the limitation outlined above is unable to be 
eliminated in this study.  
Fourth, there is an implication in agency theory that the inclusion of covenants in 
debt agreements impacts on the cost of debt (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The results 
do not reveal a consistent association between environmental covenants and the cost 
of bank loans. Therefore, while this study contributes to validate the relevance of 
agency theory for environmental risks in the bank-corporate customer relationship, 
the results do not sufficiently serve to extend the contribution to all implications of 
agency theory. Due to the limited resources and scope of this study, this limitation is 
not able to be addressed.  
Fifth, this study relies on perceptions and experiences of bankers and the 
interpretations by the researcher to provide insights into environmental policies and 
practices for both banks and their corporate customers. Biases are likely to arise due 
to the subjective conceptualizations which, to a large degree, are influenced by the 
opinions, experiences and knowledge of both the researcher and the bankers 
(Creswell 2009). The researcher has put every effort into overcoming the possible 
biases, and this was further discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, despite a bank’s 
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credit process usually starting with the bank’s lending policy, this study focuses 
merely on major Australian banks’ environmental practices in corporate lending. It is 
suggested in the next section that this study be extended to include investigations of 
banks’ policies regarding environmental risks.  
Last but not least, this study does not address how to benchmark environmental risks 
into high, medium and low or how to price them. However, due to a lack of 
standardised environmental information and appropriate instruments for measuring 
the magnitude of environmental risks, this limitation is far beyond the capability of 
this study. Additionally, this study does not address how banks can technically price 
environmental risks given that technical evaluation of environmental risks and their 
resultant costing and pricing are usually undertaken by independent external 
environmental experts. This falls outside of the research scope. Furthermore, there is 
an increasing awareness among banks that environmental issues of corporate 
customers result in both risks and opportunities for banks (Jeucken & Bouma 2001). 
However, this study only focuses on risks facing banks resulting from environmental 
issues rather than the opportunities.  
While these potential limitations are identified and acknowledged, they do not 
detract from the significance of the results. The limitations provide opportunities for 
future research, some of which are discussed in the following section.  
6.5 Directions for Future Research 
Based on the results and limitations of this study, a number of suggestions for future 
research are identified and presented in this section. First, replicating this study in 
other contexts with similar financial markets and environmental legislative situations 
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would help to further generalise the results. Similar studies could also be conducted 
to include other Australian domestic banks. Furthermore, as loans to small and 
medium sized companies are also a key area in banks’ lending businesses, it would 
be interesting to investigate whether and how environmental risks are integrated in 
this lending process.  
Second, instead of purposive sampling, a variation of this study could be conducted 
based on a random sampling of personnel working in corporate lending and ERM for 
lending businesses. This type of research could be expected to provide a more ‘grass 
roots’ description of banks’ environmental practices and the stages banks are up to in 
implementing their environmental sustainability transformation.  
Third, further investigation of a systematic and comprehensive ERM mechanism 
combining environmental covenants and financial covenants is worthwhile. The 
results indicate that environmental covenants on their own are insufficient to manage 
environmental risks in banks’ corporate lending. 
Finally, further investigation regarding costing and pricing of environmental risks 
through interviews with environmental experts has the potential to play an important 
role in promoting banks’ environmental sustainability. This study provides senior 
executive bankers’ perceptions about integrating environmental risks into banks’ 
corporate credit processes. However, they do not reveal details about quantifying and 
pricing environmental risks due to technical requirements. Interviews with 
environmental experts could shed some light on the quantification and pricing of 
environmental risks.  
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8 APPENDICIES 
Appendix 1 Specimen Environmental Undertakings and Covenants in Term 
Loan Facility Letters (Case 1999) 
The specimen clausing highlights in bold type the most important and commonly 
used clausing. The following undertakings and covenants shall be deemed to be 
incorporated into the Loan Agreement and any provisions relating to undertakings 
and/or covenants in the Loan Agreement shall apply thereto:  
(a) to indemnify the Bank and its employees and agents fully at all times on 
demand (without prejudice to the bank’s other rights) for any expense, loss, 
damage or liability incurred by them directly or indirectly as a result of any 
actual or alleged failure by the borrower to comply with any undertaking or 
covenant in this facility letter, or any of its obligations under environmental law, 
environmental permits or any other applicable law relating to the Borrower 
and/or its business and/or the property; 
(b) to comply with all environmental laws and to obtain, maintain and comply 
with all necessary environmental permits; 
(c) to provide to the Bank: a copy of any environmental report at least once 
every []; and full details (are not less than two monthly intervals) of the steps taken 
by the Borrower to comply with recommendations contained in any environmental 
report; 
(d) to give notice to the Bank of any prosecution, action (including any 
enforcement or prohibition action), civil claim, non-compliance with 
environmental laws, contamination of the property, statutory notice served or 
issued by a regulatory authority in respect of, or relating to, environmental laws 
and/or environmental permits or the existence of any environmental condition 
whatsoever which could have a material adverse effect on the value of any such 
land as security to the Bank; 
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(e) not to create or permit to subsist any statutory charge under environmental laws 
on any of the properties; 
(f) within two months after such notification given under paragraph (d) above, to 
inform the Bank of the steps taken by the Borrower to deal with the matters 
described thererin and thereafter to keep the Bank informed (at not less than two 
monthly intervals) about the circumstances and the steps being taken; 
(g) to give notice to the Bank of any new or additional requirements imposed or 
intended to be imposed on the Borrower or any of the property under 
environmental laws and/or environmental permits including notice of any 
indication given to the Borrower that any of the property is or may be listed or 
described in any register maintained pursuant to Part IIA of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 or that any charge is or may be imposed under 
environmental laws;  
(h) on notice having been served by the Bank on the Borrower, to provide the Bank 
with the respective notices, information, details and documents described in 
paragraphs (c)-(f) inclusive above whether or not the prosecution, action, civil claim, 
non-compliance, contamination, statutory notice, requirement or circumstance could 
have, or the environmental report could provide evidence relating to, an adverse 
effect on the value of any of the property or on the ability of the Borrower to conduct 
any of its business or to fulfil its obligations under the Loan Agreement save where 
the provision of documentation would result in loss of legal privilege; 
(i) to provide the Bank with full information and/or details of any action, lobbying, 
campaign, boycott or other measures taken by or on behalf of any residents, pressure, 
action or environmental group or organisation or committee in respect of the 
Borrower and/or its business and/or the property and/or any measures or lack of 
measures taken by the Borrower in respect of, or relating to, the environment; 
(j) to commission (at the Borrower’s cost) an environmental report satisfactory to the 
Bank on the Borrower and the Property every [] years; 
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(k) to maintain (at the expense of the Borrower) an insurance policy or policies 
covering such liability of the Borrower under environmental laws as the Bank may 
require with such endorsements (which may include undertakings by the insurer to 
the Bank) as the Bank may require with the insurance policy or policies having been 
approved by the Bank in its absolute discretion; and at yearly intervals and whenever 
requested by the Bank to provide the Bank with  a copy, certified a true copy on 
behalf of the Borrower, of the insurance policy or policies with premium receipts or 
other evidence of the payment thereof and acceptance by the insurer; and where 
(subject always to paragraph (h) above) in the case of paragraphs (d) and (g) such 
prosecution, action, civil claim, non-compliance, contamination, statutory notice, 
requirement or circumstance could have [or in the case of paragraph (c) such 
environmental report provides evidence relating to] an adverse effect on the value of 
any of the property or on the ability of the Borrower to conduct any of its business or 
to fulfil its obligations under the Loan Agreement. 
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Appendix 2 The Value of Environmental Covenants in Bank Loan Agreements
96
 
A bank was asked to advance $10million to a company operating in the chemicals 
sector. Due to the high environmental risk inherent in the sector, the bank required 
that environmental conditions were incorporated into the loan agreement, including 
the requirement for the borrower to make representations as to the absence of any 
existing environmental claims or liabilities. As a result of these conditions the 
chemicals company was obliged to reveal that one of its production plants had 
caused contamination of underlying groundwater and a nearby river. The company 
faced a clean-up cost of $3million. Taking into account the assets taken as security 
this was considered to be a material issue to the deal. The bank therefore successfully 
secured a guarantee from the chemical company’s parent to underwrite all clean-up 
costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96
 The real example is based on EBRD’s own experiences and discussions with staff from financial 
institutions. However, they have not been verified and EBRD cannot guarantee that every detail is 
accurate.  
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Appendix 3 Consent Form 
                                     
 
Consent Form to Participate in Research 
 
Project Title: Environmental Risks, Bank Loan Covenants and the Cost of Bank 
Loans: An Australian Study  
Researcher: Yinshuo Xu 
Doctoral Student at the University of Southern Queensland 
Purpose of the Research:  
The purpose of this research is to explore whether and how environmental risks 
facing banks in their corporate lending are associated with bank loan covenants and 
the cost of bank loans in the context of Australia. In the first instance, this study is 
going to investigate whether and how Australian banks integrate environmental risks 
into their corporate credit processes. Second, based on the broader framework, this 
study will focus particularly on whether and how environmental risks facing banks 
are associated with loan covenants and the cost of bank loans.  
The aim of this research is to help understand Australian banks’ considerations of 
environmental risks in their corporate credit processes in general, rather than assess 
or rate the banks according to their environmental policies or practices. We expect to 
establish whether or not Australian banks place importance on environmental risks 
and how much weight it is given by bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans. 
The information will be collected from senior executive bankers being responsible 
either for corporate lending decision-making or dealing with environmental risks in 
corporate lending in major Australian banks.  
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The conversationally based interview will require approximately 60 minutes of the 
participant’s time. 
Once this study is completed, the analysed report will be provided for you. It is 
expected to assist banks in developing environmental policies, improving 
environmental practices and provide banks with the insights into the use of covenants 
and the cost of bank loans to manage environmental risks in corporate lending.  
 
 
I ______________, have been invited to participate in the above research and 
consent to take part in it.  
My agreement is based on the understanding of the research’s purpose. I am 
informed that I can refuse to answer any questions or withdraw from the research at 
any time without explanation. I consent to the publishing of the analysed results with 
my identity not being revealed. 
 
Signature (Participant):                                                              _____/____/____ 
 
Signature (Researcher):                                                             _____/_____/_____ 
 
Note: Should you have any concern about the conduct of this research project, please 
contact the USQ Ethics Officer, Office of Research & Higher Degrees, University of 
Southern Queensland, West Street, Toowoomba QLD 4350, Telephone (07) 4631 
2690, email: ethics@usq.edu.au.  
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Appendix 4 Cover Letter 
Cover Letter 
 
Dear ____ 
 
Subject: Environmental Risks, Bank Loan Covenants and the Cost of Bank 
Loans: An Australian Study 
 
I am currently engaged in this research at University of Southern Queensland. I am 
pursuing my PhD degree under China Scholarship Council which is a non-profit 
institution with legal person status affiliated with the Ministry of Education, China.  
 
The purpose of this research is to explore whether and how environmental risks are 
related to bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans in Australian banks’ 
corporate lending. In the first instance, this study is going to investigate whether and 
how Australian banks integrate environmental risks when they process corporate 
loan applications. Second, based on the broader framework, this study will focus 
particularly on whether and how environmental risks are associated with loan 
covenants and the cost of bank loans.  
 
The attached interview checklist is to obtain the information regarding environmental 
risks facing banks in their corporate credit processes. The questions of whether and 
how environmental risks are associated with bank loan covenants and the cost of 
bank loans in Australian banks’ corporate lending are expected to be addressed. 
 
Your participation in this research will result in the following benefits to your bank:  
 The analysed results of this research will be provided; 
 The implication for banks’ environmental policies and practices in corporate 
lending will be available. 
 
The ethical committee of University of Southern Queensland has approved the 
research. There are no anticipated physical, psychological or economic risks to you. I 
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also would like to ensure that your participation is completely voluntary. You have 
the right to refuse answering any questions or withdraw from the study at any time.  
 
Your responses will be recorded under your permission and the names of you and the 
bank will not be identified in the analysed results. 
 
If you have any inquiries or suggestions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 
Xu.Yinshuo@usq.edu.au or 61 401542470. 
 
Thank you  
Yours sincerely, 
 
Yinshuo Xu 
PhD student 
School of Accounting, Economics & Finance 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Australian Centre for Sustainable Business and Development 
University of Southern Queensland 
Xu.Yinshuo@usq.edu.au 
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Appendix 5 Interview Checklist 1 
Environmental Risks, Bank Loan Covenants and the Cost of Bank Loans: An 
Australian Study  
Guiding Question 1:  What are the main areas of focus for your bank’s lending 
businesses and how much weight is given to each area? (e.g., project finance, term 
loans, revolving loans, facilities) 
 
Guiding Question 2: How does your bank process corporate loan applications? (The 
indicators for the corporate loan application approval decision) 
Key issues:  
 the weight of each indicator;  
 Does this vary between the different types of loans (e.g., corporate loan, 
business loan)? 
 
Guiding Question 3: What is the process to negotiate loan contracts between your 
bank and borrowers? 
Key issues:  
 the initial provider of  loan covenants; 
 What are the determinants of loan covenants? 
 What are the functions of loan covenants for your bank, risk protection, early 
warning, extra comfort or others?  
 loan covenants comes first in bank loan contracts or the cost of loans; 
 the determinants of the initial cost of loans in loan contracts;  
 Do renegotiations of loan covenants and the cost of loans often happen? 
 Do the different bargaining powers of different firms matter in determining 
loan covenants and the cost of bank loans? 
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Guiding Question 4: How does your bank assess risks in its corporate lending? 
Key issues:  
 the main risks your bank are considering in corporate lending; 
 Are environmental risks considered? If so, how do they impact on your bank? 
 definitions of corporate environmental performance (borrowers’ 
environmental performance) and environmental risks; 
 the evaluation of corporate environmental performance and the assessment of 
environmental risks;  
 the weights your bank put on corporate environmental performance and 
environmental risks in corporate loan application assessment;  
 the association between corporate environmental performance and the cost of 
bank loans; 
 the association between environmental risks and the cost of bank loans; 
 Does your bank make distinctions between different types of loans when 
assessing risks in lending businesses?  
 
Guiding Question 5: Are there environmental covenants in the loan contracts 
between your bank and the borrowers? 
Key issues:  
 the nature of environmental covenants (In what forms the environmental 
covenants exist, affirmative covenants putting requirements or negative 
covenants imposing restrictions, financial covenants based on accounting 
numbers or non-financial covenants?); whether your bank can provide some 
samples about environmental covenants. 
 How does your bank customise environmental covenants (number, 
restrictiveness and type) to account for the various environmental risks?  
 How are corporate environmental performance and environmental risks 
related to environmental covenants?  
 How are environmental covenants related to the cost of bank loans;  
 the application of the Equator Principles; 
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 If there is no environmental covenants, what other mechanisms (if any) are 
used to manage environmental risks in loan contracts? 
 
Do you have any suggestions in refining my research topic which is ‘How are 
environmental risks associated with bank loan covenants and the cost of bank 
loan in Australian banks’ corporate lending? Any suggestion is welcomed. 
Thank you very much for your time! 
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Appendix 6 Interview Checklist 2 
Environmental Risks, Bank Loan Covenants and the Cost of Bank Loans: An 
Australian Study  
 
Guiding Question 1:  What are the categorisations of your bank’s lending 
businesses and how much weight is given to each categorisation? 
Key issues: 
 What is the basis to categorise the bank’s lending businesses? 
 How much weight is assigned to corporate lending (if your bank has this 
categorisation or the similar categorisation)? 
 What are the dominant products in corporate loans?(e.g., term loans, 
overdrafts) 
 Are corporate loans usually secured? 
 
Guiding Question 2: How does your bank process corporate loan applications? (The 
stages in this process to approve corporate loan applications) 
Key issues:  
 the activities in each stage; 
 If there are due diligence and annual review, where do they fit in?   
 How are each stage and its activities related to bank loan covenants?  
 How are each stage and its activities related to the cost of bank loans?  
 Whether and how bargaining power of corporate clients in processing loan 
applications matters. 
 Whether the corporate loan approval process and the answers to above points 
vary among different categorisations of the bank’s lending businesses. 
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Guiding Question 3: What is the process to establish corporate loan documentations? 
Key issues:  
 the initial provider and the determinants of  loan covenants; 
 What are the functions of loan covenants for your bank?  
 the determinants of the initial cost of loans in loan contracts; 
 How are the process to establish loan covenants and the process to determine 
the cost of bank loans related to each other? 
 How do loan covenants and the cost of bank loans relate to each other? 
 When do renegotiations of loan covenants and the cost of loans happen? 
 How do different bargaining powers of corporate clients matter in 
establishing loan covenants and the cost of bank loans? 
 
Guiding Question 4: How does your bank assess and manage risks in corporate 
lending? 
Key issues:  
 the main risks your bank are considering in corporate lending; 
 How to manage the identified risks in corporate lending? 
 definition of environmental risks in the bank’s corporate lending; 
 the principles of assessing environmental risks in the bank’s corporate 
lending;  
 How do environmental risks in corporate lending impact on the bank? 
 the weights your bank put on environmental risks in the corporate loan 
approval process;  
 the association between environmental risks and the cost of bank loans; 
 the association between environmental risks and bank loan covenants; 
 What are the mechanisms/systems used to manage environmental risks in 
corporate loans? 
 Does your bank make distinctions between different categorisations of 
lending businesses when assessing and managing risks?  
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 For a corporate client with superior environmental performance, whether and 
how bank loan covenants and the cost of bank loans reflect the superior 
environmental performance.  
 
Guiding Question 5: Are there environmental covenants in the loan documentations 
between your bank and corporate clients? 
Key issues:  
 the nature of environmental covenants (In what forms the environmental 
covenants exist, affirmative covenants putting requirements or negative 
covenants imposing restrictions; financial covenants based on accounting 
numbers or non-financial covenants?); whether your bank can provide some 
samples about the environmental covenants in corporate lending. 
 How does your bank customise environmental covenants (form, content, 
number and tightness) to account for the varying environmental risks?  
 How are environmental covenants related to the cost of bank loans;  
 the implications for corporate lending by adopting the Equator Principles in 
project finance. 
 
 
Do you have any suggestions in refining my research topic which is ‘How are 
environmental risks associated with bank loan covenants and the cost of bank 
loan in Australian banks’ corporate lending? Any suggestion is welcomed. 
Thank you very much for your time! 
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Appendix 7 Ethics Clearance 
 
